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Tsunami have the potential to cause significant disruptions to society, including damage to 
infrastructure, critical to the every-day operation of society.  Effective risk management is 
required to reduce the potential tsunami impacts to them. Christchurch city, situated on the 
eastern coast of New Zealand’s South Island, is exposed to a number of far-field tsunami hazards.  
Although the tsunami hazard has been well identified for Christchurch city infrastructure, the 
likely impacts have not been well constrained. To support effective risk management a credible 
and realistic infrastructure impact model is required to inform risk management planning.  
 
The objectives of this thesis are to assess the impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure from a 
credible, hypothetical far-field tsunami scenario. To achieve this an impact assessment process 
is adopted, using tsunami hazard and exposure measures to determine asset vulnerability and 
subsequent impacts. However, the thesis identified a number of knowledge gaps in infrastructure 
vulnerability to tsunami. The thesis addresses this by using two approaches: a tsunami damage 
matrix; and the development of tsunami fragility functions. The tsunami damage matrix pools 
together tsunami impacts on infrastructure literature, and post-event field observations. It 
represents the most comprehensive ‘look-up’ resource for tsunami impacts to infrastructure to 
date. This damage matrix can inform the assessment of tsunami impacts on Christchurch city 
infrastructure by providing a measure of damage likelihood at various hazard intensities. A more 
robust approach to tsunami vulnerability of infrastructure are fragility functions, which are also 
developed in this thesis. These were based on post-event tsunami surveys of the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ 
earthquake tsunami in Japan. The fragility functions are limited to road and bridge infrastructure, 
but represent the highest resolution measure of vulnerability for the given assets. As well as 
providing a measure of damage likelihood for a given tsunami hazard intensity, these also indicate 
a level of asset damage. 
 
The impact assessment process, and synthesized vulnerability measures, are used to run tsunami 
impact models for Christchurch infrastructure to determine the probability of asset damage 
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occurring and to determine if impact will reach or exceed a given damage state. The models 
suggest that infrastructure damage is likely to occur in areas exposed to tsunami inundation in 
this scenario, with significant damage identified for low elevation roads and bridges. The results 
are presented and discussed in the context of the risk management framework, with emphasis 
on using risk assessment to inform risk treatment, monitoring and review.  
 
In summary, this thesis A) advances tsunami vulnerability and impact assessment methodologies 
for infrastructure and B) provides a tsunami impact assessment framework for Christchurch city 
infrastructure which will inform infrastructure tsunami risk management for planners, emergency 
managers and lifelines groups. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction and Hazard Background 
1.1  Context of study 
Tsunami have the potential to cause significant disruptions to society including damage to 
infrastructure, critical to the every-day operation of society. Christchurch city, situated on the 
eastern coast of New Zealand’s South Island, is exposed to a number of far-field tsunami hazards 
sourced from the Peruvian-Chilean subduction zone off the South American coast. Although the 
tsunami hazard has been well identified for Christchurch city infrastructure, the likely impacts 
have not been well studied. Infrastructure vulnerable to tsunami includes transport corridors, 
water networks, telecommunications, port facilities and the electricity network (Centre for 
Advanced Engineering 1997).  Effective risk management is required to reduce the potential 
tsunami impacts to Christchurch city infrastructure and in support of this, a credible and realistic 
infrastructure impact model is required to inform risk management planning.   
 
Infrastructure is vital to the post-disaster recovery and normal operation of society. 
Transportation networks play an important role in evacuation and provision of aid (Frangopol & 
Bocchini 2012; Nakanishi et al. 2014; Saatcioglu 2007).  Transportation also provides the means 
to access damaged sectors of other infrastructure networks and accelerate recovery. Many 
infrastructure networks are interdependent, (e.g. electricity for wastewater treatment) (Centre for 
Advanced Engineering 1997) and undamaged buildings may be uninhabitable without 
infrastructure services.  
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Damage to infrastructure can make up 20% of the total economic cost of a tsunami disaster, 
mostly attributed to transport asset impacts (Marchand et al. 2009). It is therefore necessary to 
mitigate tsunami impacts prior to the event (including site exclusion and design planning) and/or 
to restore the functionality of these networks as soon as possible following a tsunami. 
International case-studies have shown that the impacts associated with a tsunami can be reduced 
through appropriate risk reduction techniques (Horspool & Fraser 2015). The scale and spatial 
distribution of tsunami impacts on infrastructure will determine the impacts on population and 
the efficiency of post-disaster relief and recovery (Gill et al. 2015). This means that a credible 
and realistic infrastructure impact model is required to improve the management and mitigation 
of tsunami risk in Christchurch. 
1.2  Research Aims and Objectives  
The aim of this research is to assess the impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure from a 
hypothetical South America-sourced tsunami, by developing methodology for an infrastructure 
impact model.  
The objectives of the present research are to 
 Review and identify the impacts on infrastructure following significant tsunami reported 
in international case studies, from relevant literature and field observations. 
 Implement impact assessment processes to prove the effectiveness of multi-risk analysis 
software concepts for tsunami impact modelling on infrastructure. 
 Provide a credible and realistic tsunami impact model, based on existing hazard models, 
for a hypothetical tsunami scenario. 
  Assess the tsunami exposure and impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure. 
 
This research has been conducted in parallel with that of Scheele (2016), which provides a 
tsunami impact assessment of Christchurch city buildings from the same hypothetical scenario 
as that herein. The research was requested jointly by the Canterbury Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management (CDEM) group, Environment Canterbury and the National Institute of 
Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA). A $5,000 scholarship was awarded by Environment 
Canterbury to conduct this study.  Both studies are in support of a Tier 4 national Civil Defence 
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and Emergency Management (CDEM) exercise taking place in 2016 (Ministry of Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management 2016) and this research has been commissioned in part to 
contribute towards the realism of the given scenario for participants. 
1.3  Risk Management Framework 
This section presents the risk management framework and how it acts as the conceptual 
framework for this study. The risk management framework (Figure 1.1) was developed to 
provide a systematic and robust approach to reducing risk through: risk identification, risk 
analysis, risk evaluation, and risk treatment (Standards New Zealand 2009). The focus of this 
thesis is to assess impacts on infrastructure and this is achieved by embedding an impact 
assessment process within the risk analysis stage of the risk management framework.  
A credible tsunami impact model for infrastructure will provide the means to better manage and 
mitigate the risk from a far-field tsunami in Christchurch city. It would serve to isolate 
vulnerabilities in infrastructure networks, providing information enabling emergency managers 
and planners to implement appropriate mitigation strategies.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Risk management framework (Standards New Zealand 2009) 
The terms used in the risk management framework are defined by the following equation 
(modified from Power 2013): 
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Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability 
 
Hazard is defined as the interaction between society (exposure), an extreme natural phenomenon 
at a certain magnitude (intensity), with a given frequency (return period), which has potential to 
cause negative effects. Vulnerability is the degree to which elements (e.g. infrastructural assets) 
can be damaged due to the hazard. Risk is the probability that damage to elements will occur as 
a result of the hazard based upon an asset’s vulnerability to the hazard. However, in the context 
of the impact assessment adopted in the present research, ‘impact’ can be defined as the potential 
consequence of the given risk. This thesis uses a level of service (loss of services or no loss of 
services) to describe tsunami impacts on infrastructure, based on analysed levels of risk in 
Chapter 4.  
1.3.1  Risk Identification 
Once the context and objectives are established, the risk management framework progresses 
toward risk identification. In the context of this research, this step involves identifying all potential 
tsunami hazards and determining their potential impacts on infrastructure. This is achieved by 
reviewing literature on previous tsunami events worldwide.  It involves recognising the range of 
hazards a society is exposed to and what aspects are vulnerable. Societal aspects include people, 
buildings and infrastructure (Sword-Daniels et al. 2014; Power 2013) with the latter being the 
focus of this research. It also involves the determining of constraints, including data limitations. 
A review of infrastructure vulnerability literature is presented in Chapter 2. 
1.3.2  Risk Analysis  
The risk analysis stage of the risk management framework focuses on developing an 
understanding of risks, so they can be compared and ranked (Standards New Zealand 2009).  In 
the context of the present research this means determining the vulnerability of exposed 
infrastructural assets to tsunami hazards. 
 
These analyses can be either probabilistic, deterministic or aspects of both. 
Deterministic scenario-based assessments use hypothetical hazard scenarios, based on models 
or previous events to determine the impact of hazards on the given asset(s). These often 
implement worst-case scenarios and provide a definitive impact value (e.g. damaged/not 
damaged). These assessments are often limited by subjective expert opinions resulting in: risk 
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uncertainty; no likelihood of risk/impacts; and focusing on only a single scenario (Borrero & 
Goring 2015). These limitations can in certain circumstances be addressed with a probabilistic 
approach. Probabilistic risk assessments are used to define the probability of a hazard occurring 
and its associated damage from a range of scenarios, with limited subjective input. To determine 
the degree of damage that can occur in each scenario, fragility functions can be incorporated into 
probabilistic risk assessment.  
 
Fragility functions are often empirical probabilistic functions which communicate the probability 
of an asset suffering a given level of damage, at each hazard intensity  (e.g. inundation depth, flow 
velocity etc.) and are commonly presented as a series of fragility curves (Power 2013; Horspool 
& Fraser 2015). They are developed through observations either in a controlled experimental 
setting or in the field (e.g. a post-event survey). These functions are helpful during risk treatment, 
as they can define which conditions cause impacts to occur and where mitigation strategies may 
help reduce these impacts, and therefore risk. Fragility functions are discussed further in Chapter 
2.  
 
A deterministic scenario-based approach is taken for this research, using a hypothetical 
inundation scenario, however it also implements probabilistic assessments of asset vulnerability 
to achieve this.  An impact assessment process can be embedded within the risk analysis stage of 
the risk management framework, which is outlined in Section 1.4.  The results of this analysis 
will yield values describing an asset’s probability of incurring damage in the given scenario, or the 
probability of reaching or exceeding a given level of damage (damage state). 
1.3.3  Risk Evaluation 
Risk evaluation compares various risks to determine what actions could be taken to reduce 
impacts and therefore risk (Standards New Zealand 2009; Power 2013). Ranking risk as 
acceptable, tolerable, and/or unacceptable is crucial to tsunami impacts mitigation. In the context 
of this thesis, this step involves constraining areas of high priority for mitigation based on the 
results of a tsunami impact assessment on Christchurch city infrastructure, and outlining potential 
mitigation strategies. 
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1.3.4  Risk Treatment 
The final stage of the risk management process is risk treatment. This involves determining how 
best to reduce the vulnerability of exposed assets and/or the hazard.  Impacts, and therefore risk, 
can be reduced through the application of various mitigation strategies, developed through the 
integration of field or laboratory analyses (Horspool & Fraser 2015; Power 2013; Palliyaguru & 
Amaratunga 2008; Gill et al. 2015). They include land management legislation, relocation of 
assets, improved construction standards, hazard monitoring and societal education.  
 
The results of a tsunami impact assessment on Christchurch city infrastructure can be used to 
provide emergency managers and planners with a metric on which to base response and 
mitigation strategies and it also provides potential and recommended mitigation strategies, for 
exposed infrastructural assets. This can lead to a reduction in future tsunami impacts on 
Christchurch and therefore a reduction in risk. 
1.3.5  Monitoring and review  
During the course of the risk assessment process it is crucial to implement up-to-date 
information. The methods used in this research are designed so that input parameters can be 
substituted with more relevant and/or up-to-date data to improve the subsequent impact 
assessment. The methods themselves should also be scrutinized if new techniques are developed 
that would provide a more relevant/accurate risk assessment.  Monitoring and review in turn 
provides a better means by which to evaluate, and therefore mitigate, risk. 
1.3.6  Communication and Consultation 
As with monitoring and review, it is crucial to communicate to, and consult with, relevant 
stakeholders throughout the risk assessment process. This is especially important for emergency 
managers and planners who will have a direct role in the risk treatment stage of the risk 
assessment process. Ensuring that impact and risk assessments are geared towards what these 
organisations require will ensure the best means by which to evaluate and therefore mitigate risk. 
The present research has maintained constant communication and consultation with leading and 
relevant research, emergency management and planning stakeholders. These include Canterbury 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management, Environment Canterbury, the National Institute of 
Water and Atmospheric Research, GNS Science and the University of Canterbury. 
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1.4  Impact Assessment Process 
The core of this research is impact assessment, which, as mentioned previously, can be 
embedded within the risk analysis stage of the risk management framework (Section 1.3.2 and 
Figure 1.1). It can be adopted to model the impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure, and 
subsequently used to inform mitigation and response strategies to reduce impacts and therefore 
risk.  
 
The impact assessment process (Figure 1.2) is a commonly adopted approach to modelling 
disaster impacts especially in multi-hazard and loss modelling software. One example is 
RiskScape (GNS & NIWA 2015) which is available for New Zealand-specific risk and impact 
modelling. One objective of this research is to use concepts from RiskScape to prove the process 




Figure 1.2: Impact assessment process (modified from GNS & NIWA 2015) 
 
Impact assessments can be either ex ante or ex post (Power 2013). Ex ante assessments are 
conducted prior to an event using deterministic or probabilistic analyses and are aimed at 
predicting impacts in order to reduce risk. Ex post assessments are undertaken following a 
specific event as a post-disaster survey. They are commonly used to verify/validate scientific 
models as well as prioritising relief and rehabilitation efforts (Power 2013). The focus of this 












Input Parameters Data 
Processing 
Model Outputs 
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impact assessment data are used to inform the approach (especially for vulnerability assessment 
in Chapter 3).  The approach developed in this research is suitable for integration/input to 
RiskScape. 
 
All data used in the development of impact assessment parameters can be analysed qualitatively, 
quantitatively or semi-quantitatively, each with advantages and disadvantages. Qualitative analyses 
are descriptive rather than numerical and often use coarse data or expert opinions to derive or 
categorise damage, such as the tsunami damage matrix developed in Chapter 2. They are often 
used with low volumes of data and/or too many uncertainties to warrant quantitative methods. 
Semi-quantitative analyses use a numerical evaluation of quantitative impact assessment by 
ranking risk. These rankings are not necessarily any more realistic than a qualitative analysis, 
however they provide a more rigorous and consistent approach to comparing risk values and 
mitigation techniques (Power 2013; Standards New Zealand 2009). Quantitative assessments can 
be either deterministic or probabilistic (as outlined in Section 1.3.2) and use numerical values 
for both risk and impact using modelled, experimental or historic data (Standards New Zealand 
2009; Power 2013). Quantitative input parameters provide the most in-depth results for an 
impact assessment, depending on the data quality of other input parameters. These assessment 
types are discussed further in Chapter 2.  The data processing stage of the impact assessment 
process (Figure 1.2) is outlined in Chapter 2. Input parameters are outlined below and discussed 
further in Chapters 2 and 3.  
1.4.1  Hazard metric 
To quantify impact, a hazard characteristic must be determined on which to base the assessment 
(Figure 1.2), and to apply a measure of magnitude to exposed assets (GNS & NIWA 2015; Power 
2013; Thywissen 2006). In the case of this research, tsunami inundation depth is used as a hazard 
metric. Flow velocity is another tsunami hazard metric used in impact assessments. A measure 
of hazard frequency can also be used in an impact assessment (although it is not in the present 
research). This is done by associating each hazard magnitude with a specific return period or 
vice-versa (Thywissen 2006; Power 2013). Numerical modelling can be used to compute tsunami 
propagation, the resolution of which is often determined by the resolution of local topographic 
data. 
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1.4.2  Exposure Asset Attributes 
Exposure is also required to quantify tsunami impacts (Figure 1.2). It can be defined as the 
number of elements that could be affected by the given hazard. These can include people, 
building and, in the case of this research, infrastructural assets (Schmidt et al. 2011; Power 2013). 
There is a spatial-temporal relationship between the elements at risk and the hazard magnitude, 
based on a chosen hazard metric. As well as spatial exposure, each asset also has a set of attributes 
that can be used to describe its potential to withstand a given hazard, such as construction type, 
construction materials, use category, floor height etc.  
 
Compiling infrastructure-specific data can be challenging as many data are owned by private 
organizations, in inconsistent formats and in some cases with commercial security restrictions 
(Power 2013). 
1.4.3  Vulnerability Metric 
Vulnerability can be defined as the potential for negative effects to occur to a given asset/attribute. 
A vulnerability metric determines the severity of the impact by magnitude of the local hazard and 
an asset’s potential, or lack thereof, to resist it (Papathoma & Dominey-Howes 2003; Marchand 
et al. 2009; Porter n.d.; Power 2013). Common quantitative vulnerability metrics include fragility 
functions (see Section 1.3.2), which describe the probabilistic relationship between hazard 
intensity and damage (Reese et al. 2011; Power 2013; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Mas et al. 2012). 
Qualitative vulnerability metrics include damage matrices which provide a descriptive measure 
of vulnerability (e.g. high, medium, low). The use of local data is preferential in an impact 
assessment as, in the case of infrastructure, assets and systems are more comparable (in design 
and operation) than with overseas equivalents. 
 
The vulnerability metric combines hazard and exposure metrics to quantify impacts on the given 
element (see Figure 1.2), which in the context of this research is tsunami impacts on Christchurch 
city infrastructure. 
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1.5  Tsunami Hazard Background 
The objective of this section is to define tsunami and the associated hazard including potential 
damage styles and the New Zealand and Christchurch specific tsunami hazard. 
When a series of waves causes sea level to fluctuate more rapidly than a single tidal cycle, it is 
considered to be a tsunami (Power 2013; Horspool & Fraser 2015). These are usually generated 
by large area sea floor disturbances which have the capacity to displace the entire water column 
above, such as an earthquake, submarine landslide or volcanic activity (Power 2013; Horspool & 
Fraser 2015). They can also occur from large area displacements on the water surface, such as a 
meteorite impact or landslide (Power 2013). The speed and height of tsunami waves at a given 
location depend on the magnitude of the trigger event, the distance from source and the 
directivity of wave approach (Gill et al. 2015; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Fraser et al. 2014; Jin & 
Lin 2011; Power 2013). Tsunami waves can reach a shoreline in seconds-to-minutes if the source 
event is proximal to the coast, or many hours if from a far-field source (Figure 1.3). Tsunami can 
be defined by their travel times as either local (< 1 hour), regional (1-3 hours) or far-field/distal 
(> 3 hours). 
 
Figure 1.3: Observed water heights (yellow and blue bars) and computed tsunami travel times for 2015 'Illapel' earthquake 
tsunami (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2015) 
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Once a tsunami reaches a coastline the waves slow and their wavelength decreases (see Figure 
1.4), and the water column will either flow long distances inland (e.g. over low, flat topography), 
or become relatively confined nearer to the coast (e.g. when restricted by steep coastal 
topography). Tsunami have been the cause of many international disasters historically,  
Table 1.1 presents those from the past two decades.  
 
 
Figure 1.4: Tsunami terminology: H = tsunami wave height; R = run-up height; dᵢ = inundation depth (Division on Earth 
and Life Studies et al. 2011) 
Table 1.1: Tsunami resulting in casualties in the past 2 decades 
 
1.5.1  Tsunami Damage Styles  
The behaviour of a tsunami may vary spatially across an area. It is therefore important to 
understand how tsunami cause damage, in order to determine the impacts they may have on 
infrastructural assets. Power (2013) outlines the different styles of tsunami damage as primary 
Location Year Source Casualties Reference 
Papua New Guinea 1998 Papua New Guinea 2,200 (USGS 2015) 
Indian Ocean 2004 Sumatra 230,000 
(Mulligan & Nadarajah 
2011) 
Java 2006 Java 600 (USGS 2015) 
Solomon Islands 2007 Solomon Islands 52 (USGS 2015) 
Samoa 2009 Samoan islands 189 (Okal et al. 2010) 
Chile 2010 Chile 525 (Fritz et al. 2011) 
Sumatra 2010 Sumatra 408 (USGS 2015) 
Japan 2011 Japan 15,891 
(Yeh et al. 2013; USGS 
2015) 
Solomon Islands 2013 Solomon Islands 10 (USGS 2015) 
Chile 2015 Chile 13 
(Gaurdian News and 
Media Limited 2015) 
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and secondary impacts. Primary impacts are based on forces caused by the flow of water (both 
hydrostatic and hydrodynamic impacts), while secondary impacts involve the movement of 
objects by the flowing water. The following is a summation of the different styles of tsunami 
damage typically observed. 
1.5.1.1  Inundation and Contamination 
Areas exposed to tsunami are generally limited to relatively narrow bands along a coast, often 
less than a few km from the initial shoreline (Yeh et al. 2013). The distribution of tsunami 
inundation is dependent on topography as well as wave height (see Figure 1.4). Run up of a 
tsunami will be determined by the scale of the initial displacement on the water column (wave 
height), the distance from its source (energy lost) and the local topography. This implies that 
near-source tsunami would have greater wave heights at a given coast than far-field tsunami of the 
same initial wave heights. Geomorphic features such as beach terraces, sea cliffs and thick 
vegetation will result in restricted inundation extents (but often higher run-up), whereas areas of 
tidal flats, mud flats, estuaries and river inlets have been observed to suffer greater areas of 
inundation (Chandrasekar & Ramesh, 2007). Inundation on its own can cause minor-to-
significant impacts, including to soil conditions (from salt contamination), control panels, fuse 
boxes and structures (from intrusion of moisture and fine sediments; e.g. Figure 1.5) (Power 
2013). 
 
Figure 1.5: Fine sediments which were entrained in tsunami flow, mark an inundation depth indicator (below arrows) on a 
building in Coquimbo, Chile, following the 2015 'Illapel' earthquake tsunami 
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1.5.1.2  Hydrodynamic Forces 
The flow depth and velocity of a tsunami directly influence the hydrodynamic pressure that it 
can apply to structures and surfaces. These involve dragging (horizontal), erosion (scouring) and 
buoyancy (vertical lifting) induced deformation of structures, and occur during advancing wave 
fronts and/or retreating flows (Power 2013). The positioning of structures and topography can 
increase or decrease the hydrodynamic forces of a tsunami. Debris in the flowing water can also 
influence the hydrodynamic forces of a tsunamis. An increase of pressures would occur when 
debris hinders the flow of water (e.g. beneath a bridge). Comparatively, wall collapse can create 
a jet flow through building interiors (e.g. Figure 1.6). 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Increased tsunami velocity created by confined flow resulted in complete internal and external wall blowout in 
an apartment building in Coquimbo, Chile, during the 2015 'Illapel' earthquake tsunami 
1.5.1.3  Debris impacts 
Debris impacts are a significant cause of tsunami damage to structures (e.g. Figure 1.7). Unlike 
inundation depth, entrained debris behaviour is difficult to measure or quantify directly and 
hence, is often inferred from post-event observations (Reese et al. 2011; Naito et al. 2014). Debris 
transport depends on the size of debris, topography, inundation, velocity, flow direction, and the 
layout of surrounding structures.  
 
Building construction and spacing play an important role in debris transport through urban areas. 
In industrial areas where steel and concrete construction is typical, buildings are generally able 
to withstand the hydrodynamic forces generated by tsunami and can therefore act as barriers to 
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producing increased probability of debris mobilisation. However, as Naito et al. (2014) and Reese 
et al. (2011) acknowledge, the fact that a structure can stop debris transport also means that it is 
subject to debris impact damage. This may in turn cause eventual structural collapse, thus 
releasing additional debris into the water flow, which is where debris dispersal becomes complex. 
 
Figure 1.7: Debris impact damage to a reinforced masonry building in Coquimbo, Chile, following the 2015 'Illapel' 
tsunami earthquake 
1.5.1.4  Soil Instability 
Scour of soils can occur in high velocity tsunami flows (Figure 1.8) and are often associated with 
the retreating wave. Soil instability is not exclusively associated with fast tsunami flows and has 
been observed in areas that were assumed to have minimal flow velocities (Yeh et al. 2013). This 
phenomenon can involve the lifting of asphalt surfaces, especially on roads, harbour quays, and 
parking lots at low elevations near the shore. This can be caused by liquefaction and subsidence, 
two impacts usually associated with seismic events. During tsunami inundation, soil top layers are 
compressed, resulting in an increase in pore pressure and total normal stress of the entire soil 
profile. Consequently as tsunami water retreats, the soil will decompress and the slow rate of 
pore pressure dissipation creates a vertical gradient of excess pore pressure within the soil. Once 
this excess pore pressure gradient equals or exceeds the buoyant specific weight of the bulk 
saturated soil it can suffer a complete loss of shearing force resistance, resulting in liquefaction 
(Yeh et al. 2013; Mas et al. 2012). 
 




Figure 1.8: Collapsed pavement due to scoured base material in Coquimbo, Chile from the 2015 ‘Illapel’ earthquake 
tsunami 
 
1.5.1.5  New Zealand and Christchurch Tsunami Hazard Assessment 
New Zealand has large exposure to tsunami hazards from multiple sources, but has little direct 
experience (Gill et al. 2015), because human habitation (and recording of tsunami observations) 
is relatively recent (see Table 1.2). New Zealand has experienced multiple large tsunami (>10 m 
at the coast) based on the geological record, and since European settlement approximately 10 
tsunami have been recorded exceeding 4 m heights at the coast (Gill et al. 2015). Although 
damaging tsunami happen infrequently, they can cause substantial fatalities and property damage 
in affected areas when they do occur. Figure 1.9 by Power (2013),  represents New Zealand’s 
tsunami hazard for the 2,500 year return period at the 84th percentile. Note that Christchurch 
and Lyttelton Harbour are both >12 m tsunami height at the coast. 
 




Figure 1.9: Expected maximum tsunami height in metres at 2,500 year return period, shown at  the 84th percentile of 
epistemic uncertainty (Power 2013) 
 
There have been a number of recorded tsunami in Christchurch since European settlement. 
Table 1.2 shows historic tsunami that have impacted Christchurch, all of which were sourced 
from South American submarine earthquakes. 
Table 1.2: Historic Christchurch Tsunami, 1868 - 2010 
Year Source EQ Magnitude Reference 
1868 Peru Mw=9.1 
(De Lange & Healy 1986; Lane et al. 2012; 
Goff & Chagué-Goff 2012) 
1877 Chile Mw=8.7 (De Lange & Healy 1986) 
1960 Chile Mw=9.5 
(Goff & Chagué-Goff 2012; Lane et al. 2012; 
Power 2013; Borrero & Goring 2015) 
2010 Chile Mw=8.8 (Lane et al. 2012) 
2015 Chile Mw=8.3 
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 2015) 
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Christchurch is located on the western edge of the Pacific Ocean (Figure 1.10) and is subjected 
to local, regional and distal source tsunamis (Lane et al. 2014). Goff & Chagué-Goff (2012) have 
identified up to seven paleo-tsunami likely to have impacted the Christchurch area over the past 
approximately 6,500 years. There was more than one possible paleo source identified for each, 
however it was concluded that the likely source for most, if not all, were South American 
subduction zone events as opposed to local or regional sources. Power (2013) estimates the 





 percentiles respectively for a 2,500 year return interval. Power (2013)  also estimates 
Christchurch’s most likely tsunami source for both a 2,500 and 500 year event, at the 50
th
 
percentile, is a Peru subduction zone event.  Although historically Chile has proven the more 
common tsunami source for Christchurch, a Peru subduction zone source is considered a larger 
hazard than an equivalent Chile subduction zone event (Figure 1.11). 
 
 













Figure 1.11: Comparison of 1960 Chilean tsunami wave height propagation model and equivalent Peru Scenario 
illustrating the effect that directivity and great circle routes can have on maximum wave heights in New Zealand (Power 
2013) 
 
Lane et al. (2014) have numerically modelled the tsunami hazard to Christchurch using an 
equation of fluid motion, basing it on a Mw 9.485 earthquake from a Peru subduction zone 
source (Figure 1.12). It represents the tsunami hazard for a 2,500 year return period at the 84
th
  
percentile confidence interval (Lane et al. 2014; Power 2013). There are previous tsunami hazard 
models for Christchurch with a range of sources and magnitudes, but these do not account for 
the changes in topography following the ‘Canterbury earthquake sequence’ which has impacted 
Christchurch since late 2011. The recent models represent the highest resolution tsunami 
inundation and velocity models for Christchurch and will be used as a hypothetical scenario for 
the present impact assessment. Appendix 7.1 covers the specifics of these models.  
 
The modeling by Lane et al. (2014) assumes fixed topography, meaning it does not take into 
account the progressive scouring of features such as coastal dunes, and any consequential changes 
to the associated velocity and inundation. Hart & Knight (2009) found that Christchurch coastal 
dunes, from South Shore to the Northern Christchurch coast, currently provide a high degree of 
protection from potential tsunami of heights up to 6 m above mean sea level, irrespective of gaps 
in the dunes (Appendix 7.2). However, once a dune is breached, erosion is expected to widen 
the area of breaching significantly. This will impact the distribution of tsunami inundation. 
 




Figure 1.12: Modelled tsunami inundation depths for a 1:2500 year return Peru subduction zone event in Christchurch 
(from Lane et al. 2014) 
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1.6   Research Methodology and Thesis Structure 
The methodology used in this thesis follows the risk management framework of risk 
identification, risk analysis risk evaluation and risk reduction (Figure 1.1). Within the risk analysis 
stage a combination of probabilistic and deterministic approaches follow an impact assessment 
process which implements qualitative and quantitative data for an ex ante tsunami impact 
assessment on Christchurch city infrastructure.  
 
The risk identification stage was undertaken by identifying the various hazards associated with 
tsunami and the potential styles of damage (Chapter 1). 
 
Fragility curves, required for an impact assessment, are largely lacking for tsunami impacts on 
infrastructure, therefore the risk analysis stage was undertaken in three parts. 
1. Firstly a literature review of available quantitative fragility functions was used to determine 
infrastructure vulnerability to tsunami hazards, including inundation depth, flow velocity 
and debris impacts (Chapter 2).  
2. Secondly a qualitative damage matrix was developed to determine infrastructure 
vulnerability of assets that lacked associated fragility curves (Chapter 2).  
3. Finally, an ex post assessment is undertaken to develop fragility curves for roads and 
bridges using post-event survey data associated with the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake 
tsunami (Chapter 3). 
These three parts of this risk analysis are ultimately used to model the impacts on Christchurch 
city infrastructure of a hypothetical tsunami scenario (Chapter 4), based on methods developed 
in Chapter 2, and implementing the impact assessment process presented in Figure 1.2. 
 
The risk evaluation stage of the risk management framework is used in the context of this thesis 
to prioritise areas that would benefit the most from risk reduction strategies (Chapter 4). 
Response and mitigation options are presented for tsunami impacts on infrastructure (Chapter 
4). 
 
Having completed the risk management process, recommendations are given for the risk 
management of tsunami on Christchurch city infrastructure, as well as potential future research 
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which addresses the post assessment monitoring and review stage of the risk management process 
(Chapter 5). 
 





Chapter 2  
Infrastructure Vulnerability and Impact 
Assessment Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is a credible and realistic tsunami impact model for Christchurch 
city infrastructure. This is achieved by firstly reviewing relevant literature related to infrastructure 
tsunami vulnerability. This builds on the review of tsunami damage styles and Christchurch 
tsunami hazard from Chapter 1. The objective of this review is to identify the impacts on 
infrastructure following significant tsunami recorded in international case studies, as well as 
identifying methods for modelling tsunami impacts on infrastructure, including the availability 
and selection of appropriate model input parameters. There is currently little knowledge of this, 
and so the present research is a new contribution. To address a lack of model parameters 
identified in the literature review, methodology for developing a tsunami damage matrix for 
infrastructure is presented, to be used as vulnerability metrics within the greater objective of 
developing tsunami impact models for Christchurch city infrastructure.  
 
The overall chapter structure is presented in Figure 2.1 where it can be seen that the review of 
tsunami impact assessment methods (Section 2.2) are used to inform the methodology of a 
tsunami impact assessment on Christchurch city infrastructure (Section 2.4). The gaps identified 
in the review of tsunami impact assessment literature (Section 2.2) are used to identify a need for 
the development of a tsunami damage matrix for infrastructure (Section 2.3), as well as identifying 




associated gaps in the research methodology of this thesis (Section 2.5.1). The review of 
vulnerability demand parameters in tsunami impact assessments (Section 2.2.1) and the results 
of the tsunami damage matrix (Section 2.3.2) are used to inform vulnerability metric application 
when implementing an impact assessment methodology for tsunami impacts on Christchurch 
city infrastructure (Section 2.4.1), the results of which are presented in (Chapter 4). 
 
Figure 2.1: Chapter 2 structure. LR = tsunami impact assessment literature review; DM = tsunami damage matrix; M = 
tsunami impact assessment methods; IAP = impact assessment process. Note that hazard and exposure are not the focus of 
the impact assessment process input parameters review due to prior availability 
2.2 Review of Tsunami Impact Assessment Literature 
The objective of this section is to inform a tsunami impact assessment on Christchurch city 
infrastructure. The first step towards this is to review previous impact assessments, both empirical 
and theoretical, to constrain appropriate methodology. The remainder of this review focuses on 
identifying the availability, types and treatment of infrastructure tsunami vulnerability metrics, to 
implement within a tsunami impact model of Christchurch city infrastructure. 
 
Prior to an actual tsunami event, it is difficult to determine the distribution and extent of 
infrastructure damage. However, systematically assessing how infrastructure components and 
networks were impacted, previous tsunami events can be used to inform how infrastructure may 
be impacted by future tsunami events.  
 
The use of local asset vulnerability data is always preferential in an impact assessment (Power 
2013; Horspool & Fraser 2015; NIWA 2014). However, a lack of damaging tsunami in New 
Zealand’s recent history, as outlined in Chapter 1, means there are no local data to draw upon 
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for an accurate infrastructure impact assessment. International case studies are therefore a useful 
tool to establishing impact model processes and parameters for tsunami (NIWA 2014). The 
most common impact assessment methodology is an empirical approach such as a post-event 
survey (Bell et al. 2005; Chandrasekar & Ramesh 2007; Ghobarah et al. 2006; Kim et al. 2014). 
As identified in Chapter 1, post–event surveys involve recording damage observations and hazard 
magnitude indicators in the field to assess the vulnerability of affected elements. They are used 
for ex post impact assessments to either inform response and recovery efforts or to validate 
previous ex ante assessments (Okal et al. 2010; Fritz et al. 2011; Bell et al. 2005; Power 2013; 
Horspool & Fraser 2015). They can also be used to develop fragility metrics for future ex ante 
risk or impact assessments. While the impacts in these events are obvious, the source of the 
damage is often uncertain, or harder to determine, such as hydrodynamic forces, inundation 
depth and flow velocity (Koshimura, Oie, et al. 2009). For this reason an analytical approach is 
often taken to address these uncertainties (Prasetya et al. 2012; Lane et al. 2014; NIWA 2014; 
Centre for Advanced Engineering 1997).  
 
As recommended by Koshimura et al. (2009), statistical analysis is the best approach to 
widespread tsunami impact modelling given the often limited resource and time post-event. A 
less common approach for tsunami impact assessments is an experimental one, involving the 
recording of asset performances under various simulated conditions based on controlled tsunami 
forces (e.g. Chen & Melville 2015). In the absence of data, or to supplement what is available, 
expert opinion can be used as a justifiable impact assessment (e.g. Centre for Advanced 
Engineering 1997; Horspool & Fraser 2015). Subjective assumptions for analytical and 
experimental methods are also based on expert opinion. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, various demand parameters are required for an impact assessment. 
Hazard metrics are already available for Christchurch tsunami hazards, as outlined in appendix 
7.1. Asset exposure and vulnerability are not yet constrained for Christchurch city infrastructure, 
however they can both be analysed qualitatively, semi-quantitatively or quantitatively in order to 
constrain measures for the input of an impact assessment on infrastructure. All of these have the 
potential to produce outputs constraining impacts on infrastructure, but each has varying 
advantages and disadvantages, as identified in Chapter 1. Qualitative tsunami impact assessments 
can be conducted using sparse data and are often not labour-intensive, these include damage 
matrices and expert judgement. They are however commonly biased, low-resolution and ill-
purposed for subsequent risk treatment strategies, such as cost-benefit studies (Reese n.d.; Power 




2013). Conversely, quantitative tsunami impact assessments require extensive empirical data 
inputs and are often labour-intensive. They will however result in modelled impacts which are 
comparable, high resolution, consistent and unbiased (Reese n.d.; Power 2013). An appropriate 
tsunami impact assessment methodology therefore depends on two things: the specific model 
requirements; and the availability of demand parameters. Both of these influence the reliability 
and accuracy of the given impact assessment’s outputs (i.e. damage to infrastructure).  
2.2.1 Tsunami Vulnerability Parameters 
Tsunami vulnerability is defined as the structural damage probability with particular regard to the 
hydrodynamic features (hazard) of a tsunami. These hazard metrics commonly include 
inundation depth, flow velocity and hydrodynamic force (Koshimura et al. 2009; Akiyama et al. 
2013; GNS & NIWA 2015). In principle, the development of tsunami vulnerability metrics 
require that hazard data and damage statistics be used in parallel to produce fragility functions, 
as defined in Chapter 1. Fragility functions related to tsunami damage tend to be empirical curves 
determined from remote sensing, numerical modelling, and field surveys. These typically relate 
to a single tsunami event meaning the fragility curve will be specific to the characteristics of that 
tsunami and the local asset standards (e.g. construction standards). This means individual fragility 
functions do not provide a universal measure of tsunami impact or damage (Akiyama et al. 2013; 
Koshimura et al. 2009). Current scientific literature focuses heavily on vulnerability metrics for 
tsunami impacts to buildings and casualty estimations. Few examples of tsunami fragility 
functions for infrastructural assets exist. The available data are as summarised in Table 2.1.  
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Not all of the available infrastructure vulnerability metrics would apply to a New Zealand setting. 
The most common hazard parameter for empirical fragility functions (of buildings) is inundation 
depth (Reese et al. 2011; Suppasri, et al. 2013). This is a result of the comparatively easy 
identification of inundation depth markers (e.g. Figure 1.5) during post-event surveys (e.g. Goff 
et al. 2006). However, this is not always the most significant cause of damage - velocity and debris 
impacts can play as important a role as inundation depth in the spatial distribution of damage 
during a tsunami, as reviewed from relevant literature below. 
2.2.1.1 Velocity 
Koshimura et al. (2009) recommend not to use velocity in the application of fragility functions, 
but instead to use inundation depth. This is due to velocity models being significantly dependant 
on grid resolution and topography data used. However, King & Bell  (2006) argue that inundation 
is also sensitive to inaccuracies in topographic data as well as the assumption of static topography 
in modelling. Velocity can be difficult to quantify ex post, and difficult to measure during a 




tsunami event. However a study by Fritz et al. (2012) measures flow velocity from the 2011 
‘Tohoku’ earthquake using survivor videos of the event and LIDAR techniques. They 
determined that flow velocities reached 11 m/s at the research location. Techniques like the one 
presented by Fritz et al. (2012) could be used in future ex post tsunami impact assessments to 
develop fragility functions with a flow velocity hazard intensity metric, thereby increasing the 
resolution and realism of outputs. 
2.2.1.2 Debris Impacts  
Debris impacts are not commonly used as a vulnerability metric. The one example of  reviewed 
literature using debris impacts as a measure of fragility was Reese et al. (2011). However, these 
were designed based on buildings in Banda Aceh. The probability of exceeding a given damage 
state for a given water depth is less for a shielded structure (e.g. behind a reinforced masonry 
building) than for a non-shielded structure.  The effects of debris on asset vulnerability had not 
been quantitatively examined prior to Reese et al. (2011), due to the complex site-specific and 
event-specific nature of the associated damage.  
 
Vulnerability metrics which do not consider debris, while inaccurate, are still practical for the 
likes of residential areas. Reese et al. (2011) use a classification system of ‘shielded’ or ‘exposed’ 
based upon the presence of another structure or significant topographic feature on the sea-facing 
side of the given asset. This measure of shielding is used for its simplicity and Reese et al. (2011) 
recognise that it would not accurately portray damage associated with a flow direction oblique to 
the shore line or retreating flows. The methods used by Reese et al. (2011) are simple but largely 
inaccurate, as the authors acknowledge. The inclusion of methods for debris site assessment and 
dispersal by Naito et al. (2014) could be used in conjunction, to determine with more accuracy 
the shielded or exposed status of a structure or network, in order to apply a level of vulnerability. 
These methods are comparatively complex but far more accurate. An issue with the methods 
used by Naito et al. (2014) however, is that the specific debris source will vary on a day-to-day 
and even hour-to-hour basis with regards to mobile objects (e.g. vehicles, containers and vessels). 
Only debris sourced from static structures (e.g. buildings) would be spatially-temporally fixed. 
Naito et al. (2014) examined four regions of Japan, following the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake 
tsunami, classifying debris objects into three categories (Table 2.2) in order to calculate their 
potential impact forces (e.g. Table 2.3). Naito et al. (2014) specifies that this can be estimated by: 
 




       𝐹 = 𝑟 ∙ 𝑈𝑚𝑎𝑥√𝑘 ∙ 𝑚𝑑(1 + 𝑐)                                                   
 
Where F = impact forces in kilonewtons (kN); r = the importance coefficient for a given risk 
category; 𝑈𝑚𝑎𝑥  = maximum flow velocity carrying the debris; 𝑚𝑑  = mass of the debris; k = 
effective stiffness of the debris; and c = hydrodynamic mass coefficient. Note that this equation 
requires knowledge of an object’s mass and stiffness value.  
It must be assumed that this measure of impact force is proportional to the likelihood of the 
given object striking a structural component (Figure 2.2). The assumption is made that the debris 
will disperse from its origin in a direction normal to the coast with variation. The origin is 
determined by the geometric centre of the debris object’s original site. Because of variations in 
onshore flow conditions, a spread of dispersal of +/- 22.5 degrees from shore normal is assumed.  
 
Table 2.2: Classification of tsunami debris (modified from Naito et al. 2014) 
Debris Category Grouping definition Examples 
Small Debris 
Suspended objects that are not large enough to 
impart significant force on impact 
Household items, foliage, detached pieces of 
wooden structures. 
Moderate Debris 
Objects can result in localized impact as well as 
damming on structures and would represent a 
typical force demand 
Wooden poles and trees, empty containers and 
trailers, concrete and stone objects, vehicles, 
fibreglass vessels, 
Large Debris 
Large debris objects can impart excessive force on 
impact and produce significant damage to an 
engineered structure 
Loaded containers and trailers, concrete and 
stone structures, wooden structures, large 
steel vessels. 
Table 2.3: Examples of Estimated Debris Generated impact Forces (Naito et al. 2014). 
Debris types Debris size Stiffness (kN/mm²) Mass (kg) Impact forces (kN) 
Wood pole Moderate 2.4 450 131 
Vehicle Moderate 1.0 1,000 133 
Container (empty) Moderate 85 2,200 1,770 
Container (full) Large 85 30,000 6,390 
Barge Large 60 181,000 13,180 





Figure 2.2: Debris dispersal calculation (Naito et al. 2014) 
2.2.1.3 Inundation Depth 
King & Bell (2006); Marchand et al. (2009); Mas et al. (2012); Graf et al. (2014) and Eguchi et 
al. (2013) all determine that tsunami damage is very sensitive to inundation depth, with particular 
regard to the floor heights of buildings. This makes them the most frequent hazard intensity 
measure for tsunami fragility functions (see Table 2.1).  
 
Limited damage tends to occur if inundation remains below floor height, with moderate to 
significant damage occurring from depths just above floor height upwards. This is of particular 
relevance to infrastructure components housed in buildings (such as pump houses, substations, 
etc.) more so than to the networks themselves. This is supposedly a threshold where any degree 
of inundation to internal structures, components and equipment, will result in the need for almost 
complete replacement (King & Bell 2006). Damage state (level of damage) classes with such 
sensitivity rely on the precision of topography and inundation models, if an impact assessment is 
to produce realistic outputs. It also means that inundation depth, and by association damage, is 
very dependent of the performance of flood and coastal protective structures (sea walls, stop 
banks etc.). This is an issue because as these structures become damaged or washed away in a 
tsunami, uninhibited flows occur where they would have otherwise not (e.g. as a coastal dune is 




eroded, tsunami waters are progressively less constrained behind it). This can be difficult to 
predict accurately in tsunami hazard modelling, most of which use static topography (King & Bell 
2006).  
 
Among coastal transportation networks, bridges are often the most vulnerable structures to 
tsunami damage given the increase in flow velocities along channels they cross. There is also 
often a lack of any obstructions to shield debris or slow the incoming waves (Akiyama et al. 2013). 
Of the limited examples of published infrastructure fragility curves, the majority are devoted to 
bridges and use inundation depth as a hazard intensity measure (Akiyama et al. 2013; Eguchi et 
al. 2013; Marchand et al. 2009; NIWA 2014; Horspool & Fraser 2015). Eguchi et al. (2013) and 
Akiyama et al. (2013) have produced the most bridge fragility functions, all of which are based 
on Japanese structures. This makes them applicable to New Zealand construction standards, 
which are similar.  Akiyama et al. (2013) present analytical fragility curves for three failure modes: 
buoyancy force, wave force, and shear failure of bridge piers. The damage states reported are 
‘slight/none’, ‘moderate’, and ‘extensive/collapse’. NIWA (2014) states that these are too 
complex for integration into an impact model and that a tsunami inundation depth parameter 
would need to be applied to make this more functional. Horspool & Fraser (2015) use data from 
Shoji & Moriyama (2007) to develop fragility curves for bridges of three construction types 
(Figure 2.3). Although they would provide a more accurate distribution of damage, based on the 
resistance to impacts of various construction types, they are based on Indonesian and Sri Lankan 
standards, which are not akin to New Zealand bridges. Note that for PC (precast concrete) and 
steel bridges there were not enough data at Damage State 2 to include in the analysis. The hazard 
intensity measure for these fragility curves is inundation depth with respect to height above the 
base of bridge decks. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Bridge fragility curves, modified from Horspool & Fraser (2015) 





Eguchi et al. (2013) have also produced fragility curves for bridges, using data from 177 damaged 
bridges in two Japanese prefectures following the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami. The 
dataset contains only bridges that suffered some damage. There is consequently substantial non-
coverage of data which are therefore unrepresentative of all Japanese structures affected by the 
tsunami. NIWA (2014) suggests the fragility functions associated with these data be used with 
caution because of these limitations.  
 
Fragility curves have also been developed for road tsunami vulnerability. Marchand et al. (2009) 
developed fragility curves for three types of roads (national, city and neighbourhood) for the 2004 
‘Indian Ocean’ tsunami in Banda Aceh. These use inundation depth as a hazard intensity 
measure due to data limitations for other metrics. It is noted that the relationship between road 
damage and inundation depth is weak, especially by comparison with housing. It is suggested that 
this may be explained by damage to roads not occurring from the incoming wave but from 
erosion during receding floodwaters. It is also suggested that better variables would be the use of 
road orientation to flow direction or road elevation above ground level.  Marchand et al. (2009) 
indicate that damage probability for any types of road below 1 m inundation depth is a linear 
function of depth, whereas damage above this threshold will always have a probability of 1.0. 
Similarly for bridges, the transition from a linear function of depth to 100% damage probability 
is aproximately 2 m above deck height. This sensitivity may be representative of Indonesian road 
construction but is not so clear cut in literature relating to the likes of Japanese roads (Akiyama 
et al. 2013; Eguchi et al. 2013), which share similar construction standards to their New Zealand 
counterparts.  
 
One other infrastructural sector with available fragility curves is electricity. Horspool & Fraser 
(2015) have developed these for substations and utility poles (timber & concrete) based on expert-
judgement, given the lack of empirical data. For utility poles fragility is defined as a function of 
inundation depth to pole height. Substations are split into interior and exterior facilities. 
2.2.2 Discussion of Impact Assessment Literature 
The following is a discussion, proceeding the review of relevant literature, on what has been 
identified for an effective tsunami impact assessment. Also discussed is whether an impact 




assessment process can be implemented to constrain the tsunami impacts on Christchurch city 
infrastructure.  
 
The literature has identified that an effective tsunami impact assessment on infrastructure 
requires the use of hazard and exposure measures to inform a relevant vulnerability metric, of 
which fragility curves, with an inundation depth hazard intensity measure, have been identified 
as the most applicable option. The most reliable fragility functions are those which use 
quantitative data with large quantities of damage and/or hazard observations recorded. 
Qualitative data can however be used in its absence for the development of tsunami vulnerability 
metrics, including damage matrices and expert judgement. Locally sourced vulnerability data was 
identified as being the most applicable for tsunami impact model demand parameters, however 
in the absence of availability, comparable data can be implored. In the context of this research, 
Japanese sourced data has been identified as the most comparable for New Zealand 
infrastructure tsunami impact assessments. An absence of applicable tsunami vulnerability 
metrics has also been identified, which will be a limiting factor in implementing a tsunami impact 
assessment process on Christchurch city infrastructure. 
 
A gap has been identified in the availability of applicable fragility functions for infrastructure 
vulnerability to tsunami in New Zealand. It has also been identified through their absence, that 
there are no previous examples of a comprehensive infrastructure tsunami impact assessment 
from which to draw recommendations. In order to address most of the shortcomings in the 
availability of resources, a vulnerability metric will need to be developed for each infrastructural 
asset that is otherwise lacking one. Available quantitative fragility functions only apply to bridge 
damage and these data are stated as not being akin to New Zealand infrastructural standards, and 
potentially unreliable (GNS & NIWA 2015). The ability to develop relevant input parameters is 
apparent, however the creation of these would be out of the scope of this project. The inclusion 
of all vulnerability demand parameters, including inundation, velocity and debris impacts, would 
allow for the development of the most credible and realistic impact model however the literature 
review has highlighted the large scope of work that would be involved given the lack of available 
data. 
 
In order to apply a debris impacts vulnerability metric similar to that described by Reese et al. 
(2011), sections of each infrastructural network would have to be classified by debris exposure 
potential and then an appropriate weighting system applied. This would be both subjective and 




labour-intensive. The methods presented by Naito et al. (2014)  could be used to classify potential 
debris types, quantify the debris potential for a given site and then translate the debris and debris 
potential to impact loads on structures. Although there is a focus on building impacts, as with 
much of the tsunami literature, these methods could be easily applied to engineered 
infrastructure including bridges, utility poles, and substations. This methodology does not 
include debris impacts for surface-level or below-ground infrastructure, from the dragging effects 
of debris entrained in the water column.  
 
Reese et al. (2011)  acknowledge that without eye-witness reports it is often impossible to know 
which debris objects relate to specific structural damage or collapse post-event. This information 
would be required to produce some kind of debris-based fragility function. Another concern is 
that the inclusion of a debris dispersion model would require the identification of every possible 
debris source. Vehicles, wood debris, rubble, trailers, and building components are examples of 
debris types of which the origin is difficult to define prior to the occurrence of the tsunami.  
Given the time involved in applying a debris impact weighting system, plus the fact that 
inundation and velocity models already exist for Christchurch, it will be appropriate to omit 
debris impacts as a direct vulnerability metric for this project. 
 
Koshimura et al. (2009) recommend not to use velocity in the application of fragility functions, 
but instead to use inundation depth. This is due to velocity models being significantly dependent 
on the grid resolution and topography data used. However the latest tsunami velocity model for 
Christchurch (Lane et al. 2012), as with the inundation model, has high grid and topographic 
resolution. Nevertheless, given the lack of available velocity-related resources, for the purposes 
of this project, it appears the most logical action will be to limit the vulnerability demand 
parameters to inundation depth. There are significantly more inundation-depth-related resources 
relevant to a New Zealand setting (Horspool & Fraser 2015) and the development of new 
resources will be less labour-intensive if focused on this vulnerability metric. 
 
An impact assessment process has been identified as an appropriate method by which to model 
tsunami impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure. However, quantitative tsunami vulnerability 
input parameters are largely unavailable for infrastructure. This could be addressed in one of two 
ways: by using available quantitative data (i.e. from ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami, Japan), to 
develop fragility functions; or by developing a qualitative vulnerability metric for each 
infrastructural asset. As alluded to in the above literature review, the ‘Tohoku’ data is robust 




enough for the use of road and bridge vulnerability metric development. Given this, the 
development of these may be within the scope of the present research. For infrastructural assets 
other than roads and bridges, a qualitative tsunami damage matrix could be developed to provide 
a vulnerability metric based on an inundation depth hazard intensity measure. Note that 
qualitative fragility curves are available for electricity assets and fuel storage tanks (Horspool & 
Fraser 2015; Hatayama 2014) which would provide a higher resolution vulnerability input than 
a damage matrix.  
2.3 Tsunami Damage Matrix 
A tsunami impact assessment for Christchurch city infrastructure requires a measure of 
vulnerability for each asset.  The above literature review has identified a gap in the availability of 
quantitative damage data for infrastructure and therefore a lack of available fragility functions, 
and an inability to derive them, due to the lack of data. Fragility functions could presumably be 
developed for most assets given enough time and resources (experimentally or by post-event 
surveys of future events), but within the scope of this research project the most appropriate course 
of action will be to use a qualitative solution. Power (2013) states that for ex ante analyses (such 
as that in the present research), risk matrices provide a systematic method for assigning a hazard 
intensity measure to a level of damage. This approach makes it possible to link the impact results 
back to the risk management framework (Figure 1.1) to ultimately reduce tsunami impacts and 
therefore risk. This section presents the methods specific to developing a tsunami damage matrix 
for the purpose of a vulnerability metric within the greater objective of developing a tsunami 
impact assessment of Christchurch city infrastructure (see Figure 2.1). 
2.3.1  Damage Matrix Methodology 
Using a similar method to Wilson et al. (2009) and Daly & Johnston (2015), damage probabilities 
are assigned for each infrastructural asset based on hazard intensity categories. For tsunami 
impacts to infrastructure inundation depth will be used as the hazard metric, as discussed in the 
literature review, and three distinctive depth categories have been identified: <0.5 m, 0.5-2 m and 
>2 m (e.g. Table 2.4). These were selected for the following reasons: 
Two meters of inundation has been identified as a key damage threshold. This is often the depth 
of water required to potentially start mobilising large debris as well as beginning to exert significant 




hydrodynamic forces. It is also a depth at which all assets are likely to experience some degree 
of potential damage (King & Bell 2006).  0.5 m – 2 m inundation depths are where the potential 
for damage to most assets begins to occur, as medium debris objects are beginning to mobilise 
and the flow speeds are enough to begin exerting hydrodynamic forces on structures. <0.5 m of 
inundation is a key threshold to pinpoint assets which are the most susceptible to tsunami 
inundation, because at this depth only small debris objects are able to mobilise and flow speeds 
are likely to only potentially affect weak or buoyant objects. The main cause of damage within 
this depth bin is likely silt deposition and water damage to low lying assets. 
Table 2.4: Example of tsunami damage matrix design and inputs. Completed tsunami damage matrix found in Appendix 7.3 
 
 
The content of the damage matrix will be developed through a subsequent review of damage 
specific observational and theoretical recordings. Quality of data will also be recorded in the 
damage matrix, indicating the accuracy of assigned likelihoods. A low data quality value would 
indicate a low volume of qualitative data or a purely subjective likelihood assignment. A high data 
quality value would indicate a high volume of qualitative data or the use of quantitative 
observations. 
 
2.3.2 Damage Matrix Results 
The damage matrix constrains a probability of damage occurring and a description of the 
potential damage types, for three inundation depth categories. It equates to a summary of all 
relevant and available literature containing a degree of infrastructural asset damage and/or hazard 
intensity relationship. Appendix 7.3 displays the completed tsunami damage matrix. 
 
Although initially developed from current scientific literature, the tsunami damage matrix 
(Appendix 7.3) has been updated to include observations made during a post-event field survey 
following the 2015 ‘Illapel’ earthquake tsunami in Chile. This was carried out in the city of 
Coquimbo, which experienced inundation up to 600 m inland, with inundation depths of up to 
Infrastructural 
Asset 
















e.g. low e.g. siltation e.g. medium e.g. scour e.g. high e.g. washout e.g. high 




7 m at the coast (Gaurdian News and Media Limited 2015). The census style survey was run by 
GNS Science and empirical data were collected for over 3,000 transport, energy and water 
infrastructure assets as well as over 600 inundation depth indicators across the inundation zone. 
The damage data collected will eventually provide valuable fragility curves, but these are not 
within the scope of this research. The present models do not incorporate any of the survey data 
collected, however the damage matrix (Appendix 7.3) incorporates relevant and specific 
observations from the field. General observations were used to calibrate the tsunami damage 
matrix, while specific damage observations were used to update existing damage descriptions and 
assigned likelihoods of damage (Appendix 7.4). This adheres to the review and monitoring stage 
of the risk management framework (Figure 1.1). 
 
The tsunami damage matrix appears to be the first of its kind for assessing tsunami impacts to 
infrastructure. Its applications, irrespective of an impact assessment, includes providing a 
comprehensive ‘look up’ resource for infrastructure asset managers, emergency managers and 
planners to identify key damage styles for specific assets at varying hazard intensities, which 
adheres to the risk treatment stage of the risk management framework. As with most qualitative 
analyses, this damage matrix is subjective and relatively low-resolution. Nevertheless for the 
purpose of an infrastructure impact assessment for Christchurch city, it provides a vulnerability 
metric to use, in the absence of fragility curves, within a tsunami impact assessment process 
(Figure 1.2) as described in more detail below. It should not however be used to replace fragility 
curves, if available. 
2.4  Tsunami Impact Assessment Methodology 
The objective of this section is to develop methods to complete a tsunami impact assessment for 
Christchurch city infrastructure. This builds on previous sections of Chapters 1 and 2 by putting 
an impact assessment process into practice by implementing relevant and applicable data 
including a qualitative tsunami damage matrix and developed fragility curves (Chapter 3).  
2.4.1 Applying the Impact Assessment Process  
The impact assessment process involves first constraining the hazard (hazard scenario model) 
and the selection of an appropriate hazard metric (i.e. inundation depth). Asset exposure is then 




determined by spatially assigning inundation depths to each asset. Next an applicable 
vulnerability metric is selected based on the most relevant available method. Since fragility 
functions are unavailable for many infrastructural assets (Section 2.2), a damage matrix 
(Appendix 7.3) was developed based upon scientific literature and post-event tsunami survey 
observations, to define asset vulnerability to inundation. To determine the impacts on a network, 
the chosen vulnerability metric (fragility curve or damage matrix) is used to assign a probability 
of damage based on inundation depth and construction type (if available). 
 
The impact assessment process involves the selection of a variety of different parameters as 
explained below and outlined in Figure 1.2. 
2.4.2 Selecting Hazard Input  
Based on the literature review in Section 2.2, inundation depth will be used as the hazard metric 
for modelling the impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure. As stated, this is the current 
standard for tsunami impact modelling and has the most available resources (Horspool & Fraser 
2015). The impact models will therefore be deterministic as they are based on a single hazard 
scenario.  The methods used for this tsunami impact assessment could be applied to any hazard 
model, limited only by the availability of relevant input parameters. Network exposures can be 
determined by spatially assigning inundation depths to the available assets. 
2.4.3 Availability of Asset Attributes  
Spatially constrained asset data is required to determine infrastructure exposure to modelled 
inundation depth. For quantitative modelling, asset attribute data is also required to distinguish 
different levels of fragility based upon various qualities of each asset. This provides a higher 
resolution impact assessment, but again is determined by the availability of relevant vulnerability 
metrics. 
Table 2.5 lists the assets with available data following an exhaustive search from various public 
and commercial sources. Most infrastructural sectors are represented, the notable exceptions 
being in the electricity and telecommunications sectors which are not publicly accessible. The 
methodology presented for this impact assessment can be used to include more assets if they 
become available in the future. Exposure to tsunami hazard is determined by assigning 
inundation depths. Based on this exposure assignment, a vulnerability metric can then be 
applied. 




Table 2.5: Infrastructure asset data sources and relevant attributes for tsunami impact assessment 
Infrastructure Asset Relevant Attributes Data Source 
Wharves Width, length Satellite Imagery 
Fuel Storage Tanks Diameter 
OpenStreetMap contributors 
2015, Satellite Imagery 
Roads 
Pavement material, surface depth, 
surface date, surface condition, 
length, span, use type 
Stronger Christchurch 
Infrastructure Rebuild Team, 
OpenStreetMap contributors 
2015 
Rail Track type, use type, vehicle type Koordinates contributers 2015 
Wastewater Pipes Length Koordinates contributers 2015 
Wastewater Pump 
Stations 
None Satellite Imagery, field Survey 
Potable Water Pipes Length Koordinates contributers 2015 
Stormwater Pipes Length Koordinates contributers 2015 
Open Drains Length Koordinates contributers 2015 
Bridges 
Structural condition, construction 
type, construction year, use type, 
width, span, length, heritage status,  
Stronger Christchurch 
Infrastructure Rebuild Team 
Cellular Towers Frequency, power, provider Koordinates contributers 2015 
 
2.4.4 Vulnerability Metrics  
The review of infrastructure impact assessment literature determined that empirical fragility 
curves were the most appropriate vulnerability metric to use for tsunami modelling. There are 
two main vulnerability methods that can be applied to infrastructure tsunami damage probability 
models; qualitative (damage matrix) or quantitative (empirical fragility curves). There is also the 
option to use existing, or future, post-event tsunami survey data to produce new and potentially 
more relevant fragility functions. Figure 4.2 illustrates the decision process used to select the most 
appropriate data for modelling tsunami impacts on infrastructure given the lack of available data 
determined from Section 2.2. The impact modelling process will vary depending on the 
vulnerability method selected. Table 2.6 indicates the highest resolution vulnerability metric for 
each available infrastructure asset. Note that the fragility curves being used for roads and bridges 
are to be covered in Chapter 3.  





Figure 2.4: Decision process for selecting an appropriate vulnerability metric for modelling tsunami impact on 
infrastructure. If empirical data are unavailable then the damage matrix will be used to determine damage probabilities. If 
more applicable quantitative data are/become available, these should be used to create new empirical fragility curves for 
assets to determine damage state occurrence probabilities (e.g. Japan roads damage analysis, as outlined in Chapter 3) 
 




Data type Data Source 
Wharves Damage Matrix Qualitative Chapter 2 
Fuel Storage Tanks Damage Curve Semi quantitative (Hatayama 2014) 
Roads (Generic) Fragility Curve Quantitative 
Chapter 3, Horspool & Fraser 
2015 
Roads (Use Type) Fragility Curves Quantitative  Chapter 3 
Bridges Damage Matrix Qualitative 
Chapter 3, Horspool & Fraser 
2015 
Rail Damage Matrix Qualitative Chapter 2 
Wastewater Pipes Damage Matrix Qualitative Chapter 2 
Wastewater Pump 
Stations 
Damage Matrix Qualitative Chapter 2 
Potable Water Pipes Damage Matrix Qualitative Chapter 2 
Stormwater Pipes Damage Matrix Qualitative Chapter 2 
Open Drains Damage Matrix Qualitative Chapter 2 
Cellular Towers Damage Matrix Qualitative Chapter 2 
Utility Poles Fragility Curves Expert judgement Horspool & Fraser 2015 
Substations Fragility Curves Expert judgement Horspool & Fraser 2015 




2.4.4.1 Qualitative Damage Matrix Input 
As shown in Figure 4.2, a damage matrix approach should only be used in the absence of relevant 
fragility curves. If that is the case then impact assessment models will be run by determining an 
asset’s level of exposure to the tsunami hazard (inundation depth). Then by assigning each asset 
into inundation depth bins, a vulnerability metric (probability of damage) can be applied. The 
way that qualitative damage matrix data can be applied is by grouping the exposed assets into the 
three associated depth bins (<0.5 m, 0.5-2 m, >2 m). This then allows a likelihood of damage to 
be applied to each asset’s inundation grouping. Given what the damage matrix is representing, 
only a probability of damage is expressed using this method. This is because the damage matrix 
does not constrain a level of damage (i.e. damage state). 
The main factors limiting this approach include: 
 Qualitative data inputs 
 Broad inundation groupings  
 Subjective damage probabilities 
 Level of damage not expressed 
2.4.4.2 Quantitative Fragility Functions  
The methods for applying fragility curves to a tsunami impact assessment are similar to those 
described above, only differing in the level of complexity and output resolution. The asset data 
are first categorised by the applicable attribute being tested for vulnerability (e.g. construction 
type, road use etc.). The use of fragility curves allows depth bins of 0.5 m to be used which 
maximises the effectiveness of the high resolution tsunami inundation model. The assets will be 
grouped into these depth bins and for depths below 1 m, 0.25 m depth bins were used to increase 
resolution (e.g. 0.25 m – 0.5 m depth bin). Then using the vulnerability metric, a probability of 
damage is assigned to each depth bin, for each attribute category, and for each applicable damage 
state (e.g. DS1, DS2, and DS3). This method provides outputs which are significantly more 
realistic then its qualitative counterpart. Results will be presented as a probability of an asset 
experiencing a given damage state. 
2.4.4.3 Post-event Tsunami Survey Data 
Another vulnerability metric option requires the same treatment as above, but involves 
developing new and potentially more relevant fragility curves following future tsunami events or 




experimental studies. This can also include the treatment of existing post-event tsunami survey 
data. One such example of this was referred to by various sources in Section 2.2 regarding the 
post-event tsunami damage data collected following the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami. The 
analysis of these data are covered in Chapter 3.  
2.4.5 Evaluating a Level of Service 
Given the low resolution of qualitative modelling methods for many infrastructural assets, a level 
of service (service available or service not available) will be a useful additional method to present 
these data, especially for emergency managers and planners. Since the qualitative models are 
intrinsically low resolution this will be conducted at suburb scale and be based on the modelled 
results (probability of damage) as well as the above literature review and expert opinion (Snyder-
Bishop, K, 2015, pers. comm., 17 November). Logical decisions will be made on the 
serviceability of each infrastructure network, as presented in completion in Appendix 7.5. The 
results will be limited by this subjective approach. 
2.5 Discussion of Impact Assessment Methods 
This chapter has determined the importance of quantitative vulnerability metrics for tsunami 
impacts on infrastructure, whilst also identifying the lack of applicable fragility functions available 
in current scientific literature. Previous studies that have assessed damage to infrastructure from 
tsunami have not always recorded all inundated assets, regardless of damage, which is a key 
barrier to the development of useful empirical fragility curves. The damage probability index is 
a low resolution option to supplement empirical data. The alternative is to not include assets 
lacking associated fragility curves until future tsunami, or experimental studies, allow the 
collection of damage data and the development of relevant vulnerability metrics (fragility curves).  
The findings from the review of literature indicate that it is important to consider the local context 
when selecting an appropriate vulnerability metric and to closely consider the shortcomings of 
using ones which may not be entirely applicable. This chapter has also identified that it is 
important to consider other hazard metrics in the impact assessment of infrastructure. These 
include flow speed, soil erosion and debris impacts. However, also highlighted is the scale of 
research that would be involved in this and that it may be very spatially and temporally specific. 
 




This chapter has contributed to the risk management framework by providing a comprehensive 
damage matrix and outlining a methodology by which to model tsunami impacts on infrastructure 
given a low volume of resources currently available. These can be used together, or in isolation, 
to inform emergency managers and planners for the purpose of reducing tsunami impacts and 
therefore risk.  
2.5.1 Gaps in Research 
Gaps in the present research include: 
 Impacts do not take into account flow speed or debris impacts, which are both significant 
causes of variation in tsunami damage distribution. 
 Models based on the damage matrix do not provide a damage level metric (i.e. damage 
state) 
 Models based on qualitative data represent a low resolution of damage distribution. They 
also do not take into account construction materials 
 The method of serviceability designation is based on simple & broad decision making 
and the results may require a review by experts. 
 Each infrastructure sector has many more assets in its network not available for this 
assessment, which could affect the level of serviceability depending on the damage to 
them. 
 Does not consider the cascading impacts of network losses 
2.6 Summary 
A review of relevant literature has determined that the current state of science on the vulnerability 
of infrastructure to tsunami, is not sufficient enough to conduct a thorough impact assessment in 
isolation. A damage matrix has been developed to summarise qualitative data and post-event 
tsunami survey observations and substitute absent vulnerability metrics in a tsunami impact 
assessment, of which the methodology is subsequently presented. The results of this tsunami 
impact assessment will be used to determine an associated level of infrastructure service for each 
Christchurch city suburb. 
Chapter 3  Quantitative Vulnerability Analysis of Japanese Roads  




Chapter 3  
Quantitative Vulnerability Analysis of 
Japanese Roads to Tsunami Inundation 
3.1 Introduction  
The objective of this chapter is to develop quantitative tsunami inundation fragility curves for 
Japanese roads, to be used in tsunami impact modelling. This analysis is informed by the review 
of available fragility functions in Chapter 2, and uses data collected by post-event ground survey 
teams on damage from the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami in Japan. Fragility curves have 
been developed in collaboration with GNS Science (Horspool & Fraser 2015). 
 
Tsunami impact modelling can aid in tsunami mitigation and preparedness, however to do so a 
vulnerability metric is required. As determined in Chapter 2, fragility functions for tsunami 
impacts on infrastructure are not well constrained in the literature. Chapter 2 also provided a 
qualitative vulnerability method (tsunami damage matrix). However as discussed, this is a low 
resolution option and not applicable if quantitative fragility curves are available. Quantitative 
fragility functions provide the highest resolution vulnerability metric in a tsunami impact 
assessment and require detailed damage data collected during post-event field surveys (see 
Section 2.2). 
 
Following the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami, an analysis of impacted roads was carried out, 
using damage data from Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures in Japan. It has been recognised however 
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that these data require further revisions in order to create a complete asset inventory for the 
development of fragility curves (Eguchi et al. 2013).  
 
Road networks are one of the most vital lifelines for response and recovery actions following a 
tsunami disaster (Nakanishi et al. 2014; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Eguchi et al. 2013). First 
responders require access to impacted populations, and repair works to other lifelines can be 
delayed due to access constraints from damaged roads. Bridges are the most studied 
infrastructure asset in terms of tsunami impacts (e.g. Shoji & Moriyama 2007; Horspool & Fraser 
2015; Kawashima & Buckle 2013). They are also often the most vulnerable part of a 
transportation network and can have other lifelines attached to them (water, electricity, 
telecommunications etc.) increasing their importance in a lifeline network. Bridges can thus be 
cascading weak points or ‘hot spots’ for those networks (Bell et al. 2005; Edwards 2006; Horspool 
& Fraser 2015).  
 
The Mw 9.0 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake in the Pacific Ocean, east of Japan, was the cause of the 2011 
‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami disaster (Kazama & Noda 2012), (Figure 3.1). The maximum wave 
run up exceeded 30 m (MLIT 2012; Kazama & Noda 2012), resulting in more than 15,000 
deaths and extensive damage to buildings and infrastructure in Japan (Eguchi et al. 2013; Graf et 
al. 2014). Many coastal bridges were damaged from lateral forces of the flow or by impacts from 
large objects, including boats and cars. Coastal road networks were damaged, or totally destroyed, 
either by debris impact or erosion of the substrate material (Eguchi et al. 2013; MLIT 2012; 
Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kawashima & Buckle 2013; Kazama & Noda 2012).  
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Figure 3.1: Inundation extent of the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami along the coast of Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures, 
Japan (MLIT 2012) 
3.2 Methods  
The ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami provided post-disaster survey teams with an extensive area 
from which to collect damage data on infrastructural assets. The data sets used for this analysis 
are the results of a comprehensive ground survey carried out in the days to weeks following the 
tsunami by the Japanese Government, City Bureau of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism (MLIT 2013). The data relevant to this analysis included detailed 
infrastructure damage summaries and local maximum tsunami flow depths for the inundation 
area within Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures (Figure 3.1), which were two of the regions most 
impacted (Eguchi et al. 2013; Horspool & Fraser 2015; MLIT 2012; Kazama & Noda 2012). 
The flow depth and road damage data were presented as GIS shapefiles (.shp) to GNS Science, 
which provided a basis for this analysis. The damage data sets were supplemented with a 
Japanese-to-English translated spreadsheet of instructions and explanations. Modelled maximum 
flow depth (m) data was available in 100 x 100 m grid cells, across the regions (Eguchi et al. 2013; 
MLIT 2012; Horspool & Fraser 2015). Table 3.1 outlines the data used in this analysis. 
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Table 3.1: Available data and properties for a quantitative vulnerability analysis of Japanese roads to tsunami 
Data Type Relevant Attributes Format Source 
Roads 
Road type, damage level, 
damage description 
Shape-file 
(MLIT 2012; OpenStreetMap 
contributors 2015) 
Bridges 
Road type, damage level, 
damage description 
Shape-file 




Inundation depth, inundation 
height, elevation 






Satellite imagery none Base map 
(ESRI contributors 2015; 
Google 2015) 
To develop fragility curves requires: 
 Spatial hazard metric(s) 
 Measured or descriptive spatial asset data 
 Spatial non-damaged asset data 
 Asset attribute information 
 
Only assets that had been observed to experience some level of damage were recorded by the 
survey teams included in the database. This means that there were limited means to determine 
the ratio of damaged to undamaged assets. Observations of both damaged and undamaged assets 
are required to create a damage probability matrix which is used to develop a fragility function, 
otherwise a biased (over)estimate of damage will result. Asset inventory information is not 
publicly available for Japanese roads, therefore satellite imagery was used to complete the asset 
data sets within the inundation areas, as suggested by Eguchi et al. (2013).  
 
Figure 3.2 displays the overall conceptual method used in this analysis. The data produced 
(damage probability matrix) was subsequently used by Horspool and Fraser (2015) for statistical 
analysis of fragility curves for generic roads and bridges. Building upon this, the present research 
also provides an analysis of road use type vulnerability to tsunami, for the development of a 
subsequent damage probability matrix of road use fragility. The statistical analysis of these are 
less sophisticated than that of Horspool and Fraser (2015). 
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual method of vulnerability analysis of Japan roads. DS= damage state, DPM = damage probability 
matrix 
3.2.1 Generic Roads Fragility Functions 
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) data for roads had defined 
lengths with assigned damage states relating to the level of observed damage on each stretch of 
road. These are presented in Table 3.2, and examples shown in Figure 3.3. All roads missing 
from the data set were assumed to be undamaged, and were extracted from Open Street Map 
(OSM) or manually digitised from satellite imagery (OpenStreetMap contributors 2015; Google 
2015; ESRI contributors 2015). This meant all roads within the inundation extent now had an 
assigned damage state (including no damage) and could be included in the analysis (Figure 3.4). 
The damage descriptions were converted to corresponding alphanumeric values of DS0, DS1, 
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MLIT Damage Description 
0 None No Damage 
1 Minor Minor damage to road surface. All lanes passable 
2 Moderate Major damage to one lane. One lane impassable 
3 Severe Major damage to whole carriageway. All lanes impassable 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Examples of equivalent damage states observed in Coquimbo, Chile, following the 2015 'Illapel' earthquake 
tsunami 
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Figure 3.4: Damage states for roads in Ishinomaki, Japan, with maximum inundation depths (m) (MLIT 2012) 
The next step involved assigning a hazard metric to the exposed assets. In this case tsunami 
inundation depth was used, given the availability of data and standardised use in previous tsunami 
fragility function developments, however other tsunami hazard metrics could be used, such as 
flow velocity or momentum flux (energy) (Shoji & Moriyama 2007; Horspool & Fraser 2015; 
Suppasri et al. 2013; Charvet et al. 2015). The road data were spatially assigned a corresponding 
flow depth based upon the provided MLIT tsunami inundation extent shapefile (Figure 3.5). 
Where a road segment crossed multiple flow depth grids, it was split into new segments. This 
meant the inundated roads could be grouped by both damage state and inundation depth.  
 
The assigned attributes (inundation depth, damage state) and the road segment lengths were then 
exported to a spreadsheet where they were grouped by damage state (DS0 – DS3). Data were 
categorised into inundation depth bins of 0.5 m (i.e. 0 – 0.5 m, 0.6 – 1.0 m etc.). Once tabulated, 
these data were used to create a damage probability matrix by converting each damage state value 
to a proportion of total road length for each depth bin (e.g. Figure 3.6).  
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Figure 3.5: Road length totals at each 1m tsunami inundation depth bin, showing data volume for each catergory (MLIT 
2013; OpenStreetMap contributors 2015) 
 
The next step was to add the probability value of each damage state to the value of each greater 
damage state in the same depth bin (e.g. the probability of occurring in DS1 is added to the 
probability of occurring in DS2 and DS3). This creates a cumulative damage probability matrix 
and defines the probability of assets in each depth bin occurring in ≥DS1, ≥DS2 and ≥DS3 
(Figure 3.7).  
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Figure 3.7: Cumulative probability plot for tsunami damage to roads with 3-point. moving average trend lines. Based on the 
analysis of Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures, Japan (MLIT 2012) 
 
The analysis used for bridge damage probabilities was similar to that of roads, however 
inundation depth is normalised as height above the base of bridge decks. Open Street Map data 
already included bridges as a separate road attribute and so were easily integrated, and satellite 
imagery was used only to validate that all bridges were included in the data set. Any bridges that 
had been omitted were digitised manually. Bridge lengths were not necessary for the damage 
probability matrix, which uses bridge counts, therefore this attribute was not assigned to the data. 
Bridge construction materials were not available, neither was bridge deck height, both of which 
would be necessary for a higher resolution fragility function (Horspool & Fraser 2015; Shoji & 
Moriyama 2007).  
 
As with roads, each bridge within the MLIT data set had an assigned damage state between DS1 
& DS2 (Table 3.3). All non-surveyed bridges within the inundation extent were also assumed to 
be undamaged and consequently assigned DS0. All bridges within the inundation extent now had 
an assigned damage state and could be included in the analysis (Figure 3.8). To assign tsunami 
flow depths from the MLIT inundation extent shapefile, the centre point of each bridge was 
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MLIT Damage Description 
0 None No damage 
1 Minor Minor damage, often from impacts to the superstructure 
2 Moderate 
Major damage to superstructure but still in place on piers. 
Superstructure may have been shifted 
3 Severe Complete washout of superstructure 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Assigned damage states for bridges in Ishinomaki, Japan, with maximum flow depths (m) (MLIT 2012) 
 
Figure 3.9: The proportion of damage states is defined for all bridges at the 2 m and 12 m depth bins (MLIT 2012) 
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Figure 3.10: Cumulative probability plot for tsunami damage to bridges, with 3-point. moving average trend line. Based on 
the analysis of Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures, Japan (MLIT 2012) 
Using data from the damage probability matrices developed in the present research, Horspool 
and Fraser (2015) developed fragility curves for each damage state of bridges and roads. Within 
their analyses, inundation depths for bridges were normalised to allow for an average of 5 m deck 
base heights, in the absence of attribute data. The cumulative damage probability data, from the 
present analysis, were first plotted as points, and a log-normal cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) curve applied to each damage state data set (Horspool & Fraser 2015). The log-normal 
CDF was chosen as it has been used to fit fragility curves for other tsunami damage analyses 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Shoji & Moriyama 2007; Suppasri et al. 2013). Each curve by 
Horspool and Fraser (2015) defines the probability of being in that damage state or greater as a 
function of tsunami inundation depth (m) for generic roads and generic bridges. 
 
3.2.2 Road Use Fragility Functions 
The goal of this work was to create a damage probability matrix for each construction type of a 
given asset. However, this relied on construction type, damage state, and inundation depth data 
being available for exposed assets.  
 
In this case, the MLIT data did not contain construction type data for roads. To address this, the 
MLIT surveyed roads were categorised into broad pre-assigned ‘Road Type’ classes and then 
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spatial comparison and expert opinion (Davies, H, 2015, pers. comm., 6 August). This was not 
done for bridges as the ‘road use’ categories do not correspond so closely with construction types. 
Table 3.4:  MLIT road type categories and equivalent Open Street Map (OSM) classifications (MLIT 2012; OpenStreetMap 
contributors 2015) 
MLIT Number MLIT Classifications OSM Classifications 
(0/99) Unclassified Unclassified, No Data 
(1) State Road Motorway, Trunk, Primary 
(2) The Main Local Road Secondary 
(3) General Prefectural Road Residential, Road, 
(4) Municipalities Road Tertiary 
(5) Lowest Class Roads Construction, Service, Unsurfaced 
Many roads digitised from satellite imagery were assumed to be ‘General Prefectural Roads’ (3). 
However those that could not be classified were assigned to ‘NoData’ and have not contributed 
towards the damage probability matrices. Similarly, ‘Unclassified’ roads were also omitted. The 
data were grouped by type (1 – 5) (Figure 3.11) and the process of developing cumulative 
probability matrices was the same as described in section 3.2.1. This defined the cumulative 
probability of a road occurring within a damage state, as a function of inundation depth, for five 
different road types (e.g. Figure 3.12).  
 
Figure 3.11: Total road lengths of each road type category, showing the volume of data in each category (MLIT 2013; 
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Figure 3.12: The proportion of damage states is defined for road types at the 2 m and 12 m depth bins. Note that (5) ‘Lowest 
Class Roads’ do not have sufficient data >2 m, therefore have been omitted here (MLIT 2012) 
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Using the ‘Road Type’ cumulative damage probability matrices, fragility curves were developed. 
The cumulative damage data bins were grouped in increasingly larger depth bins as inundation 
height increased. This was to take into consideration smaller sample sizes at greater inundation 
depths (see Figure 3.5).  
 
Similar to the fragility curves developed by Horspool & Fraser (2015), the data were plotted as 
points, then a simple cumulative curve was applied to each damage state for each road use. Each 
curve defines a simplified probability of a road type being in a given damage state, or greater, as 
a function of tsunami inundation depth.  
3.3 Results 
In order to increase the resolution of tsunami impact modelling, fragility curves were developed 
for roads and bridges using post-disaster survey data. This is the first instance that quantitative 
fragility curves have been developed for tsunami impacts to roads, to the best of this author’s 
knowledge, and the first for an infrastructure dataset of this size for tsunami damage.  
 
Using the results displayed in Figure 3.13, it was found that roads in general performed well, even 
under the highest inundation depths. For example there is less than 0.2 probability of complete 
washout (DS3) at 15 m inundation depth. By comparison a reinforced concrete building has a 
0.4 probability of complete washout at the same inundation depth (Suppasri et al. 2013).  
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Figure 3.13: Fragility curves for generic road, based on the analysis of data from Miyagi and Iwate Prefecture, Japan 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; MLIT 2012) 
Figure 3.14 displays fragility curves for bridges, which appear to be more vulnerable to tsunami 
inundation than roads. For example generic bridges have a probability of 0.33 for being ≥DS3 at 
10 m inundation, whereas roads have a probability of 0.08 at the same inundation depth. This is 
to be expected given a bridge’s vertical profile and increased exposure when crossing channels.  
The lack of construction material data for bridges means that other fragility curves by Shoji & 
Moriyama (2007; described in Chapter 2) would perhaps provide a more realistic vulnerability 
metric. However, the MLIT data used here include almost five times as many bridges as the 
‘Indian Ocean Tsunami’ data set used by Shoji & Moriyama (2007). 
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Figure 3.14: Fragility curves for generic bridges based on the analysis of data from Miyagi and Iwate Prefecture, Japan 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; MLIT 2012) 
 
In the road use fragility curves shown in Figure 3.15, road type 1 shows very low vulnerability to 
inundation depth which is unsurprising since this class would include Japan’s most highly 
engineered road assets. This implies higher construction standards and stronger construction 
materials compared with other road types. Road types 2, 3 and 4 trend very similarly and likely 
share a similar spread of road construction materials. These also show significantly lower 
vulnerability to inundation depth than that of type 5 roads. Type 5 roads show very high 
vulnerability at even low inundation depths. This class most likely includes unsealed roads and 
would be extremely susceptible to erosion. Note that DS1 and DS2 for road type 5 did not have 
adequate data to present curves for. Subsequently just the curve for reaching or exceeding DS3 
is shown. 
 
The bridge fragility curves for DS2 and DS3 (Figure 3.14) are similar to those of the same damage 
states for the reinforced concrete curves in Shoji & Moriyama (2007), (Chapter 2). They are 
however at higher vulnerabilities than precast concrete and steel construction types. This is likely 
because the average Japanese bridge is comparable to the top end of construction standards for 
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Figure 3.15: Fragility curves for road types 1 - 5 based on the analysis of data from Miyagi and Iwate Prefecture, Japan  
(MLIT 2012) 
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Unlike Japanese roads, many described in the literature (Section 2.2) were not well engineered 
or were without well-compacted base materials. In the case of previous studies in places like 
Indonesia (e.g. Shoji & Moriyama 2007), some carriageways are laid directly onto loose sandy 
materials. This places great value on the Japanese survey data as construction standards there are 
typical also of New Zealand roads.  
 
The generic road fragility curve (Figure 3.13) remains the most reliable to the application of an 
impact model, however the road type fragility curves (Figure 3.15) provide a valuable alternative 
in the absence of a construction type vulnerability metric. Fragility curves developed in this 
chapter, and subsequently by Horspool and Fraser (2015), provide the means to develop high 
resolution tsunami impact assessments for both roads and bridges. In the case of an impact 
model for Christchurch city, they will be used in place of the qualitative damage matrix to 
determine asset vulnerability, as described in Chapter 2. 
3.3.1 Limitations of Results 
As mentioned previously, this is the first time quantitative fragility curves for tsunami damage to 
roads have been developed. It is also the largest data set used in the development of fragility 
curves for bridges. However, as with all analyses, these results are not without their limitations. 
 
Fragility functions for roads have been developed from the MLIT data by using road types 
(Figure 3.15). These delineate the vulnerabilities more realistically than using generic fragility 
curves. However these should be used with caution in tsunami impact assessments, as they are 
broadly categorised and each will have included construction materials that fall within multiple 
‘Road Use’ categories. There will also inevitably be some inconsistencies in the conversion of 
MLIT road types to OSM road types. Any discrepancies could be due to translations, differing 
standards between countries and personal bias.  There is also an element of judgement over how 
the damage states were assigned (Graf et al. 2014) and it is not entirely clear what types of damage 
are associated with each damage state (Eguchi et al. 2013). It is unknown if damage to the actual 
pavement is a prerequisite for a damage state assignment. For example it is not clear if DS1 
includes debris coverage on an otherwise undamaged road.  
 
Another concern with the ‘road type’ curves (Figure 3.15) is the lack of data for type 5 roads. 
This may pertain to an error in the data collection from unsealed roads, which can appear non-
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existent in the field once silt and debris are deposited on top. This could also simply indicate a 
low threshold for damage, implying that once damage begins to occur on an unsealed road it 
rapidly becomes significant at any inundation depth. Nevertheless, a more gradual increase with 
inundation depth should be expected.  
 
The damage probability matrices used for the fragility function development of both roads and 
bridges remain based upon the assumption that all roads within the inundation extent were 
surveyed for damage. This is the basis of assigning all non-surveyed roads to DS1. The analysis 
also assumed that all damage to an asset was exclusively from tsunami impacts. There was 
however likely damage associated with, or exacerbated by, the Mw 9.0 earthquake and 
subsequent aftershocks. This means that the weakening effect of the earthquake is not taken into 
account when applying the fragility functions to an impact assessment using a far-field tsunami 
scenario.  
 
Although inundation depth is a widely used hazard metric for both tsunami and flood damage 
(e.g. Shoji & Moriyama 2007; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Suppasri et al. 2013), velocity of flow or 
momentum flux (energy) are also a determining factor in the  distribution of damage during a 
tsunami (see Chapters 1 and 2). It is assumed that an ‘inundation depth’ metric also encompasses 
a metric of ‘flow velocity’ (i.e. greater maximum flow depths = greater maximum flow velocities). 
However flow velocity is more locally distributed than flow depth (which uses 100 x 100 m grids 
in this instance), due to the effects of hydrodynamic forces associated with changes in topography 
and obstructions.  
 
To address some of these limitations, future post-event surveys should adhere to international 
post-event tsunami survey guidelines, such as those presented by Dominey-Howes et al. (2012). 
This would ensure future post-event field surveys include data relevant to all aspects of disaster 
management, including fragility functions. Also, if attribute data for pre-disaster Japanese assets 
become available (e.g. construction type and bridge deck heights), then fragility curves should be 
developed to include these, as a replacement for the road use curves above (Figure 3.15).  
Despite their limitations, the fragility curves developed in this chapter are extremely useful for a 
tsunami impact assessment. The impact assessment of Christchurch city infrastructure will use 
both the generic road fragility curves from Figure 3.13 and the road type curves from Figure 3.15. 
This will provide a comparison of results, taking each method’s limitations into account. 
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Fragility curves have been developed for roads and bridges using survey data following the 2011 
‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami. The fragility functions developed are limited by available data but 
provide the first quantitative fragility function for tsunami road damage and the largest data set 
for bridge vulnerability. These will be used to increase the resolution of a tsunami impact 
assessment for Christchurch city infrastructure. 
 




Chapter 4  
Impact Assessment of Christchurch City 
Infrastructure 
4.1 Introduction  
The objective of this chapter is to present and critically discuss the results of a tsunami impact 
assessment undertaken for Christchurch city infrastructure for a far-field tsunami scenario. The 
results of an exposure assessment are first presented, and impacts on Christchurch city 
infrastructure are then shown for the given tsunami scenario. The scenario used (see Appendix 
7.1) is from a Peru subduction zone source and was chosen as it represents an extreme event for 
Christchurch city. This includes asset exposure summaries and damage probability maps for each 
infrastructure network. A simple ‘level of service’ assessment summarises the results. The results 
are critically discussed and implications for the greater Christchurch city area are taken into 
account. To conclude this chapter, possible response and mitigation options are identified. 
 
This chapter draws on outputs from Chapters 2 and 3 within the impact assessment model.  
Specifically, the qualitative tsunami damage matrix for infrastructure is used from Chapter 2.  
While quantitative fragility curves for roads and bridges are used from Chapter 3. See Table 2.6 
for the most applicable vulnerability metric for each available Christchurch city asset. These are 
used for the specified assets in this tsunami impact assessment as they represent the highest 
resolution data available for their respective elements as discussed in Chapter 2. Note however 
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that electricity network assets are absent from the assessment. This is due to accessibility 
restrictions on asset data within the time restraints of this thesis. 
4.2 Asset Exposure 
The objective of this section is to present results from a tsunami exposure analysis of 
Christchurch city infrastructure. It is based off the given tsunami scenario (Appendix 7.1) and is 
the first step data processing step in the impact assessment process (Figure 1.2). All available 
assets have been assigned a measure of hazard intensity for the purpose of later assigning an 
associated measure of vulnerability. 
 
The tsunami exposure (inundation depth) of each available Christchurch city infrastructure asset 
is presented in Table 4.1 and a map of Christchurch infrastructure assets is presented in Figure 
4.1 for context. These are measured in kilometre lengths for network assets (such as roads) and 
counts for network nodes (such as cellular towers). Kilometre is used as a metric of length given 
the large volume of exposed network asset spans (e.g. Figure 4.1). Potable water has the highest 
exposure to tsunami inundation in this scenario, with over 167 km inundated. However, in terms 
of above-ground infrastructure, roads have the highest exposure with over 130 km inundated. 
Potable water and roads are also the first and second most exposed assets to inundation depths 
over 2 m. 
Table 4.1: Summary of Christchurch infrastructure exposure to tsunami inundation. Pump stations refer to the wastewater 
network. Bridge inundation refers to height above deck base 
Impact Lengths (km) Impact Counts 
Inundation 
Depth (m) 












<1 21.8 58.8 36.1 70.5 .5 6 7 4 15 
1 - 1.9 12.7 36.7 23.8 43.4 1.1 7 1 3 16 
2 - 2.9 9.1 20 14.6 24.7 .7 5 2 2 0 
3 - 3.9 5.5 13.8 11.7 17.8 0 2 0 1 0 
4 - 5 3.5 4.2 5.6 8.4 0 1 0 2 0 
>5 .1 .5 .23 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
Impacted 
52.7 134 92 167.2 2.3 21 10 12 31 






Figure 4.1: Map of Christchurch city infrastructure assets. For asset data sources see Table 2.5 
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4.3 Infrastructure Impacts 
Tsunami impact assessment results are presented in the section below, indicating probabilities of 
damage for infrastructure networks. First, results for assets which had quantitative vulnerability 
metrics available are presented, followed by assets for sectors using qualitative vulnerability 
metrics. These apply to the methods defined in Chapter 2. Christchurch city suburbs referred to 
in this section can be found in Appendix 7.6. 
4.3.1 Transport 
4.3.1.1 Roads 
The road transport impact models use quantitative fragility curves, developed in Chapter 3, as 
hazard metrics.  Both generic fragility curves and ones which take road use into account have 
been modelled for comparison, as they each have their own benefits and limitations as discussed 
in Chapter 3. Figure 4.2 displays results of a model using generic fragility curves for roads and 
bridges (Horspool & Fraser 2015), while Figure 4.3 uses ‘Road Type’ fragility curves for roads. 
Bridges are modelled exclusively with generic curves and do not differ between road models. 
Results are presented as the probability of reaching or exceeding DS2, which is equivalent to 
significant damage occurring. 
 
The generic road model (Figure 4.2) suggests that most roads will range from <0.05 – 0.2 in 
probability for significant damage occurring, the highest of which are in Sumner and Moncks 
Bay, as well as in New Brighton and South Shore. Comparatively, when defining vulnerabilities 
for road use types, the model presented in Figure 4.3 suggests probabilities mostly <0.1 – 0.3 of 
significant damage occurring. The highest probabilities occur in Sumner (0.3 – 0.35), with similar 
values also represented in New Brighton and South Shore.  
 
Bridges appear to have even lower probabilities of damage using a generic vulnerability metric 
(<0.2), and most have a 0.0 probability of significant damage occurring (Figure 4.2). This is 
surprising given that they were deemed more vulnerable in a review of literature (e.g. Akiyama 
et al. 2013) and the development of fragility curves presented in Chapters 2 and 3. This may 
come down to the lack of bridge height data used as an input for the generic fragility curves. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, bridge deck heights were all assumed to be 5 m above ground level. This 
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was to normalise inundation depth values as a depth above the base of a bridge deck. The lack 
of construction type data was also noted as a limitation to these curves in Chapter 3. Subsequently 
higher probabilities of significant damage could presumably be expected for areas of high 
inundation depths (e.g. in Sumner) for bridges of lower construction standards (e.g. wooden 
bridge). 
 
These results present relatively low probabilities of significant damage for road transport assets. 
Based on these, on average Christchurch city could expect around 15% of roads exposed to 
tsunami inundation to be significantly damaged in this given scenario (likely concentrated mostly 
in the suburb of Sumner).  
 




Figure 4.2: Modelled probability of Christchurch city roads and bridges reaching or exceeding DS2 in a tsunami scenario, 
using generic fragility curves 




Figure 4.3: Modelled probability of Christchurch city roads and bridges reaching or exceeding DS2 in a tsunami scenario, 
using ‘road use’ fragility curves 
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To more clearly see the differences between these two models, Figure 4.4 provides a closer look 
at the suburb of Sumner. Here the differences between the two vulnerability inputs are slightly 
more evident. The ‘road use’ model (right) suggests more contrasting damage probability, with 
slightly higher values evident, in comparison to generic road vulnerability modelling (left). The 
‘road use’ vulnerability model also has damage probabilities slightly less constrained by 
inundation depth than that of the generic fragility model. This indicates variations in road 
construction standards associated with the road use categories constrained in Chapter 3. Note 
that bridges use the same vulnerability input and show no variation between the two models. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Modelled probability of roads and bridges reaching or exceeding DS2 in a given tsunami scenario, for the 
suburb of Sumner, using generic (left) and ‘road use’ (right) road vulnerability metrics. Bridges use a generic vulnerability 
metric in both models 
 
4.3.1.2 Port 
The modelled assets for tsunami impacts to ports are limited to wharves, as outlined in Chapter 
2. However, included in this subsection are impact models for both rail and petroleum. Rail is 
included, as the relevant assets are only exposed to tsunami inundation within the confines of the 
port for the present scenario. Petroleum fuel storage tanks have been included in the results for 
ports due to the spatial exclusivity of relevant assets in Lyttelton Port. It should be noted however 
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that these fall into the energy infrastructural sector. Wharves and rail both use a damage matrix 
method as outlined in Chapter 2. Fuel storage tanks use a generic quantitative damage curve 
(Hatayama 2014), allowing a numeric probability of damage to be determined. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, this provides a less subjective and higher resolution vulnerability metric than that of a 
qualitative one.  It may be useful in future research to treat the port as a single entity, thereby 
using the same vulnerability metric (i.e. tsunami damage matrix) for all assets. The current 
approach does not allow for easy comparison as the data have not had the same level of 
treatment. One could argue that it is preferable to model all assets with the same level of accuracy, 
however the approach used here takes the highest resolution vulnerability metric available (i.e. 
fragility curve), as outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
The model presented suggests that wharves have high probability of damage (Figure 4.5). This is 
unsurprising given they are one of the most exposed assets to tsunami inundation in terms of 
depth, velocity and duration. Results for the rail model indicate that exposed assets are largely at 
medium to high probabilities of damage occurring. It is also likely that ballasts would be scoured 
and tracks extensively covered with debris given the proximity to port facilities and their location 
at the base of a confining slope (Figure 4.5). Debris could include shipping containers, vehicles 
and vessels.  The model for fuel storage tanks (Figure 4.5) suggests all exposed tanks are below 
0.15 probability of damage occurring. This is dependent however on the volume of liquids inside 
(Scawthorn et al. 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) and the construction 
type of tanks, both of which are excluded from this assessment.  








The model for wastewater assets uses the damage probability index method (Chapter 2). It 
indicates low to medium probability of damage occurring within the inundation zone for 
wastewater pipes (Figure 4.6). The largest concentrations of pipes with medium probability of 
damage are in Sumner, Moncks Bay and New Brighton (see Appendix 7.4). New Brighton, 
Redcliffs, Taylors Mistake and Lyttelton all have small concentrations of pipes at a medium 
probability of damage, while Sumner pipes are largely at a medium probability of damage. The 
most noteworthy damages are the medium probability associated with the Ferrymead Bridge and 
the link between Moncks Bay and Sumner. Significant damage at either location could result in 
loss of service, or a bypass of treatment facilities. Also included in this model are wastewater 
pump stations. These are necessary to pump waste up-slope to the treatment plant from eastern 
suburbs. The model suggests these are largely at high probability of damage. It should be noted 
that for the given tsunami scenario the Christchurch city wastewater treatment plant is not 
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exposed to any level of tsunami inundation other than low inundation depths around the flanks 
of the eastern most treatment pond’s stop-bank (Figure 4.6). Since the hazard model uses fixed 
topography, scour is not considered for this feature, and stop-bank impacts from tsunami are not 
assessed in the present research. Future research is recommended on the vulnerability of the 
stop-bank and whether a breach would impact the functionality of the wastewater treatment plant 
facilities. 
4.3.2.2 Potable Water 
Using the damage matrix method, the model for tsunami impacts on potable water implies that 
pipes have a low to medium probability of damage occurring (Figure 4.7). The spatial distribution 
of damage probability is the same as with wastewater pipes (Figure 4.6). If construction type or 
material variations were included in the analysis, the results would likely be much less constrained 
by inundation depth between these two similar networks. New Brighton, Redcliffs, Lyttelton and 
Sumner all have pipes at a medium probability of damage, while Sumner pipes are largely at a 
medium probability of damage. A notable observation is the medium probability of damage 
occurring to pipes south of Lyttelton Port, which supply water to the other side of the harbour 
and are exposed to the strong currents produced by a tsunami traveling in and out of the harbour. 
4.3.2.3 Stormwater 
Using the damage matrix method, the modelled results for stormwater pipes indicate a range 
from low-medium to medium probability of damage for most assets (Figure 4.8). This is slightly 
higher than wastewater and potable water. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, although pipes are 
generally of similar construction to wastewater, they are often at significantly shallower depth and 
thus much more vulnerable to damage from debris impacts and soil erosion. As with the other 
two water networks (Figures 4.6 and 4.7), Sumner is almost completely at a medium probability 
of damage occurring for stormwater pipes.  
 
The only variation in vulnerability metrics for stormwater is the distinction of open drain 
channels from buried stormwater pipes. Open drain channels (located largely just south-west of 
the wastewater treatment ponds) are all at a high probability of damage, as inferred by this model 
(Figure 4.8). This may be due to a higher degree of exposure, being an uncovered waterway. 
They are also a likely flow path for tsunami waters, which could increase the chances for some 
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degree of scour or debris deposition. In saying this, damage to these channels is unlikely to affect 
their functionality for drainage purposes, unless they are entirely infilled with tsunami deposits. 
 
 
It is also worth noting that street gutters are an integral part of the stormwater network, but are 
not constrained in the present research. In addition to buried stormwater pipes being 
compromised, the presence of debris and sediment on roads (e.g. Appendix 7.4) could 
exacerbate impacts on the functionality of stormwater infrastructure. This could in part be 
inferred by the impacts to roads. 
 
 




Figure 4.6: Modelled probability of tsunami damage occurring to wastewater network in Christchurch city. 
Treatment Plant 
Treatment Ponds 




Figure 4.7: Modelled probability of tsunami damage occurring to potable water network in Christchurch city  
 




Figure 4.8: Modelled probability of tsunami damage occurring to stormwater network in Christchurch city 
 




The tsunami impacts model for cellular towers uses the tsunami damage matrix from Chapter 2 
as a vulnerability metric. The model suggests a large proportion of towers are at high probability 
of damage occurring in the given scenario (Figure 4.9). Only two exposed towers, in Ferrymead 
and Mt Pleasant, are exempt from a high probability of damage. 
 




Figure 4.9: Modelled probability of tsunami damage occurring to cellular towers in Christchurch city 
  
Chapter 4  Impact Assessment of Christchurch City Infrastructure 
80 
 
4.4 Levels of Service 
Results from a level of service analysis are presented in Table 4.2. By grouping each infrastructure 
sector by suburb, a measure of serviceability has been assigned, determined by whether the 
service would likely be available or would likely not be available for each network (i.e. within 
hours following the final damaging wave). These were determined using an entirely subjective, 
logic-based, decision-making approach (presented in Appendix 7.5) by the author based upon 
each network’s probability of damage in each suburb (outlined in Chapter 2). This took into 
account higher probabilities at network bottlenecks and other key network nodes (e.g. pump 
stations for wastewater), as well as the presence of network redundancies. 















Waimairi Beach Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 
North Beach Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 
Rawhiti Yes Yes No Yes No N/A N/A 
New Brighton Yes No No No No N/A N/A 
Aranui Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 
Bexley Yes No No No Yes N/A N/A 
South Brighton Yes No No No No N/A N/A 
South Shore Yes No No No No N/A N/A 
Bromley Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 
Ferrymead Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 
Heathcote Valley Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A 
Mt Pleasant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 
Moncks Bay Yes No No No No N/A N/A 
Sumner No No No No No N/A N/A 
Lyttelton Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
 
The exposed suburbs are broadly listed from North to South (See Appendix 7.6) and clear 
patterns are evident across the various networks. The areas modelled with higher damage 
occurrence probabilities are expressed more commonly here as having a subsequent loss of 
service (for example, stormwater in Sumner and New Brighton). This does not take into account 
the cascading impacts of interdependent network losses. 
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The subjective nature of these levels of service have their limitations, however they do provide 
an important insight in to network response and mitigation priorities on a suburb-by-suburb, and 
a network-by-network basis. 
 
Based on this analysis, Sumner would be a priority for all applicable infrastructure assets, 
followed closely by New Brighton, South Brighton and South Shore. Lyttelton may also be 
considered a high priority given its expected loss of port and rail service given, and given the local 
and national importance of such networks and their exclusivity to this suburb. Areas of low 
priority include Waimairi Beach, North Beach, Ferrymead, Heathcote Valley and Mt Pleasant.  
4.5 Model Interdependence 
4.5.1 Model Limitations 
A number of assumptions and limitations exist within components of this tsunami impact 
assessment model which could have a bearing on model results. Key assumptions and limitations 
have been categorised as to whether they would result in the model output (i.e. probability of 
damage or exceeding a damage state) being over-estimated, under-estimated, or having negligible 
impacts on model results and consequently levels of service (Table 4.3). These values were 
determined subjectively based on the review of literature presented in Chapter 2, with particular 
regard to impact assessment limitations.  
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Table 4.3: Assumptions and limitations of tsunami impact assessment models and likely implications to outputs 
Assumption/limitation 






Models based on damage matrix do not determine damage state    
Construction standards not considered    
Other hazard metrics not considered (e.g. velocity & debris impacts)    
‘Road use’ is not equivalent to ‘construction type’ for roads model    
Qualitative vulnerability metrics    
Broad inundation depth bins    
Use of ‘generic’ fragility curves    
Low volumes of literature/observations for some qualitative damage probabilities    
Fragility curves encompass assets exposed to prior earthquake impacts    
Inundation model assumes static topography    
Levels of service do not consider network interdependency and cascading 
damage 
   
Levels of service do not take all infrastructural assets into account    
Subjective levels of service    
4.5.2 Model Refinement 
This model could be refined by 
• Quantitative vulnerability metrics for all infrastructural assets 
• Developing fragility curves based upon construction standards for New Zealand assets 
• Developing fragility curves that define variations in vulnerability for different asset 
construction types  
• Inventories for more infrastructural assets (electrical cables and substations should be a 
priority) 
• Modelling different inundation scenarios 
• Extending the assessment to include regions outside of the Christchurch metropolitan 
area 
 
The tsunami impact models presented here have been designed to allow for the easy integration 
of other infrastructural assets, hazard models, and locations. It is also recommended that further 
research into tsunami fragility curve development for infrastructure be used to replace current 
qualitative methods. 
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4.6 Implications for Christchurch 
This section discusses the potential implications this research has for response and recovery 
operations in Christchurch city based on modelled impacts to infrastructure. Implications for 
both inundated and non-inundated areas are discussed. A discussion on the implications for 
Christchurch’s ongoing recovery as well as prioritisation of risk treatment strategies are then 
discussed. 
 
4.6.1 Network Interdependence 
Access to eastern suburbs could be restricted following the given tsunami scenario. This may 
occur due to damaged roads and bridges or extensive debris coverage throughout the inundation 
zone. Consequently, this may hinder response and recovery efforts. Moncks Bay, Sumner and 
South Shore (see Appendix 7.4) could be particularly impacted given their presently limited 
access routes, which could be further limited following tsunami damage. Taylors Mistake beach 
(south of Sumner) could become extremely isolated given its location. 
 
Asset data were not available for electricity networks for the present research (but could be easily 
implemented in the future). However, based on fragility curves developed by Horspool & Fraser 
(2015), damage to the electricity network could likely occur, including overhead cables and 
substations. In these curves, at 4 m of tsunami inundation a 10 m pole has a 0.6 probability of 
exceeding DS2, (where it would at least require repairs). An outdoor substation has a 0.8 
probability of reaching or exceeding minor damage (DS1), which would require shut down and 
repairs, at just 1 m tsunami inundation. Given that areas like Sumner could experience >4 m 
inundation in the present scenario, damage to the Christchurch electricity network could be 
expected. The loss of electrical services could subsequently have significant implications for 
response and recovery operations following a damaging tsunami. In the case of electricity loss 
this is often remedied by use of mobile generators, although these are then dependant on fuel 
supply (mentioned further below). Recovery of the electricity network itself could again be 
hindered by network interdependence including access restrictions and other infrastructure 
service losses.  
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Building on the above point, damage to Lyttelton wharves (Figure 4.5) could also be a significant 
hindrance to response and recovery efforts following a damaging tsunami. This is especially 
important given that this scenario is unlikely to be a local event. Coastal roads, rails and ports 
could feasibly be damaged elsewhere along the East Coast of the South Island. Lyttelton also has 
national importance to South Island mining, agricultural and manufacturing exports, many of 
which are sent through the port. Irrespective of response and recovery actions, supplies to 
Christchurch and possibly the South Island would be limited as a result of wharf damage (e.g. 
fuel shortages). One other impact not considered in the assessment of Lyttelton Port is possible 
changes to harbour bathymetry following a tsunami. Dredging may be required if large vessel 
access routes have shallowed (Horspool & Fraser 2015). Following the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ 
earthquake tsunami in Japan, debris had to be cleared from harbours and ports to allow access 
for vessels (Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012). This could likely be the case in Lyttelton with the given 
scenario, however the harbour could feasibly remain navigable. There is a lower debris potential 
given the harbour’s steep slopes and comparatively sparse built environment. Lyttelton Township 
is not expected to lose any services outside of the port in this scenario (Table 4.2). The most 
direct impact on the community may likely be a temporary or permanent loss of work for port 
employees. In saying this, the recovery and rebuild phases of a disaster often increase 
opportunities for jobs in other business sectors as well as recovery work. This was evident in parts 
of Christchurch following the 2011-2012 ‘Canterbury earthquake sequence’ (Stevenson et al. 
2011).  Another point to consider is that given the probabilities of damage to the fuel storage 
tanks (Figure 4.5), loss of service is not expected from the Lyttelton ‘tank farm’. However any 
damage has the potential to trigger fires. This could have significant impacts on the surrounding 
infrastructure and may be difficult to contain with limited firefighting access following a tsunami.  
 
Tsunami impacts to infrastructure could cascade into areas outside of the inundation zone. One 
such impact that can affect infrastructure after a tsunami is silt dispersion. Based on the literature 
review and post-event field observations, sea breezes can remobilise tsunami deposits and carry 
them farther inland. Also the loss of a wastewater pumping station could result in the bypass of 
treatment facilities for that specific catchment. This would however not likely effect wastewater 
disposal in other catchments, provided the wastewater treatment plant (Figure 4.6) remains 
operational (Centre for Advanced Engineering 1997; Snyder-Bishop, K, 2015, pers comm., 17 
November). As mentioned previously the Christchurch city wastewater treatment plant is not 
exposed in the given tsunami scenario other than its eastern most stop-banks. 
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Not considered in the present research are the conditions preceding and following a tsunami 
event. Inland flooding due to damage of stormwater networks and outflows could be exacerbated 
by adverse weather conditions flushing greater volumes of tsunami deposits into the network. 
Water being drained eastward from western Christchurch may be restricted due to network 
blockages. This could result in flooding at various locations. Changes to surface flow patterns 
could also occur following tsunami soil erosion and deposition, which may also result in surface 
flooding.  Damage to buildings could also result in unrestricted flows of potable water from 
private properties. Significant occurrences of this can result in lower water pressure for other 
parts of the network (Snyder-Bishop, K, 2015, pers comm., 17 November) and also add to 
surface flooding within the impacted zones. If extensive, a loss of pressure can result in the 
intrusion of untreated water, including sea water, wastewater and stormwater, contaminating 
larger sections of pipe networks. Defining the cascading effects of network losses outside of the 
inundation zones, in this scenario, would require a network interdependency analysis and further 
tsunami impact modelling. 
 
4.6.2 Ongoing Recovery 
Christchurch was severely impacted by the 2011 - 2016 ‘Canterbury earthquake sequence’ and 
many infrastructure networks required repair and renewal that are ongoing today. Much of this 
damage occurred in the eastern suburbs (see Figure 1.10) which are exposed to the given tsunami 
scenario presented in this research. There are areas within this inundation zone which had loss 
of services following the 2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence. Affected residents and 
businesses may struggle to cope with the loss of lifeline services once more under the present 
scenario (Stevenson et al. 2011). The economic cost of infrastructure repairs could be high given 
the potentially national scope of a tsunami event. On top of that, skilled network repairers may 
be spread thinly during the response and recovery phase of an event like this. It could feasibly 
take many more years to get services back to their pre-event standard. One positive implication 
of this is that job opportunities can increase for recovery workers, providing an economic boost 
for impacted areas (Stevenson et al. 2011).  
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4.6.3 Risk Treatment Prioritisation 
The present research provides an opportunity for emergency managers, planners and lifelines 
group managers to reduce the impacts of a damaging tsunami on infrastructure, with some degree 
of confidence in terms of where priorities may lie. Sumner could be considered a high priority 
for all assets, based on the concentration of higher damage probabilities in the impact models. 
The suburb also has the highest concentration of people within the inundation zone, with 
approximately 3,345 inhabitants (Statistics New Zealand 2013).  Lyttelton Port may also be 
considered a priority for mitigation, given the every-day and post-event importance of its 
operation, as discussed above.  
Tsunami risk reduction should also consider that there will be a number of challenges to be 
overcome before some areas can be re-occupied after a tsunami including: 
• reinstatement of critical infrastructure;  
• cleaning and repair of roads to provide access; 
• assessment of what areas are beyond repair; 
• disposal of debris and other tsunami deposits 
4.7 Response and Mitigation Options 
Appendix 7.7 presents a summary of response and mitigation options. This has been designed 
as a follow-on from the damage matrix developed in Chapter 2 (Appendix 7.3). It provides a 
response and mitigation option for each damage style, determined for every asset in the preceding 
damage matrix. The index was completed by conducting a further review of relevant literature 
and post-event field observations. These are not specific to Christchurch city, and thus could be 
applied globally. A high level summary for risk treatment of Christchurch city infrastructure is 
not included, as the mitigation options for tsunami impacts on infrastructure are vast (Appendix 
7.7). The assessment of appropriate risk treatment, within the risk management framework 
(Figure 1.1) should include a detailed cost benefit analysis (Power 2013), in order to determine 
appropriate tsunami mitigation techniques, which falls outside the scope of the present research. 




This chapter presents the results of a tsunami impact assessment for Christchurch city 
infrastructure, having already established methods and data requirements in previous chapters. 
Damage probability maps and levels of service are presented for each available infrastructural 
network. The results are critically discussed including research limitations and study implications. 
Finally a response and mitigation index is presented for tsunami impacts on infrastructure. 




Chapter 5  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis, as outlined in Chapter 1, is to assess the tsunami impacts on 
Christchurch city infrastructure with the aim of providing information that will help local 
emergency managers, planners in the reduction of tsunami impacts.  The thesis also informs 
infrastructure managers. 
 
In order to meet research objectives, systematic reviews of published literature and post-event 
survey observations were conducted for tsunami damage styles, tsunami impact assessments, 
tsunami impacts on infrastructure and tsunami response and mitigation options for infrastructure.  
 
Tsunami were found to have four key styles of damage in Chapter 1: inundation and 
contamination; hydrodynamic forces; debris impacts; and soil instability. A review of tsunami 
literature in Section 2.2 found that an impact assessment process is appropriate to implement for 
tsunami. Consequently hazard, exposure and vulnerability demand parameters were reviewed 
for the purpose of modelling tsunami impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure. However, the 
availability of locally relevant resources has been identified as a limiting factor in past tsunami 
impact assessments and for this research. In an effort to partially address an absence of tsunami 
vulnerability metrics for infrastructure, prior tsunami impacts on infrastructure were reviewed 
and summarised within a tsunami damage matrix (Appendix 7.3).  The reviewed methods from 
Chapter 2 were used to implement an impact assessment process for tsunami impacts on 
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infrastructure in Chapter 4, with both readily available resources and those synthesised from the 
present research. This included the tsunami damage matrix (Chapter 2; Appendix 7.3) and an 
analysis of Japanese road and bridge tsunami vulnerability (Chapter 3). To do this a credible 
tsunami impact model for Christchurch city infrastructure was run based on existing hazard 
models (Appendix 7.1) for a hypothetical tsunami scenario, with results presented in Chapter 4.  
 
It is concluded, based on the findings of this research (Chapter 4), that exposed areas of 
Christchurch city are likely to experience significant damage for all infrastructural sectors in the 
given tsunami scenario. The scenario used (Appendix 7.1) represents an extreme tsunami event 
for Christchurch, thus the results potentially represent the maximum (worst-case) tsunami 
impacts on infrastructure. Some exposed areas of Christchurch are likely to experience 
significant damage across all infrastructural sectors, the most widespread of which are in the 
suburb of Sumner. This research also suggests that transport infrastructure, notably roads and 
bridges, are likely to perform well in the given tsunami scenario, with low probabilities of 
significant damage occurring, the highest of which is <0.4, at approximately 6 m inundation 
depth. This is despite roads having the highest exposure of any above-ground infrastructure 
(second to buried wastewater pipes). Cellular towers, wharves, wastewater pumping stations and 
open stormwater channels were found to be the most likely infrastructural assets to incur damage 
(likelihood of damage = high) in the given tsunami scenario, although no measure of damage 
intensity is prescribed. Notably absent from the impact assessment were electricity assets (e.g. 
cables and substations) due to limitations with data accessibility. 
 
The findings of a tsunami impact assessment on Christchurch city infrastructure were used to 
assign aggregated levels of service for each exposed Christchurch city suburb. It was found that 
Sumner is likely to experience loss of service from all assessed infrastructure networks for this 
scenario, while New Brighton, South Brighton, South Shore and Moncks Bay were all assessed 
as likely to lose all but wireless telecommunication services. Bexley and Rawhiti are also likely to 
lose service from some infrastructure networks. It was found that Lyttelton is unlikely to lose 
service of infrastructure from any of those mentioned above, however rail and wharf assets are 
both likely to experience a loss of service for the given tsunami scenario. 
 
Some areas of Christchurch are assessed as a priority for tsunami risk management, including 
the mitigation options found in Appendix 7.7. This is based on the findings from the tsunami 
impact assessment on infrastructure and the assessed likely levels of service (Section 4.4). The 
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areas of highest priority are the suburbs of Sumner (all infrastructure) and Lyttelton (wharves and 
rail). Other areas of risk management prioritisation would firstly include New Brighton, South 
Brighton, South Shore and Moncks Bay, then secondly Bexley and Rawhiti. 
 
The results from this research also provide lessons for other New Zealand cities and those 
around the world that are at risk from tsunami. Tsunami impact assessments on infrastructure 
can be resource- and labour-intensive, but they provide an invaluable tool for the management 
of tsunami impacts. The tsunami impact assessment model for Christchurch city infrastructure 
developed here is easily adaptable to other locations given the availability of, or ability to develop, 
appropriate resources. Reflections and lessons for Christchurch city beyond this research are 
summarised in the section below. 
5.2 Recommendations 
This section presents general guidelines and recommendations for assessments of tsunami 
impacts on infrastructure, including future research directions based on experience from this 
study. Also presented are specific recommendations for Christchurch city infrastructure tsunami 
impact assessments. 
5.2.1 Assessment of Tsunami Impact on Infrastructure: General 
Recommendations 
Effective tsunami impact assessments first require robust and accurate tsunami hazard models, 
whether a probabilistic or deterministic approach is implemented. It is therefore recommended 
that cities, or other areas of significant societal importance, develop site specific tsunami hazard 
models such as that presented in Appendix 7.1.  
 
Tsunami vulnerability of infrastructure resources was identified as being limited early on in this 
thesis. Tsunami impact assessments on infrastructure would benefit largely from the future 
collection of quantitative data from experimental and field observations. Building on this point, 
a common causal factor for limited data is the qualitative approach used in previous post-event 
tsunami surveys. The standardisation of tsunami post-event field surveys would benefit tsunami 
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impact management by providing a register of essential observational data for surveyors to collect 
following future tsunami events, and to ensure that a census-style survey is conducted covering 
all exposed assets (e.g. such as that conducted by GNS Science following the 2015 ‘Illapel’ 
earthquake tsunami), not just those experiencing some degree of damage. This would provide 
greater quantitative resources for future impact assessments, better data to inform tsunami risk 
management and would potentially justify more empirical laboratory studies.  
 
Building upon the above points, and as mentioned in Chapter 4, although a tsunami damage 
matrix is an acceptable substitute for vulnerability metrics in the absence of quantitative fragility 
functions, tsunami impact assessments on infrastructure would benefit greatly from the 
development of fragility curves for an increased number of infrastructural assets. With future 
quantitative data, or that collected by GNS Science following the 2015 ‘Illapel’ earthquake 
tsunami, this will be possible. This would produce higher-resolution probabilistic tsunami impact 
assessments given the potential inclusion of damage state analyses and construction type 
differentiation of assets. 
 
In addition to developing fragility curves for more assets, the development of vulnerability metrics 
incorporating more hazard intensity measures, such as flow velocity, would provide a comparison 
between that and inundation depth variants. This could potentially constrain more 
accurate/applicable vulnerability demand parameters for use in future tsunami impact models. 
Incorporating a degree of debris impact vulnerability would also benefit the reduction of tsunami 
impacts on infrastructure. The inclusion of a degree of soil instability vulnerability could similarly 
be implemented into a tsunami impact assessment, using a soil type ranking system or similar 
methods. This would require detailed site-specific soil classifications and knowledge of soil-type 
scour potentials. 
 
Another recommendation to increase the resolution of vulnerability metrics, and therefore 
results, of a tsunami impact assessment on infrastructure, is to assign damage states for each asset 
in the tsunami damage matrix (Appendix 7.3). This would allow a qualitative assessment of 
damage level probabilities in the absence of quantitative fragility functions. This would again 
require further knowledge of an asset’s likely level of damage for given hazard intensities (e.g. 
tsunami inundation depth). 
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It is also recommended to implement the findings of the research presented in this thesis, 
including methodology, results and fragility curves, into national multi-hazard impact and loss 
modelling tools such as RiskScape. This would allow emergency managers, planners and lifelines 
groups easy access to relevant tsunami impacts on infrastructure data as well as to run 
infrastructure impact models for specific requirements (e.g. another city or infrastructural asset 
type). 
 
The most important of these recommendations is that higher resolution, and more abundant, 
resources are made available for effective tsunami impact assessments on infrastructure, 
especially with respect to tsunami vulnerability metrics for infrastructure. The impact assessment 
process has been proven effective within the risk analysis stage of the risk management 
framework and input parameters including hazard, exposure and vulnerability can be easily 
implemented in future studies. 
 
5.2.2 Research Directions for Christchurch Infrastructure Tsunami Risk 
The improvement of tsunami impact assessments on Christchurch city infrastructure fits within 
the monitoring and review stage of the risk management framework. All recommendations for 
tsunami impacts on infrastructure presented in the above section, are also recommended for 
implementation in subsequent tsunami impact assessments of Christchurch city infrastructure.  
Building upon recommendations already presented in the above section, other 
recommendations for Christchurch city impact and risk management are included below. 
 
More assets need to be incorporated into future tsunami impact assessments on Christchurch 
city infrastructure. Modelling electricity and telecommunication networks, for example, may be 
beneficial for risk management actions given their potential post-disaster importance, likely 
interdependency with other infrastructural networks and their contribution to the normal 
operation of society. 
 
This study focussed on impacts and levels of service immediately following a tsunami. Research 
into short-to-long term losses of service or cascading damage may better inform response and 
mitigation strategies. The level of service assignments themselves would also benefit from either 
expert validation or quantitative analysis. 




Christchurch is still in a recovery phase following the 2011-2016 ‘Canterbury earthquake 
sequence’, consequently infrastructure is being continually repaired and upgraded as a method 
of risk treatment to that specific hazard. Hence asset data should be regularly updated from those 
used in this thesis to ensure the results remain relevant. This is especially imperative for asset 
attribute data. 
 
This research used a deterministic approach to model impacts on infrastructure based on a single 
tsunami inundation model. Modelling tsunami impacts using different inundation scenarios 
would test the present research as well as informing emergency managers and planners about the 
likely impacts associated with lower magnitude tsunami events, including local and regional 
source tsunami. 
 
Extending the study to include regions outside of the area assessed in this research would also 
help inform tsunami risk management for Christchurch city, (e.g. transport corridors). 
 
Building upon the assignment of levels of service presented in Chapter 4, the economic cost 
associated with the research findings could be calculated in subsequent studies. This may be used 
to quantify the tsunami impacts on infrastructure and highlight ‘hotspots’ of economic loss to 
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Appendix 7.1: Christchurch Tsunami Hazard Models 
Lane et al. (2014) have modelled the tsunami hazard for Christchurch city using a mathematical equation 
of fluid motion, based on a Mw 9.485 Peru subduction zone event. It represents the hazard at a 2,500 
year return period. This updated tsunami model represents the best estimate of far-field tsunami 
inundation of the Christchurch coast to date and indicates that Christchurch city and Lyttelton Harbour 
would experience the worst of the inundation in Canterbury. The largest wave arrival is assumed to 
coincide with mean high water spring tide (MHWS) in this model. Areas which experience the highest 
levels of inundation (>2.5m)  include New Brighton, South Shore, Redcliffs, Sumner, Taylors Mistake 
and low lying areas of Lyttelton Port (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). The highest flow velocities are concentrated 
around the Avon-Heathcote mouth, including South Shore, Ferrymead and Sumner, with velocities 
greater than 5.1m/s, which are also seen at the entrance of the Lyttelton Port. New Brighton sees velocities 
of up to 4m/s, but most of the other inundated areas experience velocities below 2 m/s (Figure 7.3 and 
7.4). 
The research presented in this thesis uses what has been considered a credible worst case scenario for 
Christchurch city from 4 possible source event variations. The technical details of the chosen scenario 
model are presented below (GNS & NIWA 2015). 
 
Model name: Canterbury Tsunami Model 1 in 2,500 year return period from South Peru - North  
Canterbury (Scenario 2) 
Author: Dr Emily Lane 
Organisation: National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research 
Date: August 2014 
Description: Inundation model of coastal locations in Canterbury by a tsunami generated from an  
earthquake off-shore of South Peru with a magnitude Mw 9.485. This comes from the 
deaggregation of tsunami hazard with a return period of 1:2,500 years for Christchurch city as 




Model: Far-field modelling:  
Gerris: Gerris is based on a quad-tree grid and is able to adaptively refine specified  
areas to ensure error is kept below a given level. Gerris was used to model the wave from source 
to approximately 197 E, the boundary with the RiCOM inundation grids.  
RiCOM:  The RiCOM hydrodynamics model uses an irregular, unstructured, finite element grid 
which allows high resolution and refinement in areas of inundation around the coast, and 
improves numerical accuracy by controlling grid size relative to water depth. The grids used were 
originally made for several earlier inundation studies for ECAN.  
Input Data: LIDAR supplied by ECAN (post February 2011 earthquake for Christchurch and Kaiapoi),  
digitised charts, NIWA bathymetry. Post-earthquake bathymetry of the Avon-Heathcote Estuary. 
Avon stop banks, Waimakariri stop banks and Sumner sea wall design heights and positions. 
Model Area: The grid extends from the east coast of New Zealand to 197 E. Areas of interest for  
inundation modelling have increased resolution such as Christchurch and Banks Peninsula, 
which includes Christchurch city, Lyttelton Harbour coastal margin and Akaroa Harbour coastal 
margin. 
Additional Source Event Information:  Scenario 2 (40 m slip; 1,500 km by 150 km): 
 Location:  x = 286.608056°E y = -17.418918°N  
 Depth = 25000m 
 Strike = 307° dip = 10° rake = 90° 
 Length = 600e3m width = 150e3m U = 40m 
Coordinate System: New Zealand Transverse Mercator 
Output Format: Ascii raster grid (regular), GIS Maps  
Model Limitations: Spatial resolution is variable but in the regions of interest for inundation is around  
10-15 m. Open ocean at the edges of the grid have resolution as coarse as several kilometres and 
resolution grades smoothly between these.  Variable, finest resolution of modelling around 10 m. 
Ascii raster files should be used at a scale of 1:25,000 at most. Tide not accounted for except as 
static level, erosion/accretion of land not considered, bare earth LiDAR used, constant land 












Figure 7.2: Maximum inundation depth for Lyttelton Harbour coastal margin assuming the largest wave arrived at MHWS. 






Figure 7.3: Maximum flow speed for Christchurch assuming the largest wave arrived at MHWS. Flow 





Figure 7.4: Maximum flow speed for Lyttelton Harbour coastal margin assuming the largest wave arrived 





Appendix 7.2: Christchurch Coastal Dune Topography 
 





Appendix 7.3: Tsunami Damage Matrix 
Infrastructural 
Asset 













Transportation         
Roads         
Pavement Low 




Debris & sediment 
coverage, scour of 
weak base materials, 




Debris  strikes , scour of base 
materials, lifting of carriage-way, 
removal of barriers and signage, 
cracking of pavement, 
liquefaction of base materials, 
ponding, debris and sediment 
coverage 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Unjoh 2012; Suppasri, Mas & 
Imamura 2013; Edwards 2006; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 
2014; AON Benfield 2011; Ghobarah et al. 2006; Bell et al. 
2005; Francis 2006; Kazama & Noda 2012; Lekkas 2011; Kim 
et al. 2014; Yeh et al. 2013; Okal et al. 2010; Eguchi et al. 2013; 
Tang & Edwards 2012; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 







Some bank erosion, 
superficial debris  
strikes , sediment 
deposition, scour of 
footings, corrosion, 
washout of light timber 
structures 
High 
Debris and sediment deposition, 
erosion of adjoining banks,  loss 
of signage and markings, side 
barriers bent or sheared, debris 
strikes, scour of footings,   
aggradation of waterway,  
widening of waterway separation 
of deck from footings,  lateral 
distortion of super structure, 
separation of girders, washout of 
superstructure, corrosion, loss of 
utilities across bridge 
High 
(Bell et al. 2005; Evans & McGhie 2011; Horspool & Fraser 
2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; University of 
Hawaii 2015; Kim et al. 2014; Saatcioglu 2007; LRFD 2010; 
Number et al. n.d.; Eguchi et al. 2013; Tang & Edwards 2012; 
PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Edwards 2006; Frangopol & Bocchini 2012; 
Kosa 2012; Akiyama et al. 2013; AON Benfield 2011; 
Auckland Engineering Lifelines 2014; Francis 2006; Ghobarah 








Debris  strikes, 
inundation of electrical 
components, tilting or 
shearing of supports 
High 
Complete washout,  Debris  
strikes , inundation of electrical 
components, tilting or shearing of 
supports 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Francis 2006; Kazama & Noda 2012; 








floating, debris  strikes 
, impact damage 
High 
Electrical short, floating, debris  
strikes , impact damage 
Low 
(Suppasri, Mas & Imamura 2013; Tomita et al. 2011; Nakanishi 
et al. 2014; Okal et al. 2010; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 




of ballast  
Medium-
High 
Scour of ballast, debris 
and sediment 
deposition, disruption 
to signage and lighting 
High 
Scour of ballast, debris and 
sediment deposition, loss of 
signage and lighting, distortion, 
washout of track 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Goff et al. 
2006; Francis 2006; Lekkas 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012; 





Water damage to 
interiors 
High 
Water damage to 
interiors wall washout, 
short circuiting of 
electrical components 
and machinery, 
corrosion, debris  
strikes 
High 
Water damage to interiors, wall 
collapse, short circuiting of 
electrical components and 
machinery, corrosion, debris  
strikes, washout 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Tang & 






Some bank erosion, 
superficial debris  
strikes , sediment 
deposition, scour of 
footings, corrosion, 
washout of light timber 
structures 
High 
Debris and sediment deposition, 
erosion of adjoining banks,  loss 
of signage and markings, side 
barriers bent or sheared, debris 
strikes, scour of footings,   
aggradation of waterway,  
widening of waterway separation 
of deck from footings,  lateral 
distortion of super structure, 
separation of girders, washout of 
superstructure, corrosion, loss of 
utilities across bridge 
Medium 
(Bell et al. 2005; Evans & McGhie 2011; Horspool & Fraser 
2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; University of 
Hawaii 2015; Kim et al. 2014; Saatcioglu 2007; LRFD 2010; 
Number et al. n.d.; Eguchi et al. 2013; Tang & Edwards 2012; 
PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Edwards 2006; Frangopol & Bocchini 2012; 
Kosa 2012; Akiyama et al. 2013; AON Benfield 2011; 
Auckland Engineering Lifelines 2014; Francis 2006; Ghobarah 
et al. 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; Kazama & Noda 2012; Lekkas 
2011) 
Overhead lines Low 
Scour of support 
foundations, 




Scour of support 
foundations, distortion 
of supports, collapse, 
debris strikes, shorting 
of low lying electrical 
equipment 
High 
Scour of support foundation, 
distortion of supports, collapse, 
short circuiting, debris  strikes , 
washout 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Francis 
2006; Kazama & Noda 2012) 
Trains Negligible Negligible Low - High 
Derailment, debris 
strikes, floating,  
impact damage 
High 
Derailment, debris strikes, 
floating, impact damage 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; AON Benfield 2011; Goff et al. 
2006; Kazama & Noda 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
Ports         







Sediment and debris 
deposition, debris 
strikes, scour of seabed, 
debris in waterways, 
scour of foundations 
High 
Aggradation/erosion of sea bed, 
separation of deck slabs from 
footings, removal of concrete 
blocks, subsidence, collapse, 
complete washout, debris in 
waterways 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Tomita et 
al. 2011; Evans & McGhie 2011; Auckland Engineering 
Lifelines 2014; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 2006; Kazama & Noda 
2012; Lekkas 2011; Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & Edwards 2012; 
Scawthorn et al. 2006; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Borrero et al. 2015; 








Water damage to  
interiors & stored 




Water damage to interiors & 
stored goods, short circuiting of 
electrical components, washout 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Evans & McGhie 2011; Auckland 
Engineering Lifelines 2014; Kazama & Noda 2012; Lekkas 
2011; Reese et al. 2011; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Plant Machinery Low 








Water damage to electrical 
components, debris strikes, 
washout 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 
2014; Bell et al. 2005; Graf et al. 2014; Kazama & Noda 2012; 











debris damage, impact 
damage, floated inland 
High 
Broken moorings, debris damage, 
impact damage, floated inland, 
capsized, submerged 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Tomita et al. 2011; Bell et al. 2005; 
Cruz et al. 2009; Kazama & Noda 2012; Lekkas 2011; Fritz et 
al. 2011; Kurian et al. 2007; Saatcioglu 2007; Leone et al. 2011; 
Tang & Edwards 2012; Scawthorn et al. 2006; PIANC Working 




Containers Negligible Negligible Medium 
Floating of container, 
impact damage, debris 
strikes, water & impact 




Floating of container, impact 
damage, debris strikes, water & 
impact damage to goods, 
dangerous goods exposed, 
distorted, crushed 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Tomita et al. 2011; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kazama & Noda 2012; Lekkas 2011; Fritz et al. 2011; Tang & 
Edwards 2012; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Airports         
Runway Low 
Silt & light 
debris coverage, 
ponding, 




Damage to lighting, 
debris coverage, 
ponding,  shorting of 
electronic components 
High 
Damage to lighting, debris 
coverage, ponding, shorting of 
electronic components 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; 
McClelland 2011; AON Benfield 2011; Bell et al. 2005; Tang 
& Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Buildings Low 
Silt infiltration, 
water damage to 
interiors 
High 
Silt infiltration, water 
damage to interiors, 
wall washout, scour of 
foundations 
High 
Debris strikes, water damage to 
interiors, structural collapse, 
scour of foundations, wall 
washout, complete washout, 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Suppasri, 
Mas & Imamura 2013; AON Benfield 2011; Francis 2006; 
Tang & Edwards 2012; Reese et al. 2011; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005) 
Plant Machinery Low 








water damage to electrical 
components, debris strikes, 
impact damage, washout 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 
2014; Bell et al. 2005; Graf et al. 2014; Kazama & Noda 2012; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Planes Negligible Negligible High 
Small planes floated, 
debris strikes, impact 
damage 
High 
Planes floated, debris strikes, 
impact damage, fuel tanks 
breached 
Low (Horspool & Fraser 2015) 
Energy         






Lines severed from 
pulling of utility poles, 
shorting of inundated 
transformers 
High 
Debris strikes, lines severed, 
short circuiting, water damage, 
shorting of transformers, washout 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Evans & McGhie 
2011; Kazama & Noda 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 








Scour at building entry 
points, scour of 
backfill, exposure,  
water infiltration of 
compromised cable 
housing , ducting & 
cables across 




Scour at building entry points, 
scour of backfill, exposure,  water 
infiltration of compromised cable 
housing , ducting & cables across 
waterways or below bridges 
severed, ducting & cables severed 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 
2014; Francis 2006) 
Utility Poles Negligible Negligible 
Low-
Medium 
Debris strikes, scour of 
foundations, shorting of 
inundated transformers 
High 
Debris strikes, scour and 
liquefaction of foundations,  
shorting of inundated 




(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Francis 2006; Kazama & Noda 2012; 














& structures, debris and 
sediment cover, debris 
strikes, non-structural 
collapse to building, 
washout of some 
outdoor components 
High 
Salt water contamination to 
electrical components and 
structures, debris and sediment 
cover, debris strikes, non-
structural collapse of building,  
washout 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; 
Kazama & Noda 2012; Tang & Edwards 2012; Scawthorn et al. 










and structures, debris 
and sediment cover, 
non-structural collapse 




Salt water contamination to 
electrical components and 
structures, debris and sediment 
cover, non-structural collapse,  
washout, shut down of cooling 
systems 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; AON Benfield 2011; Kazama & 
Noda 2012; Scawthorn et al. 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
Petroleum         
Tanks Negligible Negligible 
Negligible -
Low 
Debris strikes, buckling 
of tank base, lifting of 
empty or small tanks, 
scour of foundations 
Medium-
High 
Sliding, overturning , debris 
strikes, scour & liquefaction of 
foundations, floating, impact 
damage, crushing, loss of fuel, 
fires 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Tomita et al. 2011; Ghobarah et al. 
2006; AON Benfield 2011; McClelland 2011; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Francis 2006; Kim et al. 2014; Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & 
Edwards 2012; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Pipes Negligible Negligible 
Low-
Medium 
Scour and exposure of 
buried pipes, utility 
bridges severed, pipes 
attached to mobilised 
tanks severed, debris 
strikes 
Medium 
Scour and exposure of buried 
pipes, utility bridges severed, 
pipes attached to mobilised tanks 
severed, debris strikes 
decoupling, fire 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; AON Benfield 2011; Ghobarah et al. 
2006; Cruz et al. 2009; Francis 2006) 
Refinery Facilities Low 
Light debris and 
silt coverage 





Debris coverage, debris 
strikes, shorting of 
electrical components 
and plant machinery, 
oil spillage, non-
structural collapse of 
buildings, washout of 
light structures, 




Debris coverage, debris strikes, 
shorting of electrical components 
and plant machinery, oil spillage, 
non-structural collapse of 
buildings, fire, explosions, 
washout 
Medium 
(Cruz et al. 2009; Graf et al. 2014; Tang & Edwards 2012; 
Reese et al. 2011) 






Lifting of empty and 
small tanks, debris 
strikes, scour to 
foundations 
High 
Scour of foundations, 
displacement of tanks, debris 
strikes, fires 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Nojima 2012; Auckland Engineering 
Lifelines 2014; Francis 2006; Kazama & Noda 2012; Eguchi et 
al. 2013; Tang & Edwards 2012; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Pipes Low Scour of backfill Low 
Scour of weak backfill, 
exposure, pipes 
crossing waterways and 
above ground severed 
by debris impacts, 
Low-
Medium 
Bending and breakage, 
decoupling at entry point to 
buildings & floated tanks, 
scouring & exposure, fracturing, 
siltation, blockage, fire, wastage 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Nojima 2012; Francis 2006; Tang & 
Edwards 2012) 
Water         
Wastewater & 
Sewerage 









failure of electrical & 
pumping equipment, 
sediment & debris 
cover, debris strikes 
High 
Contamination & failure of 
electrical & pumping equipment, 
sediment & debris cover, debris 
strikes, structural collapse, 
equipment washout 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; 
Eguchi et al. 2013; Scawthorn et al. 2006; American Society of 




Pipes Low Silt infiltration Low 
Siltation, scour of weak 
backfill, exposure, 
bending, debris strikes, 
utility bridges severed 
by debris strikes 
Medium 
Scour, bending and breakage,  
decoupling & exposure, 
fracturing, siltation, blockage, 
utility bridges severed 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Villholth & Neupane 2011; Sagara & 
Ishiwatari 2012; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Edwards 2006; 
Auckland Engineering Lifelines 2014; Ghobarah et al. 2006; 
Francis 2006; Lekkas 2011; Kim et al. 2014; Eguchi et al. 2013; 
Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil Engineers 
2005) 




Floating of exposed 
low volume 
polyurethane tanks, 
sedimentation, scour of 
weak backfill 
Medium 
Sediment infill, scour, floating of 
low volume tanks 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Villholth & Neupane 2011; Edwards 












damage of structure 
interiors, salt water 
contamination of filters 
pumps & ponds 
High 
Siltation, erosion of 
embankments, inundation of 
machinery, water damage of 
structure interiors, salt water 
contamination of filters pumps & 
ponds, washout 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Villholth & Neupane 2011; Sagara & 
Ishiwatari 2012; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Edwards 2006; Bell et 
al. 2005; Kazama & Noda 2012; Eguchi et al. 2013; Scawthorn 
et al. 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 










strikes to components 
High 
Salt water & sewage 
contamination, ground water & 
aquifer contamination, scour, 
debris strikes, components 
exposed & washed away 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Villholth & Neupane 2011; Edwards 
2006; Bell et al. 2005; Kim et al. 2014; Chandrasekar & 
Ramesh 2007; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Pipes Low Minor siltation Low 
Scouring of weak 
backfill, exposure, 
debris strikes, utility 
bridges cracked or 
severed,  non HDPE 
pipes severed, damage 
to water meters 
Medium 
Scouring and exposure, debris 
strikes, fracturing, siltation, 
blockages, severed, decoupling, 
severed, some HDPE pipes 
severed, damage to water meters 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Villholth & 
Neupane 2011; Edwards 2006; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 
2014; Ghobarah et al. 2006; Francis 2006; Kazama & Noda 
2012; Lekkas 2011; Eguchi et al. 2013; Tang & Edwards 2012; 







Salt water and sewage 
contamination, 
siltation, debris strikes 
to tanks & reservoir 
embankments, low 
volume polyurethane 
tanks floated, scour of 
foundations, tilting of 
water towers 
High 
Salt water and sewage 
contamination, siltation, debris 
strikes to tanks & reservoir 
embankments, low volume 
polyurethane tanks floated, scour 
of foundations, tilting of water 
towers, floating of low volume 
concrete reservoirs, washout 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Villholth & Neupane 2011; Edwards 
2006; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
Treatment & Pump 
Facilities 
Low 






Water damage to 







Water damage to interiors, salt & 
sewage contamination,  collapse 
of structures, equipment & 
machinery washed away 
Low 
(Villholth & Neupane 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; 
Eguchi et al. 2013; Scawthorn et al. 2006; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005) 
Stormwater         





Scour, debris & 
sediment blockage 
High 
Scour, debris & sediment 
blockage, collapse of outflows, 
washout 




Open drains and 
channels 
Medium Debris blockage High 
Scour of embankments, 
debris blockage, 
siltation, blocked 
culverts, removal of 
vegetation 
High 
Scour of embankments, debris 
blockage, siltation, blocked 
culverts, removal of vegetation, 
widening of unreinforced 
channels, covers lifted 
Low 
(Villholth & Neupane 2011; Edwards 2006; Auckland 
Engineering Lifelines 2014; Goff et al. 2006; Ghobarah et al. 
2006; Francis 2006; Kazama & Noda 2012) 






Scour of embankments, 
debris blockage, 
siltation, removal of 
vegetation,  salt 
contamination 
High 
Scour of embankments, debris 
blockage, siltation, removal of 
vegetation, salt contamination 







scour of foundations, 
floating of low volume 
polyurethane tanks 
High 
Salt contamination, scour of 
foundations, floating of tanks, 
floating of low volume concrete 
reservoirs 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Villholth & Neupane 2011; Edwards 





Debris strikes Medium 
Debris strikes, water 
damage to electrical 
components, washout 
of outdoor equipment 
High 
Debris strikes, water damage to 
electrical components , washout  
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 
2014; Bell et al. 2005; Graf et al. 2014; Kazama & Noda 2012; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Pipes Low Minor siltation Low 
Scouring of weak 
backfill, exposure, 
debris strikes, utility 
bridges cracked or 
severed, decoupling 
Medium 
Scouring and exposure, debris 
strikes, fracturing, siltation, 
blockages, severed, decoupling 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Villholth & 
Neupane 2011; Edwards 2006; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 
2014; Ghobarah et al. 2006; Francis 2006; Kazama & Noda 
2012; Lekkas 2011; Eguchi et al. 2013; Tang & Edwards 2012; 










failure of electrical and 
pumping equipment, 
sediment & debris 
cover, debris strikes 
High 
Contamination & failure of 
electrical and pumping 
equipment, sediment & debris 
cover, debris strikes, structural 
collapse, equipment washout 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; 
Eguchi et al. 2013; Scawthorn et al. 2006; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005) 
Flood Controls         
Stop banks Negligible Negligible Low 
Removal of vegetation, 
scour 
Medium 
Scour, piping, removal of 
vegetation, blowouts, washout 
Low 
(Bell et al. 2005; Hart & Knight 2009; Chandrasekar & Ramesh 
2007; Francis 2006) 
Walls & Floodgates Negligible Negligible Low 
Scour of foundations, 




Liquefaction and scour of 
foundations, tilting of concrete 
blocks, removal of materials - 
especially on backside & wall 
breaks 
Low 
(Suppasri, Mas & Imamura 2013; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 
2005; Cruz et al. 2009; Kazama & Noda 2012; Lekkas 2011; 
Kurian et al. 2007; Yeh et al. 2013; Saatcioglu 2007; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Francis 2006) 
Coastal Management         
Sea walls Negligible Negligible Low 
Scour of foundations, 




Liquefaction and scour of 
foundations, tilting of concrete 
blocks, removal of materials - 
especially on backside & wall 
breaks 
Medium 
(Suppasri, Mas & Imamura 2013; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 
2005; Cruz et al. 2009; Kazama & Noda 2012; Lekkas 2011; 
Kurian et al. 2007; Yeh et al. 2013; Saatcioglu 2007; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Breakwaters Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Low 
Scour, removal of material, 
debris impact, sliding of caissons 
Low 
(Suppasri, Mas & Imamura 2013; Tomita et al. 2011; Francis 
2006; Kazama & Noda 2012; Lekkas 2011; American Society 
of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Dunes and 
Embankments 
Negligible Negligible Low 
Removal of vegetation, 
scour, debris coverage 
Low – 
Medium 
Loss of vegetation, scour, debris 
coverage, migration, washout 
Low 





Telecommunications         
Wireless         
Cellular Towers Low 




Erosion of base, titling, 
debris strikes, water 
damage of electrical 
components, buckling 
of monopole structures, 
washout of base station, 
washout 
High 
Erosion of base, titling, debris 
strikes, water damage of 
electrical components, collapse of 
tower, collapse of low rise 
supporting buildings, twisting of 
lattice type towers, washout of 
base stations, washout 
Medium 
(Nagayama 2011; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; Kwasinski 2013; Edwards 2006; Ghobarah et al. 2006; 
Lekkas 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012) 
Exchange centres High 
Minor water 
damage to 
interiors & low 
lying generators 
High 
Scour of cables 
entering building, water 
damage to interior, 




Scour, damage to interiors, 
shorting of electrical components 
and generators, equipment 
washed away, collapse, washout 
Medium 
(Nagayama 2011; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski 2013; 
Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; Kazama & Noda 2012; Tang & 
Edwards 2012; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Radio transmitters Low 
Erosion of tower 
base, tilting of 
supports 
High 
Erosion of tower base, 
titling, debris strikes, 
collapse of support 
towers 
High 
Erosion of base, titling, debris 
strikes, collapse of tower, 
collapse of low rise supporting 
buildings, washout 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski 2013; Ghobarah et al. 
2006; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Internet         
Overhead Cables Low 
Scour of support 
base 
High 
Debris strikes to 
support, tilting of 
support pole, collapse 
of support, cables 
severed, water damage 
to components 
High 
Debris impacts to support, tilting 
of support pole, collapse of 
support, cables severed, water 
damage to components, collapse 
of support 
Low 
(Nagayama 2011; Horspool & Fraser 2015; McClelland 2011; 
Kazama & Noda 2012) 
Buried cables Low 
Scour of weak 
backfill material, 
shorting of home 
switch boxes 
Medium 
Scoured and exposed – 
especially at entrance 






Scoured and exposed – especially 
at entrance to buildings, ducting 
& cables across waterways 
severed, debris impacts, corrosion 
Low 
(Nagayama 2011; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; Kwasinski 2013; Francis 2006) 
Switch boxes Medium 




Debris strikes, water 
damage to internal 
components, washout 
High 
Debris impacts, water damage to 
internal components, washout 
Low (Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kazama & Noda 2012) 
Landline         
Overhead cables Low 
Scour of support 
base 
High 
Debris strikes to 
support, tilting of 
support pole, collapse 
of support, cables 
severed, water damage 
to components 
High 
Debris impacts to support, tilting 
of support pole, collapse of 
support, cables severed, water 
damage to components, collapse 
of supports 
Low 
(Nagayama 2011; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; McClelland 2011; Kwasinski 2013; Kazama & Noda 
2012; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Buried cables Low 
Scour of backfill 
material 
Medium 
Scoured and exposed – 
especially at entrance 







Scoured and exposed – especially 
at entrance to buildings, ducting 
& cables across waterways 
severed, debris impacts, corrosion 
Low 
(Nagayama 2011; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 









Scour of foundations, 
water damage to 
interiors, short 
circuiting of electrical 
components, washout 
of light structures 
High 
Scour of foundations, water 
damage to interiors, short 
circuiting of electrical 
components, collapse, washout 
Medium 
(Nagayama 2011; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; McClelland 2011; Kwasinski 2013; Francis 2006; 
Kazama & Noda 2012; Tang & Edwards 2012; Scawthorn et al. 
2006) 
Switch boxes Medium 




Debris strikes, water 
damage to internal 
components, washout 
High 
Debris impacts, water damage to 
internal components, washout 




Appendix 7.4: Observed Tsunami impacts 
Presented below are some key observations of tsunami impacts to infrastructure, made during a 






Figure 7.6: Roads: Mostly performed well. Where significant damage occurred, it was often associated with a culvert 







Figure 7.7: Rail: Similar to roads, rail ballast seemed to experience the greatest damage where drainage flowed beneath. 
Also on stretches close to urban streets, sections of the lines were displaced more when corresponding with the termination 
of a street – i.e. there were likely higher flow speeds between blocks of buildings as water receded. 
 
 











Figure 7.9: Stormwater: Steel culverts performed poorly and were associated with the most significant road washout. 
Concrete culverts mostly performed well but experienced significant scour on the seaward end (above). 
 
 









Appendix 7.5: Level of Service Justifications 
Infrastructure 
Type 
Applicable Suburbs Serviceable Serviceability Decision Process 
Wharves Lyttelton No 
High probability of all but one wharf becoming 
damaged, medium probability wharf would only 
service small vessels. Larger vessels may still be able 
to dock along the front of the container yard if 
undamaged. Access would likely be restricted due to 
debris deposition, fluctuating water levels would 
make most wharves unsafe to dock at for up to 24 
hours after final damaging wave has receded. 
Rail 
Lyttelton No 
Medium – High probability of damage in much of 
Lyttelton. Even if track is undamaged it is likely to 
be covered with debris, including shipping 
containers. 




All cellular towers have a high probability of 
damage. North east orientation of the valley will 
likely restrict service from undamaged transmitters. 
Waimairi Beach, North 
Beach, Rawhiti, New 
Brighton, Aranui, Bexley, 
South Brighton, South 
Shore, Bromley, 
Ferrymead, Heathcote 
Valley, Mt Pleasant 
Yes 
Although most areas have a high probability of a cell 
tower being damaged, it is likely that the effective 
range of transmitter ranges outside of the inundation 
zone would overlap with the inundation zones in 
these suburbs. 
Moncks Bay, Lyttelton Yes 
Transmitters above each valley would likely provide 
coverage to the inundated area if they lose service 
from damaged towers. 
Wastewater 
Sumner, Moncks Bay No 
High probability of damage to pump stations and 
medium probability of damage to pipes across each 
suburb. 
New Brighton, Bexley No 
High probability of damage to pump station, low 
probability of damage to most pipes but some 
damage would be expected to network. 
South Brighton, South 
Shore 
No 
Both have to pass through the network associated 
with New Brighton and Bexley. Also a high 
probability of damage to one pump station and some 
damage would be expected to pipe network given a 
low probability of damage. 
Waimairi Beach, North 
Beach, Aranui, Rawhiti, 
Bromley, Ferrymead, 
Heathcote Valley, Lyttelton 
Yes 






Mt Pleasant Yes 
High probability of damage to pump station but 
gravity fed waste would likely be able to bypass into 
estuary. Outlet has a low probability of damage. 
Stormwater 
Ferrymead Yes 
Low probability of damage to pipes. High probability 
of damage to open drains however these would still 
likely drain water unless entirely infilled which is 
unlikely. 
Sumner, Moncks Bay No 
Medium Probability of damage to pipes across 
inundation area. Extensive damage to shore fronts 
likely where stormwater outlets are located 
Lyttleton, Waimairi Beach, 
North Beach, Mt Pleasant 
Yes 
Frequent low-medium probability of damage to pipes 
but not over extensive areas, outflows could be 
damaged but redundancies in network exist in most 
places. 
South Brighton, South 
Shore 
No 
Low-medium probability of damage for most of 
inundated area. Some areas may not be affected by 
loss of services due to proximity to estuary. Surface 
flooding on road would be expected. 
Potable Water 
South Shore, South 
Brighton, New Brighton, 
Bexley 
No 
Mostly low probabilities of damage but higher 
probabilities of building damage in these areas will 
likely result in privately owned pipe breakages 
resulting in loss of pressure for networks. 
Rawhiti, Waimairi Beach, 




Networks largely un-inundated and pipes at low 
probability of damage. 
Mt Pleasant Yes 
Low probability of damage to pipes in inundation 
zone. Scour is likely along shore front which could 
affect damage and serviceability but is not considered 
in model. Appears to have redundancy built into 
network via Heathcote Valley 
Moncks Bay, Sumner No 
All of network dependant on the serviceability of two 
key bottlenecks both at medium probability of 
damage and also very susceptible to scour along 
shore front. Most pipes in inundation zones at 
medium probability of damage. Many buildings in 
these suburbs likely to be damaged resulting in 
privately owned pipes breaking and a loss of network 
water pressure. 
Roads 
Waimairi Beach, North 




Networks mostly low probability of damage for roads 
and bridges. Not extensive inundation to network in 
these suburbs. 
Rawhiti, New Brighton, 
South Brighton 
No 
Despite low probabilities of damage these suburbs 
would likely have extensive debris deposition on 
road network. Despite modelling these suburbs are 
also more susceptible to scour than most given their 





South Shore, Moncks Bay, 
Sumner 
No 
Low-Medium probabilities of damage would likely 
result in damage to bottlenecks especially due to 
scour along shore fronts. Extensive debris deposition 







Appendix 7.6: Christchurch City Suburbs 
 






Appendix 7.7: Response and Mitigation Options for Tsunami Impacts to Infrastructure 
Infrastructural 
Asset 




Transportation      




Clear by hand or with heavy machinery 
Install water permeable fence alongside road to catch small-medium sized debris, 
develop rapid response plans to deploy heavy machinery, have multiple access routes 
to communities, elevate pavement 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 Debris strikes 
Reinstate severely damaged sections, fill small 
to medium holes with temporary backfill 
Plant control forest, install reinforced barriers, Install water permeable fence alongside 
road to catch small-medium sized debris, elevate pavement 
Medium 
(Suppasri et al. 2013; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; Edwards 2006; 





Fill small to medium holes with temporary 
backfill, restrict traffic to four wheel drive access 
Utilise multiple access routes to communities, use well compacted base material, 
install coastal protection 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 
Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; Hart & Knight 
2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 Ponding 
Pump excess water into drainage channels, 
restrict traffic to four wheel drive access, clear 
any blocked drainage channels by hand or with 
heavy machinery 
Stockpile pumps outside of inundation zone, design and maintain good drainage 
systems, elevate pavement 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 




Replace washed out sections, divert traffic to 
undamaged routes, use temporary surfaces 
Coastal protection, use well compacted base material, elevate pavement, develop 
rapid response plans to deploy repair workers and heavy machinery 
High 
(Akiyama et al. 2013; Ghobarah et al. 2006; Tang & Edwards 2012; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Edwards 2006; Suppasri et al. 
2013; Cruz et al. 2009; Hart & Knight 2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC 
Working Group 53 2009; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 





Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
deploy traffic managers if required 
Stockpile spare parts outside inundation zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy 
traffic managers 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 




Temporary backfill, reinstate Utilise erosion protection, use U-shaped wing walls, longer wing wall Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; American Society 
of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Corrosion  Clean off salt, replace damaged components Seal exposed metal, use cathodic protection, ensure regular structural surveys Low 
(Akiyama et al. 2013; Frangopol & Bocchini 2012; Kawashima & Buckle 
2013) 
 Channel widening 
Replace material, rebuild embankments, 
construct longer superstructure and supports 




Dredge channel, rebuild with elevated deck 
Store dredging equipment outside of expected inundation zone, regular dredging of 
vulnerable channels, 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; LRFD 2010; Edwards 2006; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Silt & debris cover Clear by hand or with heavy machinery Raise deck elevation, install reinforced barriers Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Bell et al. 2005; Nakanishi et al. 2014; LRFD 
2010; Edwards 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
 Debris strikes Reinstate or replace damaged components 
Use RC design, install bumpers on exposed sections, install reinforced barriers, elevate 
deck 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; American 




Replace backfill to non-damaged foundations Use deep concrete foundations, install erosion protection around abutments Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; American Society 




Install temporary barriers, reinstate or replace 
barriers 
Reinforce barriers on both sides, install bumpers High 
(Edwards 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; American Society of Civil Engineers 








Install temporary bridge, replace bridge, deploy 
ferry or barge services 
Seismic strengthening of bridge, use monolithic connections, ensure continuity of 
superstructure, raise superstructure elevation, aerodynamic profile, install retainers, 
install vents in deck to alleviate buoyancy pressure, use RC design, elevate 
superstructure, install breakaway barriers to reduce debris build up and lateral forces, 
develop rapid response plans to deploy repair workers and heavy machinery, store 
ready-made temporary bridges and barges outside of expected inundation zone 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
Akiyama et al. 2013; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 2010; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & Edwards 2012; Kazama & 





Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
deploy traffic managers if required 
Stockpile spare parts outside inundation zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy 
traffic managers 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 
2011; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Lighting 
Water damage to 
electrical 
components 
Repair or replace damaged components 
Develop rapid response plans to deploy repair workers, elevate electrical components 
on supports, stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, elevate on RC 
design supports 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; McClelland 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Edwards 2006; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; Cruz et al. 2009) 
 Debris strikes 
Repair minor damages, replace structurally 
damaged supports 
Use RC supports, attach to existing RC design utility poles, bury cables, stockpile spare 
parts outside of expected inundation zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy 
repair workers 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 
Edwards 2006; Evans & McGhie 2011; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; McClelland 2011; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; 
Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
 Foundation scour 
Repair foundations, replace backfill if 
foundations undamaged 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill material Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; McClelland 2011; Kwasinski 2013; Edwards 
2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 




Use temporary supports, deploy mobile 
generators, replace utility poles 
Use RC supports, bury cables, stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation 
zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy repair workers, use deep concrete 
foundations, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 
Edwards 2006; Evans & McGhie 2011; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; McClelland 2011; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; 
Scawthorn et al. 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; Francis 2006) 
Vehicles 
Water damage to 
electrical 
components 
Deploy public transport, reinstate damaged 
components, replace vehicle 
Elevate parking, use water tight housing/seals on internal components, park outside of 
expected inundation zone if possible, develop rapid response plans to deploy public 
transport services 
Low 
(Nakanishi et al. 2014; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Cruz et 
al. 2009; Edwards 2006) 
 Corrosion 
Clean off salt, reinstate or replace damaged 
components, replace vehicle 
Seal exposed metal, park outside of expected inundation zone if possible, elevate 
parking, install flood protection around parking 
Low (Bardal 2004) 
 Debris strikes 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
replace vehicle, deploy public transport 
Elevate parking, fences/walls around parking, park outside of expected inundation 
zone if possible 
Low (Nakanishi et al. 2014; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Floating 
Recover floated vehicles, reinstate or replace 
damaged components, replace vehicle, deploy 
public transport 
Elevate parking, install fences/walls around parking, park outside of expected 
inundation zone if possible 
Low (Nakanishi et al. 2014; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Impact damage 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
replace vehicle, deploy public transport 
Elevate parking, install fences/walls around parking, park outside of expected 
inundation zone if possible, install bumpers 
Low (Nakanishi et al. 2014; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Rail      
Tracks Silt & debris cover 
Prioritise by route damage or importance, clear 
by hand or with heavy machinery 
Install water permeable fence alongside track to catch small-medium sized debris, 
elevate track, develop rapid response plans to deploy heavy machinery 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Bell et al. 2005; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; 
Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
 Ballast scour replace ballast material and relay track 
Use well compacted material, design and maintain adequate drainage systems, install 
coastal protection for coastal tracks, develop rapid response plans to deploy repair 
workers 




Prioritise by route importance, relay ballast 
material, relay tracks 
Stockpile spare parts outside inundation zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy 
repair workers, use coastal protection, plant control forests 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 






Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
deploy traffic managers if required 
Stockpile spare parts outside inundation zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy 
traffic managers 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 




Temporary backfill, reinstate Utilise erosion protection, use U-shaped wing walls, longer wing wall Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; American Society 
of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Corrosion Clean off salt, replace damaged components Seal exposed metal, use cathodic protection, ensure regular structural surveys Low 
(Akiyama et al. 2013; Frangopol & Bocchini 2012; Kawashima & Buckle 
2013) 
 Channel widening 
Replace material, rebuild embankments, 
construct longer superstructure and supports 




Dredge channel, rebuild with elevated deck 
Store dredging equipment outside of expected inundation zone, regular dredging of 
vulnerable channels, 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; LRFD 2010; Edwards 2006; American Society of 





 Silt & debris cover Clear by hand or with heavy machinery Raise deck elevation, install reinforced barriers Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Bell et al. 2005; Nakanishi et al. 2014; LRFD 
2010; Edwards 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
 Debris strikes Reinstate or replace damaged components 
Use RC design, install bumpers on exposed sections, install reinforced barriers, elevate 
deck 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; American 




Replace backfill to non-damaged foundations Use deep concrete foundations, install erosion protection around abutments Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; American Society 




Install temporary barriers, reinstate or replace 
barriers 
Reinforce barriers on both sides, install bumpers High 
(Edwards 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; American Society of Civil Engineers 




Install temporary bridge, replace bridge, deploy 
ferry or barge services 
Seismic strengthening of bridge, use monolithic connections, ensure continuity of 
superstructure, raise superstructure elevation, aerodynamic profile, install retainers, 
install vents in deck to alleviate buoyancy pressure, use RC design, elevate 
superstructure, install breakaway barriers to reduce debris build up and lateral forces, 
develop rapid response plans to deploy repair workers and heavy machinery, store 
ready-made temporary bridges and barges outside of expected inundation zone 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
Akiyama et al. 2013; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 2010; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & Edwards 2012; Kazama & 
Noda 2012; McClelland 2011; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Stations 
& Depots 
Water damage to 
interiors 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
wash out sediment & debris 
Elevate foundations, install flood controls, elevate control rooms, set back from coast, 
locate on high ground if possible, locate outside of expected inundation zone if 
possible 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
 Wall collapse  
Reinstate structure, rebuild walls if structure is 
structurally sound, use temporary facilities 
Use multi-storey RC design, elevate foundations, set back from coast, use flood 
controls, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
 Debris strikes 
Reinstate or replace damaged components if 
structurally undamaged 
Install bumpers, elevate foundations, use RC design, install flood controls, set back 
from coast if possible, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible, Install 
water permeable fences around facilities to catch small-medium sized debris 
Low 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
 




Reinstate or replace 
Stockpile spare parts outside of inundation zone, make pre-disaster arrangements to 
move equipment to higher ground if possible, store equipment on high ground where 
possible, locate outside of inundation zone if possible 
Low 





Divert traffic to undamaged stations, use 
temporary facilities, rebuild facilities 
Use multi-storey RC design, use breakaway walls on light structures, install coastal 
protection, install flood controls, elevate foundations, set back from coast, locate on 
high ground if possible, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Hart & Knight 2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
Overhead 
 Lines 
Scour of supports 
Replace backfill if foundations undamaged, 
replace foundations 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 2006; LRFD 2010) 
 
Water damage to 
electrical 
components 
Replace damaged components 
Elevate electrical components, stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation 
zone, use water tight housing on transformers 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Edwards 2006; Cruz 
et al. 2009; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Matsuhashi et al. 
2012; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Kwasinski 2013) 
 Debris strikes 
Repair or replace damaged supports, replace 
damaged cables 
Use RC supports, elevate track Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski 2013; Edwards 2006; Evans & 
McGhie 2011; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; PIANC Working 




Replace supports and cables 
Use RC supports, stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, make pre-
disaster arrangements to deploy repair workers 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski 2013; Edwards 2006; Evans & 
McGhie 2011; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; PIANC Working 
Group 53 2009; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 2011; 
Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Trains Derailment Recover with heavy machinery 
Park & locate yards outside of expected inundation zone if possible, develop rapid 
response plans to deploy heavy machinery 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Bell et al. 2005; Edwards 2006; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Cruz et al. 2009; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Debris strikes Repair damaged components, replace vehicle 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, park outside of expected 
inundation zone if possible, elevate tracks 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
 Floating 
Recover or dismantle with heavy machinery, 
replace vehicle 
Park & locate yards outside of expected inundation zone if possible, develop rapid 
response plans to deploy heavy machinery, install reinforced barriers alongside tracks 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Bell et al. 2005; Edwards 2006; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Cruz et al. 2009; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Impact damage Repair damaged components, replace vehicle 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, park outside of expected 
inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Bell et al. 2005; Edwards 2006; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Cruz et al. 2009; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 





Replace backfill to non-damaged foundations 
Use deep concrete foundations, install erosion protection around abutments, regular 
underwater surveys of structure, install coastal protection 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; American Society 





 Debris strikes Reinstate or replace damaged components 
Install bumpers, make arrangements to anchor loose equipment & containers, make 
pre-disaster arrangements to move offshore (>50m water depth) if possible 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Lynett et al. 2014; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 
2010; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 2014; Cruz et al. 2009; Fritz et al. 





Clear by hand or with heavy machinery 
Install permeated fences, develop rapid response plans to deploy heavy machinery, 
build in redundancies, elevate pavement 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 




Dredge seabed, elevate wharves and piers 
Store dredging machinery outside of expected inundation zone, dredge vulnerable 
areas regularly, design facilities to allow for aggradation 




Salvage large debris 
Develop rapid response plans to deploy salvage crews, store salvaging equipment 
outside of expected inundation zone 
Medium (Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012) 
 Removal of deck Repair or replace sections 
Design to withstand tsunami forces, install vents to reduce buoyancy pressure, seismic 
retrofitting, install coastal protection 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; LRFD 2010; PIANC 
Working Group 53 2009; Suppasri et al. 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; 




Reroute vessels to undamaged ports, rebuild 
Design to withstand tsunami forces, make pre-disaster arrangements to deploy repair 
workers, install coastal protection, regular underwater surveys of structure, seismic 
retrofitting 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; LRFD 2010; PIANC 
Working Group 53 2009; Suppasri et al. 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; 
Cruz et al. 2009; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 
2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Buildings 
Water damage to 
interiors & stored 
goods 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
wash out sediment & debris, inspect impacted 
stored goods and repack or dispose 
Elevate foundations, install flood controls, elevate storage platforms, set back from 
coast, locate on high ground if possible 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 




Erect temporary facilities & storage buildings, 
transport goods to inland storage facilities, 
rebuild 
Use multi-storey RC design, use breakaway walls on light structures, install coastal 
protection, install flood controls, elevate foundations, set back from coast, locate on 
high ground if possible 
High 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Hart & Knight 2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
Plant  
Machinery 




Reinstate or replace 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, make pre-disaster 
arrangements to move equipment to higher ground if possible, store equipment on 
high ground where possible 




Recover equipment, replace equipment 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to secure or elevate machinery if possible, store in RC 
design buildings, store equipment on high ground where possible 
Low (Horspool & Fraser 2015) 
Vessels Floated inland Recover with heavy machinery or dismantle 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to move vessels offshore (>50m water depth) if 
possible, plant control forests 
High 
(Lynett et al. 2014; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Suppasri et al. 2013; 
Auckland Engineering Lifelines 2014; Cruz et al. 2009; Scawthorn et al. 
2006; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of Civil 





Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
replace vessel 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to move vessels offshore (>50m water depth) if 
possible, install bumpers, reinforce hulls 
Low 
(Lynett et al. 2014; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Auckland Engineering 
Lifelines 2014; Cruz et al. 2009; Fritz et al. 2011; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of Civil Engineers 
2005) 
Containers Floated Recover with heavy machinery 
Secure container stacks when stored, make pre- disaster arrangements to lash 
container stacks if possible 
Medium (Horspool & Fraser 2015; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 2014) 
 
Debris & impact 
damage 
Replace if necessary 
Secure container stacks when stored, make pre-disaster arrangements to secure 
containers if possible, install coastal protection 
Low Horspool & Fraser 2015; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 2014 
 Damage to goods Inspect goods, repack or dispose of 
Secure goods inside container, pack appropriately, secure container stacks when 
stored, make pre-disaster arrangements to secure container stacks, use water tight 
container seals, install flood controls 
Medium Horspool & Fraser 2015; Auckland Engineering Lifelines 2014 
Airports      
Runway Ponding 
Pump excess water into drainage channels, clear 
any blockages in drainage channel by hand or 
heavy machinery 
Stockpile pumps outside of expected inundation zone, design and maintain good 
drainage systems, elevate pavement, locate outside of expected inundation zone if 
possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 




Clear by hand or with heavy machinery 
Install permeated fence alongside runway, develop rapid response plans to deploy 
heavy machinery, install flood controls, locate outside of expected inundation zone if 
possible 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 




Replace damaged components Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, elevate, reinforce supports Low 







Water damage to 
interiors & stored 
goods 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
wash out sediment & debris, inspect goods & 
repack or dispose 
Elevate foundations, install flood controls, elevate storage platforms, set back from 
coast, locate on high ground if possible, locate outside of expected inundation zone if 
possible 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 




Erect temporary facilities & storage buildings, 
transport goods to inland storage facilities, 
rebuild 
Use multi-storey RC design, use breakaway walls on light structures, install coastal 
protection, install flood controls, elevate foundations, set back from coast, locate on 
high ground if possible 
High 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Hart & Knight 2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
Plant  
Machinery 




Reinstate or replace 
Stockpile spare parts outside of inundation zone, make pre-disaster arrangements to 
move equipment to higher ground if possible, store equipment on high ground if 
possible, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 




Recover equipment, replace equipment 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to secure or elevate machinery if possible, store in RC 
design buildings, store equipment on high ground where possible, locate outside of 
expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
Planes Debris strikes 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
replace plane 
Stockpile spare parts outside of inundation zone, make pre-disaster plans to divert all 
air traffic to airports outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low (Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Impact damage 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
replace plane 
Make pre-disaster plans to divert all air traffic and grounded planes to airports outside 
of expected inundation zone if possible, make pre-disaster plans to secure or take off if 
possible 
Low (American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Floating Recover or dismantle with heavy machinery 
Make pre-disaster plans to divert all air traffic and grounded planes to airports outside 
of expected inundation zone if possible, make pre-disaster plans to secure or take off if 
possible 
Low (American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Energy      
Electricity      
Overhead  
Power Lines  
Shorting of 
transformers 
Repair or replace damaged components, deploy 
mobile generators 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to deploy repair workers, elevate transformers on 
supports, water tight housing for transformers, bury cables, stockpile spare parts & 
generators outside of expected inundation zone 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; McClelland 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Edwards 2006; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; Cruz et al. 2009) 
 Debris strikes 
Replace damaged lines, deploy mobile 
generators 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to deploy repair workers, bury cables, stockpile spare 
parts & generators outside of expected inundation zone, set back from coast if 
possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; McClelland 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 




Use temporary supports, replace lines, deploy 
mobile generators 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to deploy repair workers, bury cables, stockpile spare 
parts & generators outside of expected inundation zone, set back from coast if 
possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; McClelland 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Edwards 2006; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013) 
Utility Poles Debris strikes 
Repair minor damages, use temporary supports, 
replace structurally damaged poles 
Use RC supports, bury cables, stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation 
zone, make pre-disaster arrangements to deploy repair workers 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 
Edwards 2006; Evans & McGhie 2011; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; McClelland 2011; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; 
Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
 Foundation scour 
Repair foundations, replace backfill if 
foundations undamaged 
Bury cables, use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill material Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; McClelland 2011; Kwasinski 2013; Edwards 
2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 




Use temporary supports, deploy mobile 
generators, replace utility poles 
Use RC supports, bury cables, stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation 
zone, make pre-disaster arrangements to deploy repair workers, use deep concrete 
foundations, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 
Edwards 2006; Evans & McGhie 2011; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; McClelland 2011; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; 






Replace damaged cables, deploy mobile 
generators 
Make arrangements to deploy repair workers, stockpile spare parts & mobile 
generators outside of expected inundation zone 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; McClelland 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Unjoh 2012; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn 
et al. 2006) 
 Scour of backfill Replace backfill Use well compacted material, set back from coast if possible Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
 
Cables & ducting 
over waterways 
severed 
Lay temporary supports and new cable, attach 
to existing or temporary bridges, rebuild utility 
bridge 
Develop response plans to deploy repair workers, bury beneath waterway if possible, 
attach to RC bridge, install protection buffers 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Akiyama et al. 2013; 
Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Edwards 2006; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Iemura et al. 





Replace damaged components, deploy mobile 
substation and generator 
Install flood controls, elevate equipment and electrical components, locate outside of 
expected inundation zone if possible, develop rapid response plans to deploy repair 
workers 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; McClelland 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil 





 Silt & debris cover 
Clear by hand or with heavy machinery, deploy 
mobile substation and generator 
locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible, make pre-disaster 
arrangements 
 to deploy heavy machinery, install water permeable fences around facilities to catch 
small-to-medium sized debris 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Bell et al. 2005; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 
2005; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 Debris strikes 
Reinstate or replace damaged equipment & 
facilities, deploy mobile substation and 
generator 
locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible, install water permeable fences 
around facilities to catch small-to-medium sized debris, house equipment inside RC 
design buildings 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; McClelland 2011; Tang 
& Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Edwards 




Deploy mobile substations and generators, 
rebuild 
Install flood controls, locate outside of expected inundation zone, use RC design 
buildings, install  water tight doors, stockpile mobile sub-stations and generators 
outside of expected inundation zone, house all facilities in RC buildings 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
Power  
Stations 
Water damage to 
interiors 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
wash out sediment & debris 
Elevate foundations, install flood controls, elevate control rooms, set back from coast, 
locate on high ground if possible, locate outside of expected inundation zone if 
possible 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
 
Water damage 
and shorting of 
electrical 
components 
Replace damaged components, deploy mobile 
generator 
Install flood controls, elevate equipment and electrical components, locate outside of 
expected inundation zone if possible, develop rapid response plans to deploy repair 
workers 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
 Silt & debris cover 
Clear by hand or with heavy machinery, deploy 
mobile generator 
locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible, make pre-disaster 
arrangements 
 to deploy heavy machinery, install water permeable fences around facilities to catch 
small-to-medium sized debris 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Bell et al. 2005; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 
2005; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 Debris strikes 
Reinstate or replace damaged equipment & 
facilities, deploy mobile generator 
locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible, install water permeable fences 
around facilities to catch small-to-medium sized debris, house equipment inside RC 
design buildings 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; McClelland 2011; Tang 
& Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Edwards 
2006; Kwasinski 2013; Cruz et al. 2009) 
 
Shut down of 
cooling systems 
Deploy repair workers if possible, shut down 
facilities 
Install flood controls, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible, develop 
emergency shutdown procedures, make pre-disaster arrangements to deploy repair 
workers, install coastal protection 
Low 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 




Deploy mobile generators, rebuild 
Install flood controls, locate outside of expected inundation zone, use RC design 
buildings, install water tight doors, stockpile mobile sub-stations and generators 
outside of expected inundation zone, house all facilities in RC design buildings, plant 
control forests, diversify electricity generation 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
Petroleum      
Tanks Debris strikes 
Repair or replace damaged components, replace 
tank 
install water permeable fences around ‘tank farms’ to catch small-to-medium sized 
debris, secure loose objects and equipment if possible, install flood controls, elevate 
foundations, place on high ground if possible, use artificial high ground if possible, set 
back from coast if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; Edwards 2006; 
Cruz et al. 2009; Suppasri et al. 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Auckland 




Replace backfill of undamaged foundations 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill, install erosion protection 
around foundations 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 2006; 
LRFD 2010; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Loss of fuel Deploy oil containment and collection workers 
Utilise spillage control walls, store recovery equipment outside of expected inundation 
zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy containment workers, locate on high 
ground, set back from coast if possible 
Medium 
(Cruz et al. 2009; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 
2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Suppasri et 
al. 2013; Hart & Knight 2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 
53 2009) 
 Fire/explosions 
Deploy firefighting crews, replace damaged 
tanks 
Develop rapid response plans to deploy firefighting crews, make pre-disaster 
arrangements to remove fuel if possible 




Recover or dismantle tanks 
Use larger capacity storage tanks, make arrangements to fill low volume tanks with 
liquids if possible, anchor to foundations, elevate foundations, locate on higher ground 
if possible, construct artificial high ground, retrofit to seismic standards, plant control 
forests, install coastal protection 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Cruz et al. 2009; Scawthorn et al. 2006; PIANC 
Working Group 53 2009; Suppasri et al. 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; 
Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Pipes Scour of backfill Replace backfill Use well compacted material, set back from coast if possible Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
 
Washout of pipes 
over waterway 
Lay temporary supports and new pipe, attach 
new or temporary pipes to existing or temporary 
bridges, rebuild utility bridge 
Burry beneath waterway if possible, elevate utility bridges, attach to RC bridge, install 
protection buffers, stockpile spare parts outside of inundation zone, develop rapid 
response plans to deploy repair workers 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Akiyama et al. 2013; Saatcioglu 2007; 
Tang & Edwards 2012; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 
2010) 
 Decoupling 
Reinstate, install temporary linkages, replace 
connectors 
Stockpile spare parts outside of inundation zone, develop response plans to deploy 
repair workers, bury pipes 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 







Debris and silt 
cover 
Clear by hand or with heavy machinery, deploy 
mobile generator 
locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible, make pre-disaster 
arrangements 
 to deploy heavy machinery, install water permeable fences around facilities to catch 
small-to-medium sized debris 
High 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Bell et al. 2005; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 
2005; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 Debris strikes 
Reinstate or replace damaged equipment & 
facilities, deploy mobile generator 
locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible, secure loose objects & 
containers, install water permeable fences around facilities to catch small-to-medium 
sized debris, house equipment inside RC design buildings 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; McClelland 2011; Tang 
& Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Edwards 




and shorting of 
electrical 
components 
Replace damaged components, deploy mobile 
generator 
Install flood controls, elevate equipment and electrical components, locate outside of 
expected inundation zone if possible, develop rapid response plans to deploy repair 
workers 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
 Loss of fuel Deploy oil containment & collection crews 
Utilise spillage control walls, store recovery equipment outside of expected inundation 
zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy containment workers, locate on high 
ground, set back from coast if possible 
Medium 
(Cruz et al. 2009; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 
2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Suppasri et 
al. 2013; Hart & Knight 2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 
53 2009) 
 Fire/explosions 
Deploy firefighting crews, replace damaged 
tanks 
Develop rapid response plans to deploy firefighting crews, make pre-disaster 
arrangements to remove fuel and dangerous goods if possible 




Erect temporary facilities & storage buildings, 
transport goods to inland storage facilities, 
rebuild 
Use multi-storey RC design, use breakaway walls on light structures, install coastal 
protection, install flood controls, elevate foundations, set back from coast, locate on 
high ground if possible 
High 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Hart & Knight 2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 




Replace backfill of undamaged foundations 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill, install erosion protection 
around foundations 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 2006; 
LRFD 2010; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Debris strikes 
Repair or replace damaged components, replace 
tank 
install water permeable fences around tanks to catch small-to-medium sized debris, 
secure loose objects and equipment if possible, install flood controls, elevate 
foundations, place on high ground if possible, use artificial high ground if possible, set 
back from coast if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; Edwards 2006; 
Cruz et al. 2009; Suppasri et al. 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Auckland 




Recover or dismantle tanks with heavy 
machinery 
Use larger capacity storage tanks, make arrangements to fill low volume tanks with 
liquids if possible, anchor to foundations, elevate foundations, locate on higher ground 
if possible, construct artificial high ground, retrofit to seismic standards, plant control 
forests, install coastal protection 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Cruz et al. 2009; Scawthorn et al. 2006; PIANC 
Working Group 53 2009; Suppasri et al. 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; 
Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 Fire/explosions 
Deploy firefighting crews, replace damaged 
tanks 
Make rapid response plans to deploy firefighting crews, make pre-disaster 
arrangements to remove fuel if possible 
Low (Cruz et al. 2009) 
Pipes Scour of backfill Replace backfill Use well compacted material, set back from coast if possible Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
 
Washout of pipes 
over waterway 
Lay temporary supports and new pipe, attach 
new or temporary pipes to existing or temporary 
bridges, rebuild utility bridge 
Burry beneath waterway if possible, elevate utility bridges, attach to RC bridge, install 
protection buffers, stockpile spare parts outside of inundation zone, develop rapid 
response plans to deploy repair workers 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Akiyama et al. 2013; Saatcioglu 2007; 
Tang & Edwards 2012; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 
2010) 
 Decoupling 
Reinstate, install temporary linkages, replace 
connectors 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, develop rapid response 
plans to deploy repair workers, bury pipes 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Edwards 2006) 
Water      
Wastewater & 
Sewerage 
     
Pipes Scour of backfill Replace backfill Use well compacted material, set back from coast if possible Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
 Decoupling 
Reinstate, install temporary linkages, replace 
connectors 
Use HDPE pipes, stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, develop 
rapid response plans to deploy repair workers and water trucks 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et 
al. 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Matsuhashi et al. 
2012; Edwards 2006) 
 
Washout of pipes 
over waterway 
Lay temporary supports and new pipe, attach 
new or temporary pipes to existing or temporary 
bridges, rebuild utility bridge 
Burry beneath waterway if possible, elevate utility bridges, attach to RC bridge, 
protection buffers, use HDPE pipe, stockpile spare parts outside of inundation zone, 
develop rapid response plans to deploy repair workers 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; 
Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 
Akiyama et al. 2013; Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & Edwards 2012; Scawthorn 




Lay temporary HDPE pipes, replace pipes, 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, use HDPE pipes, develop 
rapid response plans to deploy repair workers, use erosion protection 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; 
Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 









Shut off intakes, reinstate or replace, flush out 
wastewater intakes 
Seal openings, make pre-disaster arrangements to shut off intake facilities, locate 
outside of expected inundation zone if possible, make pre-disaster arrangements to 
cover outlets if possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; American 




Clear by hand or with heavy machinery  
Install water permeable fences around pumping station to catch small-to-medium 
sized debris, use water tight housing, locate outside of expected inundation zone if 
possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 Debris strikes Reinstate or replace damaged components 
Install water permeable fences, elevate facilities, locate outside of expected 
inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 
Water damage to 
electrical 
components 
Replace damaged components 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone if possible, use water tight 
housing for electronic panels, elevate electrical components, locate outside of 
expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; Cruz et al. 2009; 




Deploy temporary pumps, reinstate, replace 
Stockpile spare pumps outside of expected inundation zone, locate outside of 
expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; American 




Pump out contents Seal openings, elevate vents Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 
Villholth & Neupane 2011) 
 Floating Recover or dismantle with heavy machinery 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to fill low volume tanks with liquid if possible, use 
concrete tanks 
Medium (Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 Scour of backfill Replace backfill if tank undamaged Use well compacted materials, bury at adequate depth Medium 










filters, pumps & 
ponds 
Shut off intakes & pumps, replace damaged 
components, pump out contaminated sewage, 
deploy temporary bioreactors 
Stock portable facilities (bioreactors) outside of expected inundation zone, seal 
openings, make pre-disaster arrangements to shut off intake facilities, make pre-
disaster arrangements to cover outlets if possible, make pre-disaster arrangements to 
place concrete covers over reaction tanks if possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
 Silt & debris cover Clear by hand or with heavy machinery 
Make rapid response plans to deploy heavy machinery, install water permeable fences 
around facilities to catch small-to-medium sized debris, elevate facilities if possible, set 
back from coast if possible, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 




Temporary fill, repair damaged sections, replace 
material 
Elevate embankments, use coastal protection, use erosion protection, vegetate 
embankments 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 
2009; Hart & Knight 2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 
2009; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Francis 2006) 
 




Replace damaged components, reinstate or 
replace machinery 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, use water tight housing for 
electronic panels, install water tight doors, elevate electrical components 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Cruz et al. 2009; Kwasinski 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 
2012; Matsuhashi et al. 2012) 
 
Water damage to 
interiors 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
wash out sediment & debris 
Elevate foundations, install flood controls, elevate control rooms, set back from coast 
if possible, locate on high ground if possible, locate outside of expected inundation 
zone if possible 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 




Divert intakes to operable facilities if possible, 
bypass treatment facilities, use temporary 
facilities, rebuild, deploy temporary bioreactors 
Stock portable facilities (bioreactor) outside of expected inundation zone, locate 
outside of expected inundation zone if possible, use RC buildings 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Suppasri et al. 2013; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; 
Scawthorn et al. 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 
Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009) 
Drinking Water      
Pipes Decoupling 
Reinstate, install temporary linkages, replace 
connectors, deploy mobile water trucks and 
tanks 
Use HDPE pipes, stockpile spare parts, tanks & water trucks outside of expected 
inundation zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy repair workers and water 
trucks 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et 
al. 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Matsuhashi et al. 
2012; Edwards 2006) 
 
Washout of pipes 
over waterway 
Lay temporary supports and new pipe, attach 
new or temporary pipes to existing or temporary 
bridges, rebuild utility bridge, deploy mobile 
water trucks & tanks 
Burry beneath waterway if possible, elevate utility bridges, attach to RC bridge, install 
protection buffers, use HDPE pipe, stockpile spare parts outside of expected 
inundation zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy repair workers & water 
trucks 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; 
Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 
Akiyama et al. 2013; Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & Edwards 2012; Scawthorn 
et al. 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 2010) 
 Scour of backfill Replace backfill Use well compacted material, set back from coast if possible, use erosion protection Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 




Lay temporary HDPE pipes, replace pipes, 
deploy water trucks & tanks 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, use HDPE pipes, develop 
rapid response plans to deploy repair workers & water trucks, use erosion protection 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; 
Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 






Salt & sewage 
contamination 
Pump out salt water, abandon well, deploy 
water trucks & bottled water 
Stockpile water outside of inundation zone, make arrangements to use unaffected 
facilities, raise standpipes, locate outside of expected inundation zones if possible, seal 
grated well lids, reinforce well heads, develop rapid response plans to deploy repair 
workers & water trucks 
Medium 
(Miyajima 2014; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Villholth & Neupane 2011; Bell 
et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 
2005; Edwards 2006) 
 
Damage to well 
components 
Repair or replace damaged components, deploy 
water trucks & bottled water 
Use protective housing, reinforce well heads, elevate standpipe, develop rapid 
response plans to deploy repair workers & water trucks 
Medium 
(Miyajima 2014; Horspool & Fraser 2015; Villholth & Neupane 2011; Bell 





Pump out contents Seal openings, elevate vents Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 
Villholth & Neupane 2011) 
 
Debris strikes & 
Impact damage 
Reinstate or replace damaged components 
install water permeable fences around storage tanks to catch small-to-medium sized 
debris, elevate tank, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 
Floating of tanks 
& concrete 
reservoirs 
Recover or dismantle with heavy machinery, 
deploy water trucks & bottled water 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to fill low volume tanks with liquid if possible, use 
concrete tanks, elevate tanks on multi-storey RC building or elevated steel supports 




Replace backfill of undamaged foundations 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill, install erosion protection 
around foundations 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 2006; 
LRFD 2010; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 
Tilting or collapse 
of water tower 
Repair or replace, deploy mobile water trucks & 
bottled water 
Anchor to supports, use deep concrete foundations, locate outside of expected 
inundation zone if possible, use monopole structure 
Low 
(Edwards 2006; King & Bell 2006; Francis 2006; LRFD 2010; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
Treatment & 
Pump Facilities 
     
 
Water damage to 
interiors 
Reinstate or replace damaged components, 
wash out sediment & debris 
Elevate foundations, install flood controls, elevate control rooms, set back from coast 
if possible, locate on high ground if possible, locate outside of expected inundation 
zone if possible 
Medium 
(Mas et al. 2012; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; 
Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005) 
 
Water damage to 
electrical 
components 
Replace damaged components 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, use water tight housing for 
electronic panels, elevate electrical components, locate outside of expected 
inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; Cruz et al. 2009; 




Shut off intakes, reinstate or replace, flush out 
water intakes 
Seal openings, make pre-disaster arrangements to shut off intake facilities, locate 
outside of expected inundation zone if possible, make pre-disaster arrangements to 
cover intakes and outlets if possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; American 




Divert intakes to operable facilities if possible, 
use temporary facilities, rebuild, deploy water 
trucks & bottled water 
Use multi-storey RC design, use breakaway walls on light structures, install coastal 
protection, install flood controls, elevate foundations, set back from coast, locate on 
high ground if possible, make pre-disaster arrangements to deploy water trucks & 
bottled water 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Suppasri et al. 2013; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; 
Scawthorn et al. 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 
Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009) 




Clear debris by hand or with heavy machinery Install grates on openings, make pre-disaster arrangements to cover outlets if possible Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; King & Bell 2006; Nakanishi et al. 2014) 
 Scour of outlet Replace material if undamaged 
Use well compacted material if possible, use deep concrete foundations, use erosion 
protection around outflow 
Low 




Reinstate or replace, deploy repair workers 
Install coastal protection, extend offshore, use erosion protection around outflows, 
make pre-disaster arrangements to deploy repair workers 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 
2009; Francis 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 




Deploy pumps in areas vulnerable to ponding, 
dig temporary drainage channels with heavy 
machinery, clear debris by hand or with heavy 
machinery 
Install grates on intakes, install covers on open channels, use buried pipes, develop 
rapid  response plans to deploy heavy machinery, install water permeable fence 
alongside channel to catch small-to-medium sized debris 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; King & Bell 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 2011; Scawthorn et al. 
2006; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 Covers lifted Replace covers Anchor covers, use buried pipes Low (Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski 2013; McClelland 2011) 
 
Scour & widening 
of channels 
Reinstate embankments 
Use erosion protection on embankments, vegetate embankments, reinforce channel, 
cover channel, lay buried pipes 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski 2013; McClelland 2011; Edwards 
2006; Francis 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 




Deploy pumps in areas vulnerable to ponding, 
clear debris by hand or with heavy machinery 
Install grates on intakes, install covers to open channels if possible, use buried pipes, 
develop rapid  response plans to deploy heavy machinery, install water permeable 
fence alongside canal to catch small-to-medium sized debris 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; King & Bell 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; American Society of 
Civil Engineers 2005; Unjoh 2012; McClelland 2011; Scawthorn et al. 




Shut off intakes, abandon canal until 
contamination has been washed out, use 
alternative water supply 
Elevate embankments, use flood controls, make pre-disaster arrangements to use 
alternative water supply 
Same as flood 
control 









Use erosion protection on embankments, vegetate embankments, reinforce channel, 
lay buried pipes 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski 2013; McClelland 2011; Edwards 




Pump out contents Seal openings, elevate vents Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 




Replace backfill of undamaged foundations 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill, install erosion protection 
around foundations 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 2006; 
LRFD 2010; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
 
Floating of tanks 
& concrete 
reservoirs 
Recover or dismantle with heavy machinery, use 
alternative water supply 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to fill low volume tanks with liquid if possible, use 
concrete tanks, elevate tanks, make pre-disaster arrangements to use alternative 
water supply 
Medium (Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 
Debris strikes & 
impact damage 
Reinstate or replace damaged components 
Install water permeable fences around storage tanks to catch small-to-medium sized 
debris, elevate tank, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
Machinery 




Reinstate or replace 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, make pre-disaster 
arrangements to move equipment to higher ground if possible, store equipment on 
high ground where possible, install flood controls 




Recover equipment, replace equipment 
Make pre-disaster arrangements to secure or elevate machinery if possible, store in RC 
design buildings, store equipment on high ground where possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Cruz et al. 2009; PIANC Working Group 53 
2009) 
Pipes Decoupling 
Reinstate, temporary linkages, replace 
connectors 
Use HDPE pipes, stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, develop 
rapid response plans to deploy repair workers 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et 
al. 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Matsuhashi et al. 
2012; Edwards 2006) 
 
Washout of pipes 
over waterway 
Lay temporary supports and new pipe, attach 
new or temporary pipes to existing or temporary 
bridges, rebuild utility bridge 
Burry beneath waterway if possible, elevate utility bridges, attach to RC bridge, use 
protection buffers, use HDPE pipe, stockpile spare parts outside of expected 
inundation zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy repair workers 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; 
Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 
Akiyama et al. 2013; Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & Edwards 2012; Scawthorn 
et al. 2006; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 2010) 
 Scour of backfill Replace backfill Use well compacted material, set back from coast if possible, use erosion protection Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 




Lay temporary HDPE pipes, replace pipes, 
deploy water trucks  
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, use HDPE pipes, develop 
rapid response plans to deploy repair workers & water trucks, use erosion protection 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Miyajima 2014; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; 
Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; 





Shut off intakes, reinstate or replace equipment 
and filters 
Seal openings, make pre-disaster arrangements to shut off intake facilities, locate 
outside of expected inundation zone if possible, make arrangements to cover intakes if 
possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; American 




Clear by hand or with heavy machinery  
install water permeable fences around facilities to catch small-to-medium sized debris, 
use water tight housing, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 Debris strikes Reinstate or replace damaged components 
install water permeable fences around facilities to catch small-to-medium sized debris, 
elevate facilities, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
 
Water damage to 
electrical 
components 
Replace damaged components 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, water tight housing for 
electronic panels, elevate electrical components, locate outside of expected 
inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006; 
Nakanishi et al. 2014; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; Cruz et al. 2009; 




Deploy temporary pumps, reinstate, replace 
Stockpile spare pumps outside of expected inundation zone, locate outside of 
expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Flood Controls      
Stop Banks Scour Replace material, reinstate, rebuild 
Use erosion protection on embankments, vegetate embankments, design to withstand 
hydrodynamic forces from both sides, Build up any gaps in structure 
Low 
(Edwards 2006; King & Bell 2006; Francis 2006; LRFD 2010; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Hart & Knight 2009; Iemura et al. 2005; 




install temporary stop banks, rebuild 
Use erosion protection, vegetate embankments, design to withstand hydrodynamic 
forces from both sides, build up any gaps in structure 
Low 
(Edwards 2006; King & Bell 2006; Francis 2006; LRFD 2010; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Hart & Knight 2009; Iemura et al. 2005; 





Replace material if foundations undamaged, 
rebuild structure 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill material, build up gaps in 
structure, implement overlapping walls at openings 
Medium 
(Edwards 2006; King & Bell 2006; Francis 2006; LRFD 2010; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Hart & Knight 2009; Iemura et al. 2005; 





Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill material, avoid gaps in 
structure, overlap walls at openings, use RC design, install bumpers, reinforce 
structure on both sides 
Medium 
(Edwards 2006; King & Bell 2006; Francis 2006; LRFD 2010; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Hart & Knight 2009; Iemura et al. 2005; 











Replace material if foundations undamaged, 
rebuild structure 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill material, build up any 
gaps in structure, utilise overlapping walls at openings, reinforce structure, install 
breakwaters 
Medium 
(Edwards 2006; King & Bell 2006; Francis 2006; LRFD 2010; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Hart & Knight 2009; Iemura et al. 2005; 





Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill material, build up any 
gaps in structure, overlap walls at openings, use RC design, install bumpers, reinforce 
structure on both sides, install breakwaters 
Medium 
(Edwards 2006; King & Bell 2006; Francis 2006; LRFD 2010; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Hart & Knight 2009; Iemura et al. 2005; 
PIANC Working Group 53 2009) 
Breakwaters Scour Replace material 
Maintain structure, design to withstand tsunami induced hydrodynamic forces, 
increase erosion protection 
Low 
(American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Cruz et al. 2009; Edwards 





Maintain structure, design to withstand tsunami induced hydrodynamic forces, 
increase erosion protection 
Low 
(American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Cruz et al. 2009; Edwards 
2006; Francis 2006) 
 Sliding of caissons Reinstate Design to withstand tsunami induced hydrodynamic forces Low (American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Dunes and 
Embankments 
Scour replace material, reinstate, rebuild 
Plant vegetation, plant control forests, maintain natural dunes, build up any gaps in 
structure, install erosion protection on both sides, install breakwaters 
Medium 
(Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; Hart & Knight 
2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American 




Rebuild, promote natural dune recovery 
Plant vegetation, plant control forests, maintain natural dunes, build up gaps in 
structure, install erosion protection on both sides, install breakwaters 
Medium 
(Suppasri et al. 2013; Edwards 2006; Cruz et al. 2009; Hart & Knight 
2009; Kurian et al. 2007; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Francis 2006) 
Telecoms      




Replace backfill if foundations undamaged, 
stabilise or relay foundations if necessary, use 
temporary supports 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill, attach tower to multi-
storey RC design building, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; King & Bell 2006; Francis 2006; 
LRFD 2010; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; PIANC Working 
Group 53 2009) 
 Debris strikes 
Reinstate if necessary, replace if damage is 
structural 
Install protection bumpers, use RC design, mount on multi-storey RC design building, 
use monopole structure, install water permeable fences around facilities to catch 
small-to-medium sized debris 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; LRFD 2010; Iemura et al. 2005; Kwasinski 
2013; Cutter et al. 2008) 
 




Redirect traffic to undamaged sites, reinstate, 
replace damaged electronics, deploy mobile cell 
sites & generators 
Elevate components, use water tight housing on electrical components, stockpile spare 
parts outside of expected inundation zone, develop rapid response plans to deploy 
repair workers, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 
Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Kwasinski & 
Tang 2012; McClelland 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012; Sagara & Ishiwatari 





Redirect traffic to undamaged sites, increase 
coverage radius of un-damaged sites, deploy 
mobile cell sites, use temporary cell sites, 
rebuild 
Use deep concrete foundations, use RC design monopole structure, mount tower on 
multi-storey RC buildings, stockpile mobile cell sites & other spare parts outside of 
expected inundation zone, make rapid response plans to deploy mobile cell sites & 
generators, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 
Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Kwasinski & 
Tang 2012; McClelland 2011; Tang & Edwards 2012; Sagara & Ishiwatari 




Water damage to 
interiors and 
equipment 
Use temporary exchanges, use backup 
generators, reinstate or replace components 
Install water tight doors, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible, 
elevate exchange centre, use water tight housing on electrical panels, elevate 
generators, locate in multi-storey RC building, stockpile mobile temporary exchange 
centres outside of expected inundation zone 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Cruz et al. 2009; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Kwasinski 




Reinstate  severed connections, replace backfill 
Use well compacted material, use deep concrete foundations, install erosion 
protection and flood controls, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; American Society 




Use temporary satellite entrance links, use 
temporary exchange centres, deploy mobile 
microwave repeaters 
Locate outside of expected inundation zone, use multi-storey RC design, stockpile 
mobile temporary exchange centres and microwave repeaters outside of expected 
inundation zone, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible  
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; McClelland 2011; Tang 
& Edwards 2012; Cruz et al. 2009; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 





Replace backfill if foundations undamaged, 
stabilise or relay foundations if necessary, use 
temporary supports 
Use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill, attach tower to multi-
storey RC design building, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; King & Bell 2006; Francis 2006; 
LRFD 2010; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; PIANC Working 
Group 53 2009) 
 Debris strikes 
Reinstate or repair if necessary, replace if 
damage is structural 
Install protection bumpers, use RC design, mount on multi-storey RC building, use 
monopole structure, install water permeable fences around facilities to catch small-to-
medium sized debris, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; LRFD 2010; Iemura et al. 2005; Kwasinski 




Use temporary transmitter towers, rebuild, 
attach transmitters to non-damaged structures 
Install long range radio transmitters & stockpile temporary transmitters outside of 
expected inundation zone, use deep concrete foundations, use RC design monopole 
structure, mount tower on multi-storey RC buildings, locate outside of expected 
inundation zone if possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 









Repair foundations, replace backfill if 
foundations undamaged 
Bury cables, use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill material Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; McClelland 2011; Kwasinski 2013; Edwards 
2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 
2006; LRFD 2010) 
 Debris strikes 
Replace damaged supports, replace severed 
cables, deploy mobile satellite link Wi-Fi 
hotspots 
Bury cables, elevate cables, make rapid response plans to deploy repair workers, 
stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 
2005; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn 




Deploy satellite link mobile Wi-Fi hotspots, 
redirect traffic to undamaged networks, erect 
temporary supports, replace supports, replace 
cables 
Bury cables, use RC design utility poles with deep concrete foundations, stockpile 
mobile satellite link hotspots & spare parts outside of expected inundation zone 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Edwards 2006; American 
Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Buried Cables Scour of backfill Replace backfill Use well compacted backfill material, use erosion protection Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 






Use temporary supports, mount to temporary or 
existing bridges, rebuild utility bridge, deploy 
mobile satellite link Wi-Fi hotspots 
Install protection bumpers, elevate supports, use deep concrete foundations, mount 
to RC bridge, bury beneath waterway if possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Akiyama et al. 2013; 
Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Edwards 2006; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Iemura et al. 
2005; LRFD 2010) 
Switch Boxes 
Water damage to 
internal 
components 
Replace damaged components, deploy satellite 
link mobile Wi-Fi hotspots 
Stockpile spare parts & mobile satellite link hotspots outside of expected inundation 
zone, elevate on supports, install watertight seal on switch box housing 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 
Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005) 
 Debris strikes Repair damaged components, replace unit 
Install protection bumpers, elevate on supports or multi-storey RC design building, 
stockpile spare parts & units outside of expected inundation zone 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 2010; Matsuhashi et 
al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Edwards 2006; 




Deploy satellite link mobile Wi-Fi hotspots, use 
temporary exchanges, replace unit 
Elevate on supports, bury, anchor to foundations, reinforce switch box housing, mount 
to RC design buildings, stockpile spare units outside of expected inundation zone, 
locate outside of expected inundation zone 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 2010; Matsuhashi et 
al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Edwards 2006; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 




Repair foundations, replace backfill if 
foundations undamaged 
Bury cables, use deep concrete foundations, use well compacted backfill material Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; McClelland 2011; Kwasinski 2013; Edwards 
2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Bell et al. 2005; Francis 
2006; LRFD 2010) 
 Debris strikes 
Replace damaged supports, replace severed 
cables 
Bury cables, elevate cables, make rapid response plans to deploy repair workers, 
stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 
2005; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Unjoh 2012; Bell et al. 2005; Scawthorn 




Redirect traffic to undamaged networks, erect 
temporary supports, replace supports, replace 
cables, utilise wireless network if available 
Bury cables, use RC design utility poles with deep concrete foundations, stockpile 
spare parts outside of expected inundation zone 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; 
McClelland 2011; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 
2005) 
Buried Cables Scour of backfill Replace backfill if cables undamaged Use well compacted backfill material, use erosion protection Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 






Use temporary supports, mount to temporary or 
existing bridges, rebuild utility bridge, utilise 
wireless network if available 
Install bumpers, elevate supports, use deep concrete foundations, mount to RC bridge, 
bury beneath waterway if possible 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Sagara & Ishiwatari 2012; Akiyama et al. 2013; 
Saatcioglu 2007; Tang & Edwards 2012; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Edwards 2006; Scawthorn et al. 2006; Iemura et al. 
2005; LRFD 2010) 
Exchange  
Centres 
Water damage to 
interiors and 
equipment 
Use mobile temporary exchange centre, use 
backup generators, reinstate or replace 
components, utilise wireless network if available 
Install water tight doors, locate outside of expected inundation zone, elevate exchange 
centre, use water tight housing on electrical panels, elevate generators, locate in 
multi-storey RC design building 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil 
Engineers 2005; Cruz et al. 2009; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Kwasinski 




Reinstate any severed lifeline connections, 
replace backfill 
Use well compacted backfill material, use deep concrete foundations, install erosion 
protection & flood controls 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Edwards 2006; Francis 2006; American Society 




Use mobile temporary exchange centre, replace, 
utilise wireless network if available 
Locate outside of expected inundation zone, use multi-storey RC design building, 
stockpile mobile temporary exchange centres & microwave repeaters outside of 
expected inundation zone 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; McClelland 2011; Tang 
& Edwards 2012; Cruz et al. 2009; PIANC Working Group 53 2009; 
Edwards 2006; American Society of Civil Engineers 2005) 
Switch Boxes 
Water damage to 
internal 
components 
Replace damaged components, utilise wireless 
network if available 
Stockpile spare parts outside of expected inundation zone, elevate on supports, install 
water tight seal on switch box housing 
Medium 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Matsuhashi et al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; 






 Debris strikes Repair damaged components, replace unit Install protection bumpers, elevate on supports or multi-storey RC design building Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 2010; Matsuhashi et 
al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Edwards 2006; 




Use temporary exchanges, replace unit, utilise 
wireless network if available 
Elevate on supports, bury unit, anchor to foundations, reinforce switch box housing, 
mount to RC design buildings, stockpile spare parts & units outside of expected 
inundation zone, locate outside of expected inundation zone if possible 
Low 
(Horspool & Fraser 2015; Iemura et al. 2005; LRFD 2010; Matsuhashi et 
al. 2012; Kwasinski 2013; Kwasinski & Tang 2012; Edwards 2006; 
American Society of Civil Engineers 2005; Scawthorn et al. 2006) 
 
 
 
